A TREATISE OF POLICY AND RELIGION.

PART. II.

Containing Inſtructions to a Young Statiſt.

Written about a 100 Years ſince By *Thomas Fitzherbert* Eſquire.

The Third Edition newly Reviſ'd, Divided into Four Tomes, and the *Engliſh* together with ſome accidental Errors Corrected.

By Me King's Reign, and Law-makers Ordain things that are Juſt.
Prov. 8. 15.

LONDON,
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TO

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS

THE

Prince of WALES.

SIR,

HAVING the laſt Year had the Honor of Dedicating the Firſt Part of this moſt Excellent Treatiſe to the King your Father; I Addreſs this Second to your Royal Highneſs: Nor will the Preſent, as I hope,

appear altogether improper, or unſeaſonable; even in reſpect of your Tender Years: Not Improper; becauſe it contains the moſt neceſſary Points, by which a Young and Vertuous Prince is to Steer the whole Courſe of a truly Glorious Life: Nor unſeaſonable; becauſe your Highneſs has already quitted the Trifles of Child-hood, and ſeems to excel others of your own Age in Ripeneſs of Capacity, as much almoſt as in Diſproportion of Birth.

Daniel when but about Twelve Years Old, knew more than the Wiſe Men of *Babylon*; the Royal Prophet *David* alſo, in the

the Bloſſom of his Youth, became moſt Eminent as well for his Knowledge, as Exploits: And that Heaven has not beſtow'd ſo Great a Pledge as your Royal Self upon us, in Vain; may appear by the vaſt Importance of your long Pray'd for Birth, by the great Conſequences of your Strange Preſervation, and by a wonderful Increaſe Daily of the many Graces, both of your Mind and Body; all which ſeem undoubted Tokens of farther Bleſſings.

But the more Forward and Precious a Plant is, with ſo much the greater Care ought it to be Fenc'd and Cultivated:

Your Highneſs therefore will ſtill Thrive and Flouriſh beſt, by having Good Men and Good Books about you; and amongſt the latter I hope this Solid and Pious Treatiſe of *Policy and Religion*, will not only find a place in your Cloſet, but it's Excellent Maxims will be ever Fix'd in your Mind.

Religion the Queen of Vertues will be properly the Governeſs of all your Actions and Motions; nor will you ever admit any *Policy*, but what is introduc'd by juſtice and Piety. On ſuch Foundations Thrones have their ſureſt Eſtabliſhment, and Princes become for ever Glorious. So will your Highneſs

continue,

continue, the Delight of the Loyal, the Comfort of the Faithful, and a Defender of the True Chriſtian Faith: And that you may be a Glorious Protector thereof, is conſtantly Hop'd and Pray'd for by Thouſands as well as

Royal SIR,

Your Highneſſes moſt Faithful, moſt Obedient, and moſt Humble Servant.

N. N.

A TREATISE OF Policy and Religion.

PART. II.

CHAP. I.

Certain General Rules or Advices no leſs Pious than Politic, for the Inſtruction of ſuch as deſire to manage matters of State, and have no experience therein; to the end they may act with leſs danger and difficulty.

FIRST, he that means to apply himſelf to matters of State, muſt ſee that his Intention be good and pure; that is, that he be not mov'd to it by vain Glory, Ambition, Covetouſneſs, or any other vicious or unlawful deſire; becauſe the ſame are too weak Founda-

tions to ſuſtain ſuch weighty Affairs; being accompany'd not only with the offence of God, but alſo with Paſſion, whereby Mans Judgment is blinded, and many times drawn to Error: And therefore the chief and principal Intention of a Statiſt, ought to be the Service of God, his Princes, and the Publick good of his Country; whereunto, every Man ought principally to direct and level all his Actions, which otherwiſe cannot be truly Vertuous and Wiſe, nor conform to the duty of a good Chriſtian, nor have the Bleſſing and Aſſiſtance of Almighty God, which is moſt requiſite for the good ſucceſs of all Mens Affairs. For as the Royal Prophet ſays; *Except our Lord Build the Houſe, they have Labor'd in Vain that Build it.*

2. This Foundation being layd, any buſineſs thô never ſo weighty and important may for four reaſons, be built thereupon. Firſt, becauſe a Mans Reaſon and Judgment being free from paſſion and ſelf-love, he ſhall more clearly and ſolidly both deliberate and act in all occaſions. Secondly, becauſe 'tis moſt likely that Almighty God ſeeing his good and pious Intention, will concur and co-operate with him in all his negotiations. Thirdly thô God, by reaſon of his ſecret Judgments, ſhould not bleſs and proſper his Actions, yet he will aſſuredly give him the reward of his good Intention: And laſtly, becauſe in caſe he ſhou'd fall into ſuch great difficulties and dangers as are incident to dealing in matters of State,

(a) Pſal. 126. 1.

yet

yet he will have the comfort and consolation of a good and clear Conscience, which as the Poët says, is: (*a*) *Murus aheneus*, *a brasen Wall*; and the most assur'd Anchor in all the Storms and Tempests of this Life; *Quæ etiam obruta delectat* which as *Seneca* says, do's delight even when 'tis oppress'd, or overwhelm'd.

3. Secondly, 'tis convenient for a Young Statist, to weigh very well and foresee the difficulties and dangers which he may probably incur, by dealing in matters of State, either throu' the nature and condition of the matters which he is to handle; or throu' the treachery and perfidiousness of those with whom he is to deal; or throu' the malice and emulations either publick or private, which are never wanting; or else throu' the jealousie of Princes, who, as *Comines* well notes; (*b*) easily suspect and mistrust their best Servants, in matters concerning their State; or lastly, throu' the uncertainty of the success of business, which is in no Mans power to warrant, as has been sufficiently prov'd. (*c*) By all which means we see many times most important matters miscarry, to the great grief, disgrace, and utter overthrow of the managers; especially, when they have not foreseen the same; whereas by consideration and foresight, they might perhaps have prevented the inconveniency, or at least have been better arm'd to bear their misfortune with patience.

(*a*) *Horat. lib.* 1. *ep. ad Mecenat. lib.* 4. *de benefici. cap.* 21. (*b*) *Phil. Comcron. Lodovic. lib.* 1. *cap.* 26. (*c*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 13.

4. Therefore *Plutarch* worthily compares improvident and unadvis'd managers, to one that ſhould fall before he were aware into a Coal Pit or Mine, where thô perhaps he eſcapes with Life, yet he commonly receives ſome hurt; or at leaſt is ſtrangely aſtoniſh'd and amaz'd, not only with the fall, but alſo with the obſcurity and horror of the place; which, to thoſe that go in of ſet purpoſe, and with reſolution to endure it, is nothing ſo noiſom or loathſom.

5. Thirdly, he ought always to obſerve three things, which I have largely prov'd throughout this whole Diſcourſe; the firſt is, the weakneſs of Mans Wit; ſecondly, the uncertainty of the ſucceſs of all Mens Actions; and thirdly, the Providence of God in the diſpoſition of all Human Affairs. Theſe three things, I ſay, every Statiſt ſhould have continually before his Eyes, to the end, that ſeeing his own infirmity, and the uncertainty of the ſucceſs of all his deſigns, he may conſider the danger he is in, as well of error in his determinations, as of ill ſucceſs in his actions; and conſequently have recourſe to the remedies ordain'd for the ſame, by the Providence and Mercy of God: According to the advice which old *Tobias* gave to his Son, for the direction of the whole courſe of his Life, to whom, amongſt many other excellent precepts, he gave this. (a) *Aſk Counſel of a Wiſe-man*, ſays he, *and continually bleſs and praiſe God, and beſeech him to direct all thy courſe, and let all thy Counſels be fix'd and ſettl'd in*

(a) Tobiæ, *cap.* 4. 19.

him

him. Thus ſays the *Holy Ghoſt* by the Mouth of *Tobias*, adviſing two things neceſſary, as to be practis'd by all Men, for the remedy of their natural weakneſs: Firſt, to take Counſel of Wiſe-men: Secondly, to beg God's aſſiſtance, becauſe we are not ſo abſolute of our ſelves, but that we need his help in all things, as I have ſufficiently prov'd, (*a*) nor that we are ſo govern'd and guided by Almighty God, as to contemn the help of Man: Such being the courſe of his Divine Providence in Human Affairs, that he works his Will not only in Men, but alſo by them, and with their co-operation; in which reſpect Saint *Paul* did not ſtick to call himſelf, and the other Apoſtles. (*b*) *God's Coadjutors*, in the Converſion of the *Gentils.*

6. Therefore as 'twere great folly, pride, and preſumption in Man, ſo to confide in himſelf, or in Human Wiſdom and Power, as to neglect the Providence and Aſſiſtance of God, ſo were it on the other ſide extream negligence, and even a tempting of God, ſo to rely upon him, as to contemn all Human help and Counſel: Which we may learn by the example of *Moyſes*, (*c*) who thô Inſtructed, Inſpir'd, and Conducted by Almighty God himſelf, yet refus'd not the good Counſel of *Jethro* for the manner of his Goverment, which Almighty God approv'd in him. As alſo on the other ſide King *David*, (*d*) thô

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 2. (*b*) 1 Cor. 3. 9. (*c*) Exod. *cap.* 18. (*d*) 1 Reg. 20. 2. Reg. 19. & 16. 1. Reg. *cap.* 21. 22. 24.

he took the Counſel of his Friends, Counſellors, and Servants, as of *Jonathas*, *Achitophel*, *Joab* and others, and us'd alſo his own prudence, as well in the deliberation, as in the execution of his Affairs, yet he never omitted to conſult Almighty God, by his Prophets and Prieſts when he conveniently could do it; and as I have ſignifi'd elſewhere, (*a*) crav'd continually the Aſſiſtance, Light, and Direction of Almighty God in all his Actions.

7. And this concurrence of Divine help with Human diligence, is notably expreſs'd in Scripture, where 'tis ſignifi'd that *Gedeon* gave order to his Souldiers to cry in their Conflict with the *Madianits*; (*b*) *To our Lord God, and to* Gedeon, *the Sword of God, and* Gedeon: And again, in the relation of the great Victory which *Aſa* King of *Juda* had againſt the *Æthiopians* the Scripture ſays, (*c*) *They were utterly overthrown, our Lord killing 'em, and the Army of* Aſa *fighting*, which is as much as to ſay, that Man do's his endeavor, and God giv's the good ſucceſs. This alſo the very Pagans knew, and obſerv'd ſo well, that *Plutarch* notes (*d*) it very ſeriouſly in the Battel betwixt *Perſeus* King of *Macedon*, and *Paulus Æmilius* the *Roman*. For whereas *Perſeus* when he ſhould have fought, withdrew himſelf from the Field under colour to Sacrifice to *Hercules*, he ſays, that God do's not uſe to favor ſuch Idle fellows that ſo preſume of

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 28. *n.* 23. (*b*) Iudic. *cap.* 7. 18. 20. (*c*) 2. Paralip. *cap.* 14. 13. (*d*) *Plutarch in P. Æmilio.*

his

His help, as they will do nothing themſelves: For God, ſays he, has ſo ordain'd, that he who will hit the Mark, muſt Shoot, and he who will win the Goal muſt Run, and he who will have the Victory, muſt Fight; and therefore God favor'd and help'd *Paulus Æmilius*, who crav'd force and Victory with his Arms in his Hands; *A dios rogando, y con la maça dando, Praying to God and laying on load with Club*, according to the *Spaniſh* Proverb.

8. But to ſay ſomething here particularly, of a ſpecial means to procure the help and aſſiſtance of God; nothing behoves a Statiſt more then daily to recommend his Actions to his Divine Majeſty, by fervent and devout Prayer; the force and benefit whereof is unſpeakable, no leſs in all kind of Temporal matters, than in Spiritual; for which we have not only our Saviors Doctrin and Warrant, (*a*) but alſo infinite examples of Holy and Wiſe Men, in both Divine and Prophane Hiſtories. Whilſt *Joſue* fought with the *Amalecits*, *Moyſes* Pray'd upon the Mountain, and obtain'd the Victory. The two *Anns* being Barren, were by Prayer made Mothers, the (*b*) one of the Prophet *Samuel*, and the (*c*) other of the Virgin *Mary*: (*d*) *Salomon* by Prayer obtain'd Wiſdom: (*e*) King *Ezechias* recover'd health, and had Victories againſt the *Aſſyrians*: The three (*f*) Chil-

(a) Matth. 6. & 7. Marc. 11. 24. Luc. 11. 2. Exod. *cap* 17. 11 (*b*) 1. Reg. *cap.* 1. (*c*) *S. Ioan. Damaſcen orat. de Nativ. B. Virg.* (*d*) 3. Reg. *cap.* 3. 9. (*e*) 4. Reg. *ca.* 19. 20. (*f*) Dan. 3.

dren were deliver'd from Fire: And to ſpeak of latter times, *Theodoſius* the Emperor ſurnam'd the Great, as Saint *Auſtin* witneſſes; (*a*) prevail'd againſt *Eugenius* the Tyrant, more by Prayer than by force: The like is alſo teſtifi'd by grave Writers, of (*b*) *Narſes* the Eunuch, Lieutenant to *Juſtin* the Emperor, whoſe great Victories were attributed to his Prayers, and great Devotion towards the Bleſſed Virgin *Mary*, who as (*c*) *Evagrius* affirms, appear'd to him many times before his Battels, and gave him Directions for the ſame.

9. In like manner the famous overthrows, which *Heraclius* the Emperor gave to *Coſroes* King of *Perſia*, of whom he recover'd *Jeruſalem*, and all the Eaſtern Parts, are aſcrib'd by the beſt Hiſtorians that writ thereof, (*d*) to the great Devotion and Prayers which he partly us'd, and partly procur'd for the good ſucceſs of that War, wherein divers Miraculous accidents happen'd, which I omit for brevity ſake. We read alſo in our Engliſh Hiſtories, (*e*) that King *Ethelred*, Elder Brother to the famous *Alfred*, or *Alured*, Founder of the Univerſity of *Oxford*, being encamp'd againſt the *Danes*, and advertis'd by his Captains at ſuch time as he was going to Maſs, that the Enemy aſſail'd his Camp, bad them attend to the defence there-

(*a*) *Aug. de Civitate Dei lib.* 5. *cap.* 26. (*b*) *Procop. de bello Gothico.* (*c*) *Evagrius li.* 4. *cap.* 23. (*d*) *Paul. Diaco. lib.* 18. *Cedren. Theophan. Naucler. Bar. an* 621. 622. 623. (*e*) *Gul. Malmeſ. de geſt. Reg. Angl. lib.* 1. *cap.* 3. *Roger de Hoveden Annal. par.* 1. *an.* 871. *Baron. an. eodem.*

of,

of, for he muſt hear Maſs before he wou'd go out of his Tent, as he was daily accuſtom'd to do: In the mean time his Brother *Alfred* with the reſt of his Captains, who joyn'd Battel with the Enemy, were in great danger to be overthrown, where King *Etheldred* having heard Maſs, came himſelf in Perſon, and finding his Souldiers already flying away, he recall'd 'em to the Battel, thruſting himſelf into the midſt thereof, (*a*) *Cujus virtute, & Dei miraculo; by whoſe Valour, and the Miraculous help of God,* ſays the Hiſtorian, the *Danes* were put to flight, and their King Slain, with divers of his Nobility, and many thouſands of the Souldiers.

10. Alſo in the Spaniſh Hiſtory, we have an admirable example of the wonderful force and effect of Prayer, in a Noble Man of *Caſtile*, call'd *Hernandes Antolino*, in the time of *Garſias Hernandes* Count of *Caſtile*, who had great Wars with the *Moors*. (*b*) This *Antolino* being no leſs Devout than Valiant, was wont to ſpend many hours every day in Prayer, and going one day to Pray before a Battel, which the Count of *Caſtile* was to give to the *Moors*, he was ſo abſorpt, and raviſh'd with Devotion, that he forgot himſelf, and continu'd therein during the whole time of the Battel, wherein nevertheleſs it pleas'd God to ſhew viſibly, that his Prayers profited, and prevail'd more, than his preſence could have done: For one in his ſhape and Armour, and upon his

(*a*) *Gul. Malmeſ. ubi. ſupra.* (*b*) *Veſſæ. chron. an.* 941.

Horſe;

Horſe, made ſuch Slaughter amongſt the Enemies that they were forc'd to fly: Inſomuch that the Count, and all the Army being fully perſuaded, that they had won the Battel by the means of *Antolino*, ſought for him to give him the thanks and praiſe, which they thought his great Valour deſerv'd, and thô they found him not in the Field, but in his Tent, much aſham'd of his abſence, yet aſſuring themſelves that they ſaw both his Horſe, and Armour in the Battel, they caus'd 'em to be produc'd, and then it appear'd as well by the wounds and wearineſs of the Horſe, as by the ſigns of the blows upon his Armour, that ſome Angel had us'd 'em in his ſtead, and that God had giv'n 'em Victory throu' the Merit of his Prayers.

11. To this purpoſe alſo may ſerve thoſe examples, of the famous Victory of *Edward* the III. King of *England*, againſt the *French* at *Creſſy* in *Picardy*; and of the *Chriſtians* againſt the *Turks* at *Lepanto* in our days; as alſo of many other Miraculous Victories, whereof I have made ample relation (*a*) heretofore out of approv'd Authors, and therefore I remit the Reader thereunto, and end with the ſentence of Saint *Chryſoſtom* concerning Prayer: (*b*) *The force of Prayer has extinguiſh'd the force of Fire, ſhut up the mouth of Lyons, giv'n victories in war, appeas'd ſtorms, and tempeſts, expell'd Devils, open'd the gates of Heaven, broken the bands of Death, cur'd Diſeaſes, reconcil'd Enemies, deliver'd*

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 15. (*b*) *Chryſoſt. de nat. Dei, hom.* 5.

Cities

Cities from Earthquakes, and defended 'em as well from the puniſhment of God, as from the treaſons, and attempts of Men; Finally, it has overcome all ſorts of Evil. So powerful is Prayer when 'tis accompany'd with ſuch circumſtances as are requiſite to make the ſame acceptable to Almighty God, whereof I omit to ſpeak here, becauſe it properly belongs to thoſe that write expreſly of Spiritual matters.

12. Moreover as to what concerns Human Counſel, the Holy Ghoſt gives a notable advice, ſaying, (*a*) *My Son do nothing without Counſel, and thou wilt not afterwards repent thee*, and again, (*b*) *Thoſe who do all things with Counſel are govern'd with Wiſdom.* And I hold this point to be abſolutly neceſſary, not only for Young Men, or others of ſmall experience, but alſo for the Eldeſt and moſt expert: For *Nemo omnibus horis ſapit; No Man is wiſe at all hours.* And as the Proverb ſay'd: *Two Eyes ſee more than one:* And therefore the famous *Scipio Africanus* conſulted all his Affairs with *Cajus Lælius*; and *Cicero* confeſſes that in his Conſulſhip, he did nothing without the advice of the Philoſopher *Publius Nigidius*; and therefore Princes have divers Counſellors, that matters being ponder'd by different perſons, all circumſtances may be duly examin'd and conſider'd: For as *Salomon* ſays: (*c*) *Plots and deſigns are Confirm'd, where there are many Counſellors*; for ſome find out one inconveniency, ſome another; ſome one re-

(*a*) Eccleſ. *cap.* 32. 24. (*b*) Prov. 13. 10. (*c*) Prov. 15. 22.

medy

medy, and ſome another; whereof I ſhall have occaſion to ſay more hereafter.

13. Wherefore I conclude for the preſent, that a young Statiſt following the Rule and Counſel of *Tobias*, that is to ſay, fixing his heart and hopes upon Almighty God, adding the continual uſe of devout and fervent Prayer, to Human Counſel and diligence; and joyning thereby the *Wiſdom of the Serpent, with the Simplicity of the Dove*, (*a*) Piety with Policy, gifts of Grace with ability of Nature; and finally, the Wiſdom of God with the Prudence of Man, ſhall deliberate and work in all occaſions, no leſs proſperouſly then wiſely.

14. Fourthly, it imports very much, that after mature conſultation of any matter of State, and ſerious recommendation thereof to Almighty God, the time of Action muſt not be defer'd by needleſs delays, when the matter is once determin'd; for time may ſo alter the State of any affair, be it never ſo well and wiſely reſolv'd, that the opportunity of execution may utterly be loſt, and the buſineſs thereby; and therefore the Common Proverb adviſes. *To ſtrike while the Iron is hot*; for as the Poët ſays: (*b*) *Nocuit differre paratis: Delay is always hurtful, to thoſe who are ready to execute*; eſpecially in matters wherein there is any competency of Enemies, who ever watch diligently to take all opportunities and do often profit very much, by the negligences and delays of their Adverſaries.

(*a*) Matth. *cap.* 10. 16. (*b*) *Lucan. lib.* 1.

15. And

15. And thô this advice is neceſſary in all matters of State, yet 'tis moſt requiſite in Warlike Affairs; wherein we ſee many times, that ſpeed and diligence is of greater importance than force; for ſpeed being commonly accompany'd with ſudden terror and fear, opens the way to ſmall force, and enables the ſame, to work great effects: And therefore *Agathocles* one of the Tyrants of *Sicily*, having but a few Souldiers, and exhorting 'em to the ſpeedy and ſudden Invaſion of *Carthage*, ſayd; (a) *In repentino metu, non modicum Victoriæ momentum*; *Sudden fear will be of no ſmall moment and importance for the obtaining of the Victory*; which was prov'd to be true by the Event, and is daily ſeen by the experience of camiſad's or ſurpriſes, and all other ſudden enterpriſes of War.

16. To conclude this advice, one general Rule is to be held, that to delay time is never good, but in three caſes. The firſt, when matters are not maturely conſulted, and well digeſted, wherein nevertheleſs all due diligence is to be us'd, leſt time and opportunity of action be ſpent, and loſt in conſultation. The ſecond caſe is, when there is ſome juſt and important impediment in the execution. The third is, in caſes of extremity which paſs a Mans Power and Wiſdom to help; for then the only remedy is to gain time, which produces many accidents that could never be foreſeen and imagin'd, and diſcovers ſoveraign remedies for the moſt deſperate caſes; and therefore

(a) *Juſtin. lib.* 22.

Pericles

Pericles was wont to ſay: (*a*) *That Time is the wiſeſt Counſellor that is.*

17. Fifthly, let every young Statiſt conſider and meaſure his own ability, to the end he undertakes not any matter above his reach or capacity; for no Man how excellent ſoever he be, is ſo perfect that he excels in all things, and therefore the Poëts fain'd that the Gods themſelves had not all gifts alike, but that ſome excell'd in one, and ſome in another; and the Apoſtle ſays that God differently diſtributes his Gifts unto Men; (*b*) *Dividing 'em unto every one as it pleaſes him*; to the end we may have need one of another. And this alſo, common experience teaches; for ſome excel in depth of Judgment, others in ſharpneſs of Wit, others in Eloquence, others in Memory, others in Science and Learning, and ſome in one kind, ſome in another.

18. Now then, 'tis convenient for every one to weigh very well his own Talents, and how they ſuite with the buſineſs in which he is to be employ'd; as if he be to perſuade, whether he have the gift of Utterance and Eloquence? If he be to paſs Covenants and Agreements, Leagues or Marriages, whether he be a Lawyer? If he be to treat of matters of War, whether he be a Souldier? And ſo in like caſes; for otherwiſe he will prove, *Aſinus ad lyram*, *an Aſs at a Harp*, as the Proverb ſays, and not only diſgrace himſelf and them that ſent him, but alſo looſe his labor and his buſineſs.

(*a*) *Plutarch in Pericle.* (*b*) 1. Cor. *cap.* 12. 11.

19. They

19. They that err in this point, are thoſe commonly which either have ſuch an inordinate deſire to be meddling in great matters, that they care not what they undertake, ſo they be doing; or elſe have an extraordinary conceit of their own wit and ſufficiency; and therefore as 'twill be good for every one to moderate in himſelf, the deſire of dealing; ſo alſo to remedy the latter, 'twill be ſecure for any Man, in my opinion, not to rely wholy on his own Judgment concerning his ſufficiency; but partly upon the Judgment of others; rather receiving the employment from his Prince or other Superiors, than offering or intruding himſelf into it, till he have made ſome good trial of himſelf; for by that means if the buſineſs ſucceed, he ſhall have the thanks and honor of it, and if it ſucceed otherwiſe, he ſhall avoid great part of the blame.

20. But if he find that his Superiors know him not, ſo well as he knows himſelf, and that they would employ him in matters, wherein he has neither experience nor ability; 'twill be leſs ſhame for him to confeſs his defect, and either to refuſe the Commiſſion; or elſe to crave an aſſociate furniſh'd with the parts he wants, rather than accept the charge, and fail in its performance; (*a*) *Moyſes* being Commanded, by Almighty God to go in Embaſſy to *Pharao* King of *Egypt*, for the delivery of the Children of *Iſraël*, humbly excus'd himſelf as unfit for ſo weighty a charge, by reaſon of the impediment in his

(*a*) Exod. *cap.* 3.

Speech,

Speech, for remedy whereof God gave him an aſſiſtant, to wit, his Brother *Aaron*, who being very Eloquent might ſpeak for 'em both. Whereby not only Subjects, who are to be employ'd, may learn to conſider and acknowledge their own defects; but alſo Princes may learn ſo to employ their Subjects, that one may have the parts that another wants, and ſupply each one the defects of another.

21. Sixthly, 'twill not be amiſs in my opinion for a young beginner, to enter into his firſt practiſe with matters of ſmall importance, and to proceed to greater by degrees, as his experience and ability, ſhall grow and increaſe: Like to the wiſe Phyſician, who when he begins to practiſe, takes in hand eaſie Cures, and meddles not with inveterate and dangerous diſeaſes, till he has got both experience and credit: And ſo I would wiſh a young beginner to do in theſe matters, to fly buſineſs of great weight and difficulty, and rather to procure at the firſt, ſome honorable Commiſſion or Embaſſy of Congratulation, or Condoling, including ſome overture of an important Treaty, rather than to deal in the Treaty it ſelf, which requires great practiſe, experience, and Wiſdom.

22. And if he be employ'd in any ſuch Treaty I would wiſh him to be contented rather to be Second, or Aſſiſtant, than chief in Commiſſion, and ſo to grow for a while like the Vine or Ivy, by the ſupport of another Tree. Or if his dignity be ſuch as cannot admit a ſecond place, to procure as much as may be to have ſuch aſſiſtants,

as

as are not only Men of ſound Judgments and Wiſdom, but alſo his ſincere friends; ſuch being commonly the emulation and ambition in Courts, that he may otherwiſe make account that his own aſſociates, will curiouſly obſerve every little error, and from thence take the advantage of advancing their own credit.

23. To which purpoſe 'tis to be conſider'd that the *Lacedemonians* us'd to chuſe ſuch to ſend on their Embaſſies as were either publick, or at leaſt ſecret Enemies, to the end that one of 'em might ſerve for a Spy over the others actions; the like ſtill may be, and is no doubt many times us'd. And *Philip Comines* notes (*a*) of *Lewis* the XI. King of *France*, that he was wont ſometimes, when he ſent a great Embaſſador, to give ſecret Commiſſions apart to ſome meaner Man in his Company, uſing the other for a ſhew and for matters of complement, or perhaps to the end he might bear the greateſt part of the charges of the Embaſſy, as commonly great Men do, rather than for the diſpatch of important affairs; and the like of both theſe examples may well be practis'd by Princes when they ſend great Embaſſadors; eſpecially when he who is chief in Commiſſion, is raw and unexpert; and therefore 'twill be convenient for ſuch a one to conſider the ſame may happen to himſelf, to the end he may the better look to his own carriage, and procure to have about him wiſe and aſſur'd friends to adviſe him, leſt otherwiſe his own aſſiſtants let him commit ſome groſs errors, and ſo

(*a*) *Philip. Comines cron. du Roy Louis. cap.* 26.

handle the matter, that all the negotiation turn to their honor by the diſcovery of his weakneſs.

24. And this he may fear not only in his fellow aſſociates in Commiſſion, but alſo in his followers and Servants; amongſt whom ſome one of more wit and talents then the reſt, may ſeek to take advantage of his Maſters weakneſs; as it happen'd to an Embaſſador whom I knew, whoſe Secretary noting in him ſome negligence in the diſpatch of advices, when occaſion requir'd, prevented commonly his Maſters Letters with his own; moreover, being employ'd by his Maſter to procure advices and intelligences, he conceal'd the moſt important matters from him, and writ 'em himſelf to ſome principal Counſellors, whoſe favor he gain'd ſo far, that they procur'd his advancement at his return, whereas thé Embaſſador was held unworthy of farther preferment, and liv'd ever after in diſgrace.

25. Seventhly, I wou'd adviſe a young beginner not to charge himſelf with many matters at once, as ſome do who cannot endure to ſee any Man employ'd but themſelves; whence it follows, that ſome one, or two buſineſſes ſucceeding ill, as commonly among many ſome do, they receive more diſgrace, than reputation or thanks for all the reſt, thô they ſucceed never ſo well: Wherefore 'tis wiſdom for any Man, eſpecially for ſuch as are Novices in State Affairs, to take in hand but few matters, and to diſpatch 'em well; like a Man that has but a weak Stomach, is to take heed, that he neither overcharge it with the quantity, nor yet peſter it with variety of Meats, becauſe

becauſe one will hinder the diſgeſtion of the other.

26. This I wiſh the favorites of Princes wou'd ſeriouſly conſider, who many times deſiring to have all in their own hands, ſtick not to charge themſelves with much more, than they are able to diſpatch in due manner and ſeaſon, to the exceeding great prejudice, as well of particular Men, as of the whole State in general: Whereby they expoſe not only themſelves, but alſo their Princes to ſuch hatred of the Nobility and People, that there follow many times Commotions and Rebellions; inſomuch, that their Princes are either forc'd to abandon 'em to their Enemies, or elſe to periſh with 'em: As to omit forraign examples, we have ſeen by experience in *England*, in the time of King *Edward* the II. and King *Richard* the II. (*a*) againſt whom the Nobility and Commons took up Arms, for the hatred they bore their favorites, *Pierce Gaveſton*, the two *Spencers*, *Robert Vere* Earl of *Oxford*, and others their Adherents; upon whoſe perſons they diſcharg'd their fury, exerciſing on 'em all kind of Cruelty, except upon the Earl of *Oxford*, who ſav'd his Life by flight into *Holland*, and ended his Days in Baniſhment; and hereunto, alſo may partly be aſcrib'd, the unfortunate Deaths of both thoſe Kings, who were afterwards Depos'd and Cruelly Murder'd.

27. Eighthly, nothing is more neceſſary in handling matters of State than ſecrecy, I mean matters intended or conſulted before they come to

(*a*) *Pollid. Virg. in Hiſt. Angl.*

execution, for they are like a Mine which having any vent, is wholy useless, and of no effect; therefore, *Peter* King of *Aragon*, being ask'd of Pope *Martin* the IV. what he meant to do with the great Fleet wherewith afterwards he recover'd *Sicily* from the *French*, answer'd, that if he thought his Shirt knew it, he wou'd burn it.

28. But because I am to speak of this Point of secrecy hereafter, (*a*) I will here give only one general Rule to be held and practis'd of young Statists, which is not to communicate any important matter of State to any Man whatsoever, except he be to be employ'd, or his Counsel to be us'd; and whosoever fail's in this point, is not fit to handle any matter of importance, nor shall ever have credit with Princes, who esteem nothing more in their Servants than secrecy; insomuch, that a Prince in these our days, whom for some respects I forbear to name, caus'd a faithful Servant of his, whom he also lov'd very dearly, to be kill'd, for fear he shou'd reveal a secret which by chance he came to know; whereby we may see how dangerous a thing it is, to be partakers of the secrets of Princes; therefore *Philippides* the Comedian being will'd by King *Lysimachus* to ask some favor of him, *Beseech'd him to do him what favor he thought fit, so he imparted to him none of his secrets.* (*b*)

29. Ninthly, a young Statist is to have special care to avoid all kind of unlawful employments;

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Cap.* 2. *nu.* 17. (*b*) *Plutarch* in his Treatise of talking too much.

as

as to be inſtrument of any wickedneſs for his Princes Service; for beſides the offence to God, who will aſſuredly puniſh the ſame ſooner or later, he may well think that his Prince alſo will never truſt him after, howſoever he be ſatisfi'd with this his Service for the preſent; for Princes many times are content to take the benefit of a Service done by evil means, and yet ever after ſuſpect and hate, the malicous nature and diſpoſition of him that did it, whom they uſe no otherwiſe then Poyſon, only to ſerve their turn, thô they deteſt the malignity of it: And therefore *Auguſtus Cæſar* was wont to ſay! *I Love the Treaſon, but I hate the Traytor*, (*a*) and all wiſe Princes hold it for a Rule, that where there is no bridle of Conſcience and fear of God, there is no fidelity to be expected towards Man.

30. We Read, that *Conſtantius Cæſar*, Father to the Emperor *Conſtantin* the great, having commanded that all ſuch Chriſtians as wou'd not Adore his God's, ſhou'd depart from his Service, Baniſh'd nevertheleſs all thoſe who deny'd their Faith, and retain'd the other in his Service and favor; whereof he gave this reaſon, that thoſe that had ſo little Conſcience as to be falſe to their God, could not be true to him. And *Henry* the V. King of *England*, preſently after his Fathers Death, Baniſh'd from his Court all ſuch as had been Counſellors, Inſtruments or Companions of his Riots before; perſuading himſelf, that they

(*a*) *Plutarch* in his Apotheg. of Kings and Captives.

were not to be truſted about his Perſon; and ſo it commonly happens, when Princes are wiſe and enter into the due conſideration of themſelves and their Conſciences.

31. But ſuch other Princes that give themſelves to Vice and Sin, and make no Conſcience of any thing, do not only diſavow their own Commiſſions, after ſome wicked act is committed by their order, but alſo uſe to pick quarrels, or take very ſmall occaſions to make away the inſtruments of their own wickedneſs; either to rid themſelves of the ſuſpition, and infamy thereof, or for the jealouſie they have of the malignant natures of their inſtruments, or for fear they ſhou'd diſcover their practiſes if they live, or ſometimes for other reſpects; God ſo diſpoſing, by his juſt judgments, to make 'em the executors of his juſtice upon thoſe, who prefer'd their Service before his.

32. So *Alexander* the Great at his Fathers Obſequies, commanded publick Juſtice to be done upon thoſe, whom he had himſelf ſecretly employ'd to kill him. (*a*) So did *Tiberius* Emperor diſavow his Commiſſion giv'n to a Souldier to kill *Agrippa*, (*b*) telling him, that he ſhou'd anſwer the matter before the Senat; and alſo put to death *Seianns* his great favorit, and inſtrument of much miſchief. And in like manner *Cæſar Borgia* delt with a favorit of his; and *Henry* the VIII. King of *England* with ſome Counſellors and

(*a*) *Iuſtin. lib.* 11. (*b*) *Tacit. lib.* 1. *anal.*

Servants

Servants of his; (*a*) ſo alſo have ſome others in theſe our days, been made away by ſundry devices in divers Courts and Countries, when they had ſerv'd the turn of ſome great Perſons, whom for juſt reſpects I forbear to name; which may ſerve for an advertiſment and warning to all Men, to take heed how they ſuffer themſelves to be employ'd by any Man, in unlawful matters and offenſive to God: Wherefore *Fœlix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum*; *He is happy who can take heed by other Mens harms.*

33. My Tenth advice to a young Statiſt, is, that if his Prince do's him the honor to make him of his Council, he conſider well what is the duty of a Counſellor; to which purpoſe I will ſet down ſome Rules, wherein nevertheleſs I mean not to frame an Idea of an exact Counſellor as *Cicero* did of an Orator, and *Xenophon* of a Prince, and *Caſtilion* of a Courtier; neither do I take upon me to adviſe old Counſellors, whoſe experience muſt needs ſurpaſs mine, but only to give ſome precautions, to ſuch as have not any great experience or practice in matters of State, and becauſe it requires a larger Diſcourſe than were convenient to proſecute in this Chapter, it ſhall ſerve for the Subject of the next.

(*a*) *Sand. lib. 8. de Sciſm. Ang. Ioan. Stow in Hen. 8. & aliis.*

CHAP. II.

Other General Rules for a young Statiſt, advanc'd by his Princes favor, to be of his Council; as what he is to conſider in himſelf, in his Prince, and in the matters that are to be Conſulted. And firſt concerning the Counſellor himſelf.

THE Points that are principally to be conſider'd by a young Counſellor, thô they may be devided into many heads, yet may be reduc'd to three; the firſt concerning himſelf, the ſecond concerning his Prince, and the third touching the matters to be Conſulted; of all which I will ſay ſomewhat, with all the perſpicuity, and brevity I am able.

2. As for what concerns himſelf, he is to regard chiefly eight points. The firſt is, that he procur's by all means not only to have the Reputation of Vertue and Religion, but alſo to be indeed truly Vertuous and Religious; and this for two reaſons: The firſt to obtain the aſſiſtance of God's Grace, which how neceſſary it is for the illumination of Man's underſtanding in all matters of Counſel, appears throughout this whole Diſcourſe, eſpecially in the 28*th.* Chapter (*a*)

(*a*) Tom. 1. *nu.* 3. 4. 5. 7. *&c.*

where

where I have prov'd that true Wiſdom, Prudence and Policy, are the ſpecial gifts of Almighty God, and not otherways to be obtain'd, but by the obſervance of his Commandments.

3. The other cauſe why it behoves a Counſellor to be truly Religious and Vertuous, is, becauſe ſuch is the force of Vertue, that it gives credit to the poſſeſſors, and makes 'em more eaſily believ'd, and their Counſel better accepted; therefore we ſee that all Men of diſcretion and judgment, demand Counſel rather of thoſe that are reputed Wiſe and Vertuous, than of wicked Men, who have only the Reputation of Wiſdom; for as Saint *Ambroſe* ſays, (*a*) *Where wiſdom and vertue are united, there good and wholſome Counſel is to be had, and all Men are willing to hear the wiſe and vertuous Man, as well out of admiration of his wiſdom, as for the love of his vertue*; in which reſpect, he alſo ſays, that Men commonly addreſs themſelves to thoſe, for Counſel, that are more Vertuous than themſelves: *For no Man has reaſon to think him, who is inferior to himſelf in vertue and manners, to be his ſuperior in wiſdom and counſel.* (*b*)

4. Moreover, ſuch is the Dignity and Authority of Vertue, that even ill Men bear a reſpect to it, and ſtand as 'twere, in awe of thoſe that are good: Whereof we have an example in *Herod*, who thô he kept Saint *John Baptiſt* in Priſon, and wou'd not follow his Counſel in the matter of his Divorce, yet out of the Reverence he had to his

(*a*) *Amb. de Offic. li. 2. cap. 10.* (*b*) *Amb. ibid.*

Vertue,

Vertue, he conſulted many other things with him, and follow'd his advice; and as the Scripture ſays, (*a*) *He fear'd him*; and no doubt but Wiſe and Vertuous Princes, much more eſteem and reſpect the Counſel of Wiſe Men that are Vertuous, than of others of equal Wit and Judgment that are vicious and wicked; knowing that, as *Solomon* ſays, (*b*) *The Counſels of the wicked are fraudulent*, and that he who has no care of his Conſcience and Duty towards God, will have leſs care of his Duty towards Men.

3. The ſecond point is, that he giv's ſatisfaction to the World of his Wiſdom, by the good and wiſe goverment of his Family; for no Wiſe Prince can think him a fit Man to Counſel him, or to govern under him, that cannot govern himſelf, and his own Family; therefore *Baſil* the Emperor advis'd his Son, to chooſe thoſe for his Counſellors who had given proof and experience of their Wiſdom, in the good conduct and direction of their own private affairs; whereupon Saint *Ambroſe* ſays, (*c*) *An Idoneum putabo, qui mihi det conſilium, qui non dat ſibi? Can I think him fit to Counſel me, who cannot Counſel himſelf?* For he that is a Fool in his own buſineſs, can never be Wiſe in the affairs of other Men. And therefore Saint *Paul* declaring the duty of a Biſhop, requires that he be ſuch a one, as governs well his own Family; becauſe ſays he, (*d*) *If a Man cannot govern his own Houſe, how ſhall he*

(*a*) Marc. c. 6. 20. (*b*) Prov. c. 12. 5. (*c*) *Amb. lib. 2. de Offic. cap.* 112: (*d*) 1 Timo. 3. 5.

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ſhew his diligence in governing the Church of God?

6. The third point is, that in all his Speeches and Conferences with his Prince, he uſe all ſincerity, truth and plainneſs, without flattery; for thô the common Proverb ſays, (*a*) *Obſequium amicos, veritas odium parit*; *Flattery gains friends, and truth hatred*; yet as there is nothing more pernicious to Princes than flattery, ſo conſequently, there is nothing more unfit to be us'd by Counſellors; whoſe office and ſpecial care ſhou'd be, to undeceive their Prince in all things, wherein they are deceiv'd; and to labor therein ſo much the more, by how much leſs other Men do it; ſeeing one of the greateſt misfortunes of Princes, is, that all, or moſt Men flatter and ſooth 'em in all things, and few or none deal plainly or ſincerely with 'em; in which reſpect *Seneca* ſays, (*b*) *Quid omnia poſſidentibus deeſt? Ille qui verum dicat*; *what wants he who has all? One to tell him truth*; which therefore a faithful Counſellor ſhou'd do; for otherwiſe the Prince wou'd live in continual error and ignorance of his own State, and eſpecially of his own imperfections, and in great danger of ruin; for as *Curtius* ſays very well, (*c*) *The States of Princes are oftener overthrown by flattery, than by force.*

7. Nevertheleſs, if the Counſellor has occaſion to admoniſh his Prince of any error or fault of his, he ought to do it with great diſcretion and

(*a*) *Terent. in Andr.* (*b*) *Seneca de beneficijs lib. 6. cap. 30.* (*c*) *Quint. Curt. lib. 8.*

moderation,

moderation, *uſing*, as *Mandane* Mother to *Cyrus* was wont to ſay, (*a*) *words of Silk, and Launcing the Sore like a good Surgeon, with ſuch dexterity that he may cure without hurting*, neither exaſperating his Prince, nor making him thereby leſs capable of his good Counſel; thoſe that offend in this kind are commonly ſuch as preſume too much on their own wits, and power, or of their Princes weakneſs, or his over great favor and familiarity, or the need he has of 'em; or elſe perhaps are of a ſevere, inſolent, or paſſionate nature; for ſuch ſometimes forget themſelves, and take a Pride in contradicting or admoniſhing their Princes with leſs duty and reſpect than 'tis convenient for 'em to do.

8. Such a one was *Caliſthenes*, of whom *Aranius* writes, (*b*) that he made himſelf odious to *Alexander* the great; *Tum ob intempeſtiuam libertatem, tum ob ſuperbam ſtultitiam*; *Both for his unſeaſonable liberty of Speech, and alſo for his proud folly.* Such a one alſo was a Philoſopher that liv'd in the Court of *Dionyſius* the Elder, Tyrant of *Sicily*; (*c*) for the Tyrant being delighted with his own Poems, was us'd to impart 'em publickly, to certain Philoſophers who liv'd in his Court, to have their opinions; amongſt which there was one, who cou'd not flatter, nor endure the vanity of the Tyrants humor, but told him plainly, that his Verſes were nothing worth, and that 'twas a ſhame to hear 'em; upon which the Tyrant was

(*a*) *Plutarch*, in his Treatiſe of flattery. (*b*) *Arran. li.* 8. *de rebus Alex.* (*c*) *Plutarch.*

ſo

ſo offended, that he commanded his Guard to take him preſently away, and carry him to the Mines, to work amongſt condemn'd perſons: Afterwards, the ſame Philoſopher being releas'd, and return'd to the Court at the requeſt of his friends, it chanc'd, that the Tyrant caus'd a certain Poem of his own to be Read in the preſence of him, and of all the other Philoſophers, commanding 'em to ſpeak their opinions of it; all the reſt extoll'd the work to the Skies, ſome praiſing the invention, and others the vein and grace of the Verſe, every one ſtriving who ſhou'd commend 'em moſt, until it came to the turn of this Philoſopher; who inſtead of giving his Cenſure, call'd ſuddenly the Guards of the Tyrant, ſaying, *Come my Maſters, carry me away to the Mines, for I cannot endure this extream folly*; and the Tyrant, as it happen'd, being in a good humor took it not ill, but was content to turn it to a Jeſt, which he laugh'd heartily at.

9. But this Philoſopher, ſeeking to avoid *Silla*, fell into *Charibdis*; for by flying baſe flattery, he fell into another extremity, of impudent inſolency, which is no leſs unfit and abſurd for Counſellors; who are to imitate the diſcreet and prudent modeſty of *Hephæſtion* Counſellor to *Alexander* the great; for tho he always admoniſh'd *Alexander* diſcreetly and freely as occaſion ſerv'd, yet he ever did it in ſuch a manner, as that it ſeem'd rather to be *Alexanders* will and pleaſure he ſhou'd do ſo, than that he challeng'd any ſuch right to himſelf. (*a*) The like ſtill ought a

(*a*) *Q. Curtius de reb. geſtis Alexand.*

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Counſellor to uſe in contradicting or admoniſhing his Prince, obſerving exactly his diſpoſition and humor; becauſe no Man is always alike diſpos'd to receive contradiction, or to hear of his faults, eſpecially in the preſence of others; wherefore fit time and place is always to be choſen for that purpoſe, and ſome plauſible preamble to be us'd of the Princes praiſes for ſome of his good parts, which in ſuch a caſe is no flattery; but a ſpur to vertue, and may ſerve for a preparative to the Pill of admonition he means to give him; which he muſt give in ſo good terms, and with ſuch dutiful reſpect, that the Prince may perceive it proceeds not from paſſion, or a Spirit of contradiction, audacious inſolency, or contempt, all which are moſt odious to Princes, but from an entire love and affection towards him; for ſo he will, if prudent, take the admonition in good part, and ſay with *Solomon*, (*a*) that *a wound from a friend, is better than the kiſs of an Enemy.*

10. To conclude, a Counſellor may keep this Rule, to ſpeak always thus freely to the Prince himſelf, thô it be of his errors; but never to others of him; but in his honor and commendation, and thô the Prince be never a whit the better for his admonition, yet 'tis ſufficient he has done his duty, and thereby freed himſelf from being partaker of his Princes faults, as otherwiſe he wou'd be, if he ſhou'd not in all dutiful manner adviſe and admoniſh him, as occaſion requires: And therefore thô he ſhou'd fear to incur his

(*a*) Prov. *cap.* 27. *ver.* 6.

diſpleaſure

diſpleaſure for his plainneſs, yet he ought to diſcharge his Conſcience, and to ſay as *Themiſtocles* ſayd to *Eurybides*, (*a*) (who took up a Staff to ſtrike him for his freedom of Speech) *Strike me, ſo you but hear me afterwards.* Finally, a Counſellor ſhou'd not expect that his Prince ſhou'd always follow his advice, nor much afflict himſelf if he do's not: For thô Princes give their Counſellors great liberty to ſay what they will, yet they reſerve a greater to themſelves, to do what they pleaſe.

11. The fourth point, that a Counſellor is to conſider in himſelf, is, that it behoves him, to be grave and conſtant in his opinions; for levity and inconſtancy is a moſt evident ſign of folly. And to this end 'twill be neceſſary for him to deliberate maturely, and conſider fully the matter propounded, before he giv's his opinion; for as *Seneca* ſays, (*b*) *Sunt duo contraria conſilio, feſtinatio & ira*; *Two things are contrary to Counſel, haſt, and anger*; and again, *Deliberandum eſt diu quod ſtatuendum eſt ſemel*; *The thing that is once to be determin'd, is to be deliberated at leiſure*; and to the ſame purpoſe *Ariſtotle* ſays, (*c*) *That a wiſe Man ought to Counſel ſlowly, and to execute quickly.*

12. Wherefore he excludes very young Men from Counſel in matters of State, becauſe their natural heat, ſays he, makes 'em over haſty in giving their opinions, and by reaſon of their want of experience, many reaſons, or difficulties occur not to them to be conſider'd, in which

(*a*) *Plu. in Themiſto.* (*b*) *Seneca in proverbiis. Ibid.* (*c*) *Ariſt. 6. Ethic.*

reſpect

reſpect they reſolve eaſily, haſtily, and with leſs judgment; whereas Ancient Men both by reaſon of their cooler temper, and alſo of their greater experience, which gives 'em more matter of Diſcourſe, and more doubts to be reſolv'd, determin ſlowly and with far more judgment; ſo that haſty reſolutions, are arguments of weakneſs of wit, or want of judgment, and therefore to be avoided by Counſellors.

13. The fifth point, is to fly obſtinacy and wilfulneſs, the other extremity, oppoſite to levity, which is no leſs unfit for a wiſe Counſellor, than the other; for obſtinacy is always accompany'd with contention and contempt of other Mens opinions; and therefore is an Enemy to reſolution, which can never be taken where obſtinate and contentious Men meet in a Council. This defect proceeds commonly either from pride and preſumption of a Man's own wit, whereof I have ſpoken ſufficiently in the beginning of this Diſcourſe, (*a*) or from a falſe conceit that many Men have, that 'tis a ſhame for a wiſe Man to change his opinion, which is far otherwiſe: For thô a wiſe Man ought not to do it lightly, and without great reaſon, yet when there is ſufficient cauſe, 'twere great ſhame and folly not to do it; and therefore *Seneca* the Stoick, who according to the opinion of thoſe of his Sect, held, that *A wiſe Man never changes his opinion*, (*b*) expounds it in ſuch a manner, that he includes in the opinion of a

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 1. *num.* 3. 4. & 5. &c.
(*b*) *Seneca lib.* 4. *de benefi. cap.* 34.

wiſe

wiſe Man a neceſſary exception, which is, if nothing happens that may alter the caſe, and therefore he alſo ſays, that *'Tis the property of fools to aſſure themſelves too much of the event of their Counſels, and determinations; and that a wiſe Man know's what ſway error bears in the affairs of Men; how uncertain all human things are; and how many accidents hinder good and wiſe deſigns;* (*a*) whereupon he concludes, *that 'tis no ſhame for wiſe Men to alter their opinions when occaſion requires.* *Plato* compares a wiſe Man to a good Gamſter, who accommodates his Play to the Chances of the Dice; and ſo ſays he (*b*) ſhou'd a wiſe Man his Counſels and courſe of Life to the occaſions; which changing and varying with the time, do often require new deliberations.

14. Nevertheleſs, 'tis to be conſider'd, that this change according to occaſions, is convenient only when the occaſions change the fundamental and chief reaſon of the firſt reſolution; for in all matters of Counſel many reaſons may concur to one end, whereof ſome may be more important than others, and ſome one perhaps the ground and foundation of the reſt; otherwiſe it falls out, that change of times and variety of occaſions, alter ſome conſiderations, and circumſtances, and not the grounds and fundamental reaſons of the matter; in which caſe the reſolution is not to be chang'd; for otherways Men wou'd be like weather-cocks, which change with every wind; ſeeing time produces always ſome new difficulties, and

(*a*) *Ibid.* (*b*) *Plat. de Rep. lib.* 10.

changes ſome part of the reaſons, in all matters that require any long time for the execution; whereupon ſome alteration of circumſtances in the deſign may follow, thô the reſolution may ſtand good as to the principal end.

15. Wherefore 'twere great levity and raſhneſs in any Man, to condemn other Mens Counſels, becauſe ſome of the Motives that induc'd 'em thereunto have fail'd; or becauſe the ſucceſs has not in the beginning anſwer'd their expectations; as may appear by the example of the wiſe *Phocion* of *Athens*, who having diſſwaded the *Athenians* from a certain enterpriſe which ſucceded well, being reproach'd therewith by ſome of his adverſaries, ſayd, *That he was very glad of the good ſucceſs, but did not repent him of his opinion*; (*a*) and this he ſayd, partly becauſe he foreſaw a bad ſequel of their good beginning, as after it fell out; and partly becauſe a wiſe Man diſcharges his duty, if his Counſel be well grounded upon good and ſound reaſon, thô the ſucceſs be not ſo good as he expected; ſeeing the event of all Mens Counſels is only in the hands of God, and cannot be aſſuredly foreſeen, and much leſs warranted, by the Wiſdom of any Man; as I have ſufficiently declar'd elſewhere. (*b*)

16. To conclude this point, a wiſe Man ought always ſo to ground his Opinions and Counſels upon Reaſon, Conſcience, and Juſtice, that whatſoever the ſucceſs be, he may have no juſt cauſe

(*a*) *Plut. in Timoleon & in Phocion.* (*b*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 11. 12. *&* 13.

to

to repent or retract the ſame; and therefore *Ariſtides* having ſayd to *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, who demanded one of his Daughters in Marriage, (*a*) *That he had rather ſee her burn'd, than Marry'd to a Tyrant*, wou'd never retract or recall his words, thô it coſt him the Life of his Son; for when the Tyrant had Slain his Son, and aſk'd him whether he was ſtill of the ſame mind, concerning the Marriage of his Daughter, he anſwer'd, that thô he was ſorry for what had happen'd to his Son, yet he repented not of what he had ſayd; which conſtancy of *Ariſtides*, *Plutarch* greatly commends, *as proceeding*, ſays he, *from an extraordinary and compleat vertue.*

17. The ſixth point neceſſary in a Counſellor, is ſecrecy, whereof I have ſayd ſomewhat before, and here add, that Counſellors muſt underſtand that their Mouths are Seal'd up by their Princes, as *Hephæſtion's* Mouth was by *Alexander* the great, (*b*) who having ſhew'd him a ſecret Letter, ſayd nothing to him, but took off his Sealing Ring and put it to his Lips; this a young Counſellor muſt underſtand to paſs betwixt his Prince and him, when his Prince do's him the honor to make him of his Council, or to treat with him of matters of State, whereof ſecrecy, is as *Valerius* ſays, (*c*) *Optimum & tutiſſimum vinculum*; *The beſt and ſureſt bond.* And therefore 'twas ſo much eſteem'd amongſt the *Perſians*, that they honor'd *Silence* for a God; and ſuch was the care and reſpect that

(*a*) *Plut. in Timoleon.* (*b*) *Plut. in Alexandro.* (*c*) *Valer. lib. 2. cap. 2.*

the *Romans* had thereunto, that when King *Eumenes* came into the Senat to demand aſſiſtance againſt King *Perſeus*, 'twas never underſtood, as *Livy* witneſſes, (*a*) either what he ſayd, or what any anſwer'd, until the War which the *Romans* made at his requeſt was ended; ſuch being the ſecrecy of the *Roman* Senators, thô very many in number, that as *Valerius* ſays, it ſeem'd that; (*b*) *Not ſo much as one Man heard, that which was committed to the Ears of ſo many.*

18. Nevertheleſs, great diſcretion is to be us'd herein; for a Man may as well be over ſecret in ſome caſes, as too open. I have noted ſometimes that ſome great Princes and Counſellors for fear of diſcovering their deſigns, have either forborn to take ſufficient information and inſtruction, of ſuch as cou'd beſt inform 'em, and might have been truſted, whereby they have gone blindly to work; or elſe they have ſought to inform themſelves in cloud's, by ſuch dark and obſcure queſtions, that they have been falſly, and ill inform'd; for the parties with whom they confer'd making a falſe conjecture of their drift, and anſwering 'em according to their own ſenſe, far otherwiſe than they wou'd have done, if they had known their meaning, have abus'd 'em againſt their wills.

19. Again, ſome there are, who intending to be very ſecret, play as a Man may ſay, at croſs queſtions. I knew a Counſellor, who being

(*a*) *Aminian. Marcellin. lib.* 21. *Livius lib.* 42. (*b*) *Valer. lib.* 2. *cap.* 2.

commanded

commanded by his Prince to give him his opinion in a matter of exceeding great importance and ſecrecy, thought to inform himſelf of ſome circumſtances ſo cunningly, that his meaning ſhou'd not be ſo much as gueſs'd at: But the party with whom he treated being of an excellent Judgment, preſently underſtood it, and thô he anſwer'd him to his great ſatisfaction, yet not thinking himſelf any way bound to ſecrecy, becauſe he had neither giv'n his Oath, nor his Word to the Counſellor, who ſhew'd no confidence in him about the matter, he wrote it to a great perſon, with whom he had correſpondence, by which means it was within a Month after ſo publick, that it came into the *Roman* Gazet, and from thence was publiſh'd throu' Chriſtendom, as the Counſellor himſelf has ſince told me; ſo that in ſeeking information by Ridles and obſcure Queſtions, two inconveniences are to be fear'd; the one, leſt you receive a falſe information; the other, leſt you diſcover the deſign againſt your will.

20. Therefore to prevent theſe inconveniences, my opinion is, that when one muſt needs take Counſel, as in ſome caſes 'tis abſolutly neceſſary, eſpecially for enterpriſes to be made in forraign and unknown Countries, 'twill be convenient, if a ſufficient informer be found of good and ſincere Conſcience, to deal plainly with him, and to ſhew confidence in him; taking nevertheleſs his Oath of ſecrecy, to bind him the more; and to uſe other means of courteſie and benefits to oblige him; and to do this with the liking and leave of the Prince; for the Counſellors

better ſecurity; but when ſuch a confident and ſincere informer cannot be had, I think, that thô 'twill be good to uſe all poſſible means and diligence to learn what is poſſible, without diſcovery of his intention; yet nevertheleſs no great foundation is to be made of an information, taken by ſuch means; except it be of a matter of fact, wherein no Man that knows truth, can falſly inform, except he will wilfully lie; but of matters of diſcourſe, depending upon the judgment of the informer, be he never ſo wiſe, ſmall reckoning is to be made, when he do's not fully underſtand the drift and intention of the propoſer.

21. The ſeventh point, which a Counſellor ſhou'd conſider in himſelf, is, that in the deliberation of all matters whatſoever, he be clear and free from all paſſion, and particular affection; that is, from all reſpects, either of love, hatred, or envy to any one; becauſe wiſe Princes are wont exactly to obſerve the humors and diſpoſitions of their Counſellors, and to make ſmall account of the advice or perſons of ſuch, as they find to be ſubject to any of the aforeſaid imperfections; and with great reaſon; for as *Saluſt* ſays, (*a*) *The mind do's not eaſily ſee the truth, where paſſion and affection bears the ſway.* Moreover, paſſion not only blinds the underſtanding of Man, but alſo ſo corrupts his will, that thô he ſees the truth, yet he will not embrace it; which *Juſtin* obſerv'd very well in King *Antiochus* and his Counſellors; for when *Hanibal* had Counſel'd him, to

(*a*) *Saluſt. in Catilin.*

invade

invade *Italy*, his Counſel, ſays *Juſtin*, (*a*) was rejected; partly becauſe the chief Counſellors, and favorits of *Antiochus*, fear'd that if 'twere admitted, *Hanibal* might grow in more credit and favor with *Antiochus* than they; and partly becauſe *Antiochus* himſelf, doubted, leſt his own glory might be in ſome part obſcur'd, if he ſhou'd be thought to do any thing by *Hanibals* advice; ſo peſtilent is the paſſion of envy and emulation, that it makes a Man ſometimes Enemy of his own private, no leſs, than of the publick good.

22. Wherefore *Ariſtides* of *Athens*, (*b*) being ſent Embaſſador with *Themiſtocles*, his Enemy, will'd him, at their departure out of the Town, that they might leave all their emulations and quarrels behind 'em at the Gate, leſt their private paſſions might hinder the publick good of the Common-wealth. In like manner all Counſellors, that have any particular quarrels, or diſguſts amongſt themſelves, ought to leave 'em at the Council-chamber-door, when they enter in. The like may alſo be ſayd of the reſpects of private friendſhip, or of other Mens greatneſs and favor with the Prince; which reſpects are many times no leſs hurtful in Councils, than envy or hatred; for that they make Men conceal their own judgments, becauſe they will not diſguſt ſome friend, or ſome great Man, that holds a contrary opinion; inſomuch, that it falls out many times, that ſome favorit of the Prince, having once

(*a*) *Iuſt. hiſt. lib* 31. (*b*) *Plutarch* in his Apotheg. of Kings and Princes.

utter'd his conceit, thô none of the wiſeſt; carries after him all the reſt without contradiction; and ſo the beſt opinions are either conceal'd, or not ſo well debated, as were convenient.

23. For the prevention and remedy of this inconvenience, the wiſe *Coſimo de Medices* Duke of *Florence*, and *Philip* the II. King of *Spain*, us'd to propoſe their moſt important matters, to their Counſellors, firſt by writing, commanding 'em to ſet down their opinions, with their reaſons; and not to communicate the ſame with any other; and afterwards if they thought it needful, they aſſembl'd 'em in their preſence, to hear 'em debate and defend their own opinions; which proceeding was very prudent; for ſo, every Counſellor gave his opinion freely without paſſion or reſpect to any other; and for his own honor and reputation defended it ſo far, as reaſon wou'd permit; whereby matters were throughly debated and well diſcuſs'd.

24. To conclude this point, Counſellors muſt ſay of all particular reſpects, as *Popilius* the *Roman*, being ſent Embaſſador to King *Antiochus* his old friend, ſayd unto him of their former friendſhip; (*a*) *Farewel private friendſhip, when publick matters are in hand*; this Counſellors, when they come to the Council Table, ſhou'd both ſay and practiſe; laying aſide all private and particular reſpects either to one another, or to themſelves; as having nothing elſe before their Eyes in all their deliberations, but the publick good; the

(*a*) *Iuſtin. lib.* 34.

ſervice

ſervice of God, their Prince, and their Country.

25. The eighth and laſt point, which I wou'd wiſh a young Counſellor to conſider, concerning himſelf, is the danger both of Human and Divine puniſhment, which he will incur, if he corrupts or ſeduces his Prince by ill Counſel, becauſe his Prince, if he has Grace to ſee his own error, cannot but hate and deteſt the Author and Counſellor thereof; as did King *Henry* the V. (*a*) who repenting the Riotous courſe of his youth, baniſh'd from his Court all thoſe who had miſled and ſeduc'd him, as I have noted before. (*b*) But thô he ſhou'd eſcape the diſgrace or puniſhment of his Prince, yet he may juſtly fear the hatred of the People, and his own inſuing deſtruction; as I have before ſignifi'd upon another occaſion, (*c*) in *Pierce Gaverſton*, the *Spencers*, and other Counſellors of *Edward* the II. and *Richard* the II. to whom I may add *Emſon* and *Dudly*, put to Death by King *Henry* the VIII. in the beginning of his Reign, to ſatisfie the importunity of the People; who demanded Juſtice againſt 'em, for the bad Counſel they had giv'n to King *Henry* the VII. in matters of exactions, impoſitions, and pecuniary penalties.

26. And *Plutarch* alſo notes, (*d*) that the Counſellors and favorites of *Apollodorus*, *Phalaris*, *Dionyſius*, *Nero*, and other Tyrants, were rack'd,

(*a*) *Polid. Virg. & Io. Sto. in Henr.* (*b*) Tom. 2. *Chap.* 1. *num.* 28. (*c*) *Ibid. num.* 24. *Stow in Hen.* 8. (*d*) *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe, that Philoſophers ſhou'd converſe with Princes,

flead,

flead, burnt, and otherwise most cruelly tormented by the People; *And justly*, says he, *because he who corrupts, or seduces a Prince, deserves no less to be abhorr'd of all Men, than one that shou'd poyson a publick Fountain, whereof all Men must drink*; seeing, that upon the Princes Example and Authority, depends the good or bad State of all his Subjects; and therefore he who misleads the Prince, do's a very great injury to the Common-wealth, and owes his penalty, no less to the People, than to the Prince himself. In which respect, *Plutarch* also notes, (*a*) *That the People after* Nero's *Death, made continual instance for the punishment of* Tigellinus, *his wicked Counsellor and corrupter*; as for a publick debt due to the Common-wealth, which at length they obtain'd of *Otho*, Successor to *Galba*.

27. But thô neither the Prince nor the People exact this debt of a wicked Counsellor, yet he shall be sure to pay it Eternally to Almighty God, if he repent not, and satisfie his Justice otherwise. For if *Not only those who do ill, are worthy of Death*, as the Apostle says, *but also those, who consent thereunto*; (*b*) much more guilty are Counsellors of evil, who are either the principal Authors, if they invent it; or arbiters and associates in the highest degree, if they approve and confirm it; therefore, how hateful such are to Almighty God, it appears by the examples of *Achitophel* and *Aman*, the one Counsellor to *Absalon*, (*c*) and the other to *Assuerus*, (*d*) whose wicked Coun-

(*a*) *Plut. in Otho.* (*b*) Rom. *cap.* 1. *ver.* 32. (*c*) 2 Reg. *cap.* 17. *ver.* 23. (*d*) Esther *cap.* 7. *ver.* 10.

sels

ſels God did not only, *fruſtrate and infatuate*, as the Scripture ſays, but alſo puniſh moſt exemplarly in this Life; making the one of 'em his inſtrument to execute Juſtice upon himſelf, and turning the wicked Counſel of the other to his own deſtruction.

28. The like may be obſerv'd in ſome Counſellors of King *Henry* the VIII. as in Cardinal *Wolſey*, who upon a diſguſt, which he had taken againſt *Charles* the Emperor, Counſel'd the King to repudiate his lawful Wife Queen *Catherin*, Aunt to the ſaid Emperor; and to Treat a Marriage with the Dutcheſs of *Alençon*, Siſter to *Francis* King of *France*. But King *Henry* being then fall'n in Love with the Lady *Ann Bullen*, took hold of the Cardinal's Counſel, for the Divorce of Queen *Catherin*, but not for the Match with the *French* King's Siſter; and thô the Cardinal promis'd the King to do his endeavour to procure, that Pope *Clement* the VII. ſhou'd approve, and ratifie the Divorce; nevertheleſs, being made Legat together with Cardinal *Campegius* for the hearing, and determination of the cauſe, and not able to procure the Popes conſent to the Divorce, in reſpect of the evident injuſtice, he fell ſo deeply into the Kings diſgrace, that he was firſt depriv'd by a *Premunire*, not only of the Office of Lord Chancellor, and all his Temporal Authority; but of all his Moveable Goods, and Poſſeſſions, which were of incredible value, and within a while after, was apprehended as a Traytor, and going Priſoner towards *London*, dy'd for ſorrow by the way, he himſelf acknowledging God's Juſtice.

29. To

29. To which purpoſe *Stow* relates in his Cronicle, that the Cardinal lying upon his Death Bed, ready to give up the Ghoſt, ſayd to Mr. *Kingſton*, Conſtable of the Tower, who was ſent with ſome of the Kings Guards to convey him to *London*, (*a*) *If I had*, ſayd he, *ſerv'd God, as diligently, as I have ſerv'd the King, he wou'd not have left me in my old Age, but this is the juſt reward that I muſt receive, for the diligent pains and ſtudy, that I have had to do him ſervice, not regarding my ſervice to God, but only to ſatisfie his pleaſure*; ſo he requeſted Mr. *Kingſton* to beſeech the King in his behalf, to call to mind, all that had paſs'd betwixt them two, in his weighty matter, meaning that of his Divorce, and giving to underſtand, that he had therein eſpecially neglected his duty to God, for the ſatisfaction of the Kings pleaſure, and therefore the ſame had juſtly turn'd to his overthrow; nevertheleſs, it ſeems he dy'd very Penitent, for as *Stow* reports, he was found after his Death to have a Hair Shirt next his Body, whereby it appears, that he might well ſay with the Royal Prophet, (*b*) *'Tis well for me O Lord, that thou haſt humbl'd me*, and that Almighty God of his Infinite Mercy puniſh'd him here Temporally to ſave his Soul Eternally.

30. To him I will add another Counſellor of King *Henry*, I mean the Lord *Cromwel*, who Govern'd the whole Kingdom for ſome time, not only in Temporal, but alſo in Spiritual Affairs;

(*a*) *Stow an. 22. reg. Henr. 8. in fine & an. Dom.* 1530. (*b*) Pſal. 118. *ver.* 71.

having

having the Title, and Authority of the Kings Vicar General for Eccleſiaſtical, and Spiritual cauſes; inſomuch, that he had abſolute command over Biſhops, Arch-biſhops, and the whole Clergy; and Sate as Preſident in their Convocations, and Aſſemblies, and made Eccleſiaſtical Decrees, and Injunctions, being nevertheleſs a meer Lay-man.

31. This Lord *Cromwel*, being deſirous to make a particular demonſtration of his Loyalty towards the King, and the great care he had of his Perſon, and Service; caus'd a moſt unjuſt Statute to be enacted, which was, that if any Man were accus'd of Treaſon againſt the Kings Perſon, he might be condemn'd in abſence, without ever being admitted to anſwer for himſelf; but ſhortly after it pleas'd Almighty God ſo to diſpoſe, that he himſelf was the firſt, and the only Man upon whom the ſame Statute was executed, even then when he thought himſelf moſt ſecure, and aſſur'd of the Kings favor; for being made Lord High Chamberlain of *England*, and Earl of *Eſſex*, he was apprehended within three Months after, as he Sate in Council, and condemn'd by Act of Parliament, not only of High Treaſon, but of Hereſie alſo; and preſently after Beheaded without any farther Tryal, by vertue of the Statute which he himſelf had procur'd to be made; ſo that we may truly ſay of him with the Pſalmiſt, (*a*) *Sorrow was turn'd upon his own head, and his iniquity fell upon his own Crown.*

(*a*) Pſal. 7. *ver.* 17.

32. Moreover,

32. Moreover, it may ſeem worthy of conſideration, that he having been the chief Counſellor, and principal inſtrument of King *Henry*, as well in the ſuppreſſion of Religious Houſes, as for the Death, and Deſtruction of many Religious Men; it pleas'd God ſo to ordain, that he was condemned, and executed for matter of Religion, that is, for Hereſie, even during the time of his Vicariat, or Subſtitution to the King in Religious and Eccleſiaſtical cauſes.

33. It may alſo be obſerv'd for ſome part of God's juſt Judgment upon him, that whereas he had caus'd the King ſecretly to make a League with the Proteſtants of *Germany*, in prejudice of his Ancient League with the Houſe of *Burgundy*, lately before renew'd, and confirm'd betwixt him, and the Emperor *Charles* the V. it ſo fell out, that the ſame was alſo one ſpecial cauſe that concurr'd to his deſtruction; for when the Emperor underſtood of the ſaid Confederacy, and greatly expoſtulated with the King for the breach of his former League, and Amity with him; the King ſeeing at the ſame time that *Francis* the *French* King had ſuffer'd the Emperor to paſs quietly throu *France* to *Flanders*, for the pacification of the troubles a little before rais'd there, whereof I have ſpoken heretofore, (*a*) and that the ſaid troubles were ſuddenly appeas'd, and that all the Emperors affairs, as well in *Germany*, as elſewhere, had more proſperous ſucceſs then was expected; King *Henry* noting this, and fearing the event of his ſecret,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *cap.* 4. *num.* 1. 2. 3. & 4

and

and new League, with the Emperors Enemies, lay'd all the fault upon the Lord *Cromwel*, by whom he ſayd that League was made, without his Commiſſion, or knowledge; at ſuch time as the ſaid Lord *Cromwel* was his Embaſſador in *Germany*; and to the end, that the Emperor might the rather be perſuaded of the truth thereof, he caus'd the Lord *Cromwel* to be ſuddenly put to Death in ſuch a manner, as I before declar'd; ſo that we may ſee how true it is which the Greek Poët ſays, κἀδὲ κακὴ βυλὴ τῷ βυλεύσαντι κακίστη. *Bad Counſel is worſt of all to the Counſellor*, which I pray God all Counſellors of Princes may well and duely conſider.

CHAP. III.

What a Counſellor ought to conſider in his Prince, are his Conſcience, his Commodity, and his Reputation.

A Counſellor is to conſider in his Prince principally three things; his Conſcience, his Commodity, and his Reputation; of which three, I place Commodity in the midſt, becauſe 'tis to be ballanc'd and weigh'd with both the other, ſeeing nothing can be truly commodious which is not agreeable to both; and no Temporal commodity can recompence the loſs of either of 'em. And firſt to ſpeak of Conſcience; the word Conſcience, is differently underſtood,

derſtood, and commonly taken for an act, conſiſting in the application of our knowledge to our action, for that *Conſcientia eſt Scientia, cum alio*; *Conſcience is Knowledge, with an other thing.* (*a*) In which ſenſe, Conſcience may err, when we err in knowledge, or apply our true knowledge erroneouſly to our actions; wherefore I will not treat of Conſcience here in this ſenſe, but only as it is the (*b*) firſt natural habit in the Soul of Man; which never errs, and ſo *Conſcience is the pureſt, and higheſt part of reaſon, whereby we naturally diſcern betwixt good and evil, rejecting the evil and approving the good*; whereupon grows remorſe and repentance in our Souls after an evil act, and contentment after a good: In which reſpect *Origen* ſays, (*c*) that Conſcience is; *The Governor and Teacher of the Soul, whereby 'tis diverted from evil, mov'd to good, admoniſh'd, reprov'd, and chaſtis'd.* Saint *Baſil*, as Saint *Thomas* notes, (*d*) call'd it *Naturale judicatorium*; *The natural faculty of Judgment*; whereof Saint *Auſtin* ſpeaks, when he ſays, (*e*) that there are in the Soul of Man, *Certain infallible Rules, true and incommutable lights of vertue*; whereby every one conceives and judges truly of the general principles of the office and duty of Man. Saint *Chryſoſtom* ſpeaking of Conſcience, ſays, (*f*) that Almighty God has plac'd it in the Soul of Man, as a Judge which is ever vigilant,

(*a*) *D. Tho.* 2. *d.* 24. *q.* 2. *ar.* 4. *c.* (*b*) *Idem.* 1. *p. q.* 79. *ar.* 13. *in cor.* (*c*) *Origen. lib.* 2. *in ep. ad Rom. c.* 2. (*d*) *S. Baſil. apud D. Tho* 1. *p. q.* 79. *ar.* 13. *ca.* (*e*) *Aug. lib.* 2. *de libero. arbit.* 10. (*f*) *Chryſoſt. To.* 2. *concio.* 4. *de Lazaro.*

and

and attentive to his actions; not to be corrupted, inexorable, inflexible, and ſearching into his very thoughts and intentions; whereupon it follows, that after any ſin or offence committed, a Mans own Conſcience juſtly judges and condemns him, without any other accuſer or witneſs than himſelf. Laſtly, Saint *Thomas* calls it, (*a*) *Lex naturalis*; *A natural Law*, or the Law of Nature; by the light whereof the very Pagans know thoſe things which are commanded by the Law of God, as the Apoſtle teſtifies, ſaying, (*b*) *The* Gentils *who have not the Law*, that is, the Written Law of God, *do naturally perform thoſe things which are of the Law; and not having the Law, are a Law to themſelves, and ſhew that they have the work of the Law written in their hearts; their own Conſciences giving teſtimony unto them, and their ſecret thoughts accuſing or defending 'em in the Day of Judgment*; Whereby it appears, that thoſe who live according to the Rule of Reaſon, the Law of Nature, and the Law of God, which always conform one to another, act according to Conſcience; and on the other ſide, thoſe who decline and ſwerve from any of 'em, act againſt Conſcience.

2. Now then, for as much as our Eternal happineſs depends upon the integrity and purity of Conſcience, in which reſpect our Savior ſays, (*c*) *Bleſſed are the pure in heart, for they ſhall ſee God.* It follows, that nothing can be truly profitable which is contrary to Conſcience; for what-

(*a*) *D. Tho. quod. lib.* 3. *ar.* 6. 1. (*b*) Rom. 2. *Ver.* 14. 15. 16. (*c*) Matth. 5. 8.

ſoever hinders our greateſt good, which is our Salvation, draws us alſo into the greateſt miſery that can be, which is Eternal Damnation, and therefore cannot be good and profitable, but moſt pernicious; for as our Savior ſays, *What do's it profit a Man to gain the whole world if he looſe his Soul?* And therefore Saint *Auſtin* ſays very well, (*a*) that he who Counſels a Man contrary to his Salvation, has *Pallium conſulentis & venenum perimentis*; *The Cloak of a Counſellor, and the Poyſon of a Murderer*. Whereupon it follows, that the firſt and chief thing that every Counſellor ought to regard, is, that his Counſel be ſo grounded upon Conſcience, that God be not offended, nor his Princes Conſcience wounded thereby; which latter were of it ſelf no ſmall miſery, thô God ſhou'd not otherwiſe puniſh the evil fact; for as on the one ſide, *There can be no greater happineſs in the Life of Man, than tranquility and quietneſs of Conſcience*, as Saint *Auſtin* ſays, (*b*) ſo on the other ſide, there can be no greater miſery or torment, then *Nocte, dieq; ſuum geſtare in pectore teſtem. To carry day and night the teſtimony of a Man's wickedneſs in his own breaſt.*

3. And thô Princes do not always at the firſt feel the prick of Conſcience, whilſt the pleaſure, or commodity of wicked Counſel is yet freſh; nevertheleſs, afterwards they are ſtung and vex'd with it, at one time or other; ſuch being the nature of the Worm of Conſcience, that thô

(*a*) *Aug. in* Pſal. 119. (*b*) *Aug. de Civit. Dei. lib.* 21. *Invenal.*

ſome-

ſometimes it ſeems to ſleep, yet at other times it gnaws and bites bitterly; God having of his infinite Wiſdom and Mercy ſo ordain'd, as Saint *Chryſoſtom* witneſſes; (*a*) *Leſt if 'twere continual, it wou'd not be ſupportable, and if it were not frequent, it wou'd quickly be forgotten or contemn'd:* But howſoever it may ſeem to ſleep in proſperity, it never fail's to prick and ſting in adverſity; giving teſtimony to wicked Men of God's juſt Judgment upon 'em; for as Saint *Gregory* ſays, (*b*) *Culpa claudit oculos, & pœna aperit; Offence, or ſin ſhuts the Eyes, and puniſhment opens 'em.* To which purpoſe *Job* ſays of the wicked Man; (*c*) *When God ſhall puniſh him, according to his deſerts, then he will know, that he has ſinn'd.* The Children of *Jacob* being taken for Spies and detain'd in *Ægypt*, felt preſently a remorſe, for their ſin of ſelling their Brother *Joſeph*, ſaying, (*d*) *We ſuffer this worthily.* The wicked King *Antiochus*, having receiv'd great overthrows in *Perſia*, and *Judæa*, and being alſo tormented with a horrible, and mortal deſeaſe: (*e*) *I now remember*, ſays he, *the hurt I have done in Jeruſalem, &c. and know, that therefore all theſe miſeries are fallen upon me.* And *Mauritius* the Emperor, ſeeing his Children kill'd before his Face, and himſelf alſo deſign'd for Slaughter, acknowledg'd God's Juſtice, ſaying, (*f*) *Thou art juſt O Lord, and thy judgments are right, and full of equity.* The like may be noted in *Alphonſus*

(*a*) *Chryſoſt. in* 16. Luc. *concio.* 4. (*b*) *Greg.* Iob. 21. (*c*) Iob. 21. 19. (*d*) Gen. 42. 21. (*e*) 1 Machab. 6. 12. (*f*) *Nicephor. li.* 18. *cap.* 40.

King of *Naples*, of whom I have ſpoken before, (*a*) and infinite others whom I omit for brevity ſake; and this all wicked Counſellors ought well to conſider and fear; in reſpect of the hurt that may thereby enſue, as well to themſelves, as to their Princes; becauſe the Worm of Conſcience breeds not only remorſe, and repentance of the evil act, but alſo hatred both of the Counſel, and Counſellor; as it did in King *Adelſtan*, the firſt Monarch of *England*, after the entry of the *Saxons*, (*b*) who, being ſeduc'd by the bad Counſel, and falſe ſuggeſtions of one of his favorites, baniſh'd his Brother *Edwin* unjuſtly, commanding him to be ſet to Sea, with only one Servant, in a Boat without a Sail, wherein he periſh'd; which when King *Adelſtan* underſtood, he fell into ſuch a remorſe of his own offence, and ſo much repented it, that he not only took upon him Seven Years Pennance, but alſo grew by little and little to deteſt and abhor his favorit, who had Counſell'd him to it; inſomuch, that in the end he cut off his Head; taking occaſion upon certain words of his, who being his Cup-bearer, and coming on Day to give him Drink in a Solemn and publick Feaſt, and chancing to ſtumble with one Foot and to recover himſelf with the other, ſayd, *S one Brother helps another*; whereupon the King re membring the loſs of his Brother, was ſo mov thereby, that he caus'd him preſently to be take and Executed.

(*a*) *Guicc. lib.* 1. *cap.* 22. *num.* 6. 7. 8. (*b*) G *Malſmesb. li.* 2. *ca.* 6. *Matth. VVeſtmonaſt. an.* 934.

4. Farthe

4. Farthermore, a Counſellor is to conſider, that Counſelling his Prince againſt his Conſcience, he endangers not only his Princes Soul, as I have ſignifi'd before, but alſo his Temporal State, expoſing him and it, to the juſt wrath and puniſhment of Almighty God; upon whoſe Will depend the States of all Princes, as I have largely prov'd already. Beſides, no Man knows for how ſmall an offence in the ſight of Man, God may puniſh a Prince in his Perſon or State. *Moyſes* for a little diſtruſt in the promiſe of God, dy'd before he enter'd into the Land of Promiſe. (*a*) King *Saul* was rejected by Almighty God, and diſpoſſeſs'd of his Kingdom, for reſerving ſome part of the Spoyl of *Amaleck*, at the requeſt of the People, contrary to the command of the Prophet. (*b*) *David* was puniſh'd with the loſs and deſtruction of ſeventy thouſand of his Subjects, for numbring 'em. (*c*) And *Ezechias* for his vain glory, in ſhewing his Treaſure to the Embaſſadors of the King of *Babylon*, was threaten'd by the Prophet, with the Spoyl of his Pallace, and Captivity of his Poſterity, which was afterwards fulfill'd. (*d*)

5. But of all other acts againſt Conſcience; for which God puniſhes Princes and their States, none are more pernicious to a State, than ſuch as are committed with intention and hope to benefit the State, for how little ſoever ſome of 'em may ſeem to be in their own nature, yet they

(*a*) Num. *ca.* 20. Deut. *ca.* 1. (*b*) 1 Reg. *c.* 15. (*c*) 2 Reg. *ca.* 24. (*d*) 4 Reg. *ca.* 20. 2 Par. *ca.* 32. Iſa. *ca.* 38.

have one circumstance, which greatly aggravates 'em, and makes 'em very hainous in the sight of God; seeing that wicked Policies commonly proceed from distrust or want of belief in God's Providence; for no Man who sincerely believes, that all States depend upon God's Will, and Providence, can with any reason persuade himself, that any thing which is offensive to God, can be good for the State; and therefore no wonder if Almighty God, who of his justice punishes sinners many times, by the same means whereby they offend him, often turns the wicked Policies of *Machevillians* to their own destructions, ordaining, as *Salomon* says, (*a*) *That what the wicked Man fears, shou'd fall upon him.*

6. So it fell out to *Pharao*, who fearing lest the Children of *Israel* might multiply overmuch to the danger of his State, oppress'd 'em wrongfully; (*b*) and commanded that their Male Children shou'd be cast into the River, as soon as they were Born; nevertheless, the more they were oppress'd, the more they encreas'd and multiply'd. And throu' the special Providence of God, *Moyses* was sav'd from drowning, and nourish'd by *Pharaos* own Daughter; (*c*) and by his Ministry the Children of *Israel* were deliver'd, *Ægypt* Spoyl'd, and *Pharao* himself with all his Army drown'd. (*d*) So it also fell out to the *Jews*, who fearing lest *Christ*, if he shou'd live any time, wou'd draw so many to believe in him, that the *Romans* wou'd

(*a*) Proverb. 10. 24. (*b*) Exod. 1. (*c*) Ibid. ca. 12. (*d*) Ibid. ca. 14.

easily

eaſily deſtroy their Temple and Nation, for want of People to defend the ſame, reſolv'd to kill him, (*a*) and ſo drew upon themſelves, and their Temple, the deſtruction which they ſought to prevent; God ſo diſpoſing, for the puniſhment of their wickedneſs, that the *Romans* ſhou'd afterwards utterly deſtroy their Temple and Country, as I have before fully declar'd; (*b*) Whereupon Saint *Auſtin* ſays, (*c*) *That whilſt for fear of looſing their Temporal State, they contemn'd the Eternal; they juſtly loſt both.*

7. The like Juſtice and Judgment of Almighty God may be noted in King *Aſtiages*, (*d*) who fearing that his Daughter's Iſſue might deprive him of his Kingdom, thought to prevent it by the Murder of her Son *Cyrus*, commanding *Harpagus* to deſtroy him, as ſoon as he was Born; but God ſo diſpos'd, that the Child was ſav'd contrary to the expectation of 'em both; who afterwards diſpoſſeſs'd *Aſtiages* of his Kingdom, with the aſſiſtance of *Harpagus*, whom *Aſtiages* had made the inſtrument of his wickedneſs. So alſo it happen'd to *Amulius*; (*e*) who thinking to aſſure his own State, by the Murder of his two Nephews, *Romulus* and *Remus*, caus'd 'em to be expos'd in the Woods, when they were new Born; to the end they might be devour'd by wild Beaſts, or otherways periſh; whom nevertheleſs it pleas'd God to preſerve, and by the means of *Romulus*, to diſpoſſeſs *Amulius* of his Kingdom.

(*a*) Ioan. *cap.* 11. (*b*) Tom. 1. *cap.* 19. (*c*) *Aug. Tract.* 49. *in* Ioan. (*d*) *Iuſtin. lib.* 1. (*e*) *Idem lib.* 43. *Plutarch in* Romulo.

8. But to speak of Christians. In the time of the Emperor *Valentinian* the III. *Attila* the *Scithian*, and King of the *Hunn's*, (*a*) who call'd himself *Flagellum Dei*, *The Scourge of God*, invaded the *Roman* Empire, with an Army of eleven hundred thousand Men, and having already possest himself of all *Pannonia*, since call'd *Hungary*, pass'd throu' *Germany* into *France*; using all kinds of cruelty upon all sorts of *Christians*, threatening utter ruin, as well to *Christian* Religion, as to the *Roman* Empire; whereupon the famous Captain *Ætius*, being assisted by *Theodoricus* King of the *Goths*, and divers other Princes, gave him Battel in *France*, not far from *Orleans*, in which Battel there were Slain a hundred and fourscore thousand on both sides, and *Attila* overthrown in such a manner, that he had no means to save his own Person, but by retiring himself into his Camp, where he fortifi'd himself, and nevertheless might easily have been either kill'd or taken, and *Christendom* hereby deliver'd from a most potent and dreadful Enemy, if *Ætius* wou'd have us'd his utmost endeavour; who preferring reason of State, before true *Christian* Zeal, and God's Service; spar'd him, fearing lest if he were utterly overcome, the *Goths*, who had already Conquer'd all *Spain*, and a great part of *France*, wou'd be far more dangerous to the *Roman* Empire, being freed from the fear of *Attila*, who was a common Enemy to both; for which respect, he suffer'd him to escape with the Relicks of his Army into *Hungary*; which by the just

(*a*) *Paul. Diac. lib.* 15.

Judgment

Judgment of Almighty God, turn'd as well to the deſtruction of *Ætius*, as to the great danger of the Empire; for *Ætius* being return'd moſt Triumphant to *Rome*, fell ſhortly after into the diſgrace of the Emperor, who ſuſpected, that he had ſpar'd *Attilla* to make himſelf Emperor by his aſſiſtance; whereupou he Slew *Ætius* with his own hand, and *Attilla* having within a while repair'd his Army was more terrible and noiſome to the *Roman* Empire than before; for he came into *Italy*, puting all to Fire and Sword, raz'd *Aquileia* to the ground, took *Pavia*, ſack'd and deſtroy'd *Milan*, and march'd towards *Rome* to beſiege it; which he had done, if he had not been diverted from it by Pope *Leo* the great, who going himſelf in Perſon to him, perſuaded him to deſiſt from the enterpriſe, and to retire himſelf into *Hungary*, as he did preſently; and being demanded by ſome of his Nobility, why he chang'd his reſolution ſo ſuddenly, he anſwer'd, that he durſt not do otherwiſe; becauſe two grave old Men apparell'd like Prieſts, ſtood by Pope *Leo* all the time of their Conference, with Swords in their hands, and threaten'd to kill him if he did not ſatisfie the Pope. But to return to *Ætius*; we ſee in him the bad ſucceſs of his Policy, and how it turn'd to his deſtruction, when he preferr'd reaſon of State before Conſcience, and the Service of God. (*a*)

(*a*) *Blondus decad.* 1. *lib.* 2. *Sabellic. Ennead.* 8. *lib.* 1. *Baron. an.* 452.

9. Hereunto

9. Hereunto I may add ſome others of latter time, of whom I have alſo ſpoken before upon other occaſions; as *Cæſar Borgia*, the Mirror of *Machiavels* Prince, who determining to Poyſon Cardinal *Cornetti*, Poyſon'd his own Father and himſelf. (*a*) In like manner the Queen of *Hungary*, thinking to maintain her ſelf and her Son in the unjuſt Poſſeſſion of that Kingdom, againſt *Ferdinand* then King of *Romans*, and after Emperor, crav'd aid of *Solyman* the great *Turk*, by whom both ſhe and her Son were depriv'd of their Kingdom. (*b*) And laſtly, I may conclude with a moſt manifeſt example of God's exemplar Juſtice in this kind, extended ſome Years ſince, to *Henry* the III. King of *France*, who rejecting Conſcience in the breach of his Oath, overthrew both himſelf and his State, by the ſame means, whereby he thought to preſerve both; which was, by the Slaughter of the Cardinal and Duke of *Guiſe*, after his Reconciliation with 'em, confirm'd on his part by Solemn Oaths; with many Imprecations, and Maledictions againſt himſelf, giving himſelf to the Devil, Body and Soul, in caſe he meant, or ſhou'd attempt any thing againſt 'em; receiving alſo the Bleſſed Sacrament publickly for their farther aſſurance; which promiſe and Oath he was bound in Conſcience to perform, notwithſtanding any former act or demert of theirs; yet neverthelefs, he caus'd the Duke to be kill'd in his own Preſence, and the Cardinal

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 13. *num.* 4. & 5. *Guiccian. lib.* 6. (*b*) *Surius in commen. an.* 1541.

the

the next day after; whereby he thought he had ſo aſſur'd his State, that he boaſted with great joy and triumph, as well to the Queen his Mother, as to his favorites, that he was then King; meaning, that during the Dukes Life, he had been King only in Name, and not in deed; whereas it fell out throu' God's juſt Judgment, that the Dukes Death, was the means of depriving him both of his Kingdom and Life; for, not only all the principal Towns in *France* revolted preſently from him, for the horror and hatred of the fact, but alſo he himſelf, within eight Months after, having levy'd fifty thouſand Men for the Siege of *Paris*, was miſerably Slain, in the midſt of his Army, by a poor ſimple Frier, call'd *Clement*: Whoſe name I note, becauſe Saint *Clement* was ordain'd by the King, to ſerve for the watch word to thoſe, who Slew the Duke; and not without Myſtery, throu' God's ſpecial Providence, ſignifying, as 'twere Prophetically, the Name of him, whoſe hand ſhou'd revenge it. Whereby it may appear how dangerous, and pernicious all Counſels, or attempts againſt Conſcience are to States, and who, as *Job* ſays, (*a*) *Over-reaches the wiſe Men of the world in their own craft, and ſubtilty, and diſſipates the Counſels, and Plots of wicked Men.* Wherefore it may truly be ſayd of *Machiavillian* Princes, and their wicked Counſellors, as the Prophet ſayd of the King and Counſellors of *Ægypt*. *The Princes are fools and their wiſe Counſellors have giv'n fooliſh Counſel, our Lord has caſt amongſt 'em the Spirit of giddineſs,*

(*a*) Iob. *cap.* 5. *ver.* 13.

and

and has made 'em ſtagger and err in all their works, like a reeling and vomiting drunken Man. (*a*)

10. As for reputation, which is alſo call'd, *Honor, Eſtimation, Fame, Credit, or Good Name,* no ſmall regard is to be had thereunto, when there is any queſtion of the Princes commodity; ſeeing that of all external goods, 'tis the principal, and moſt precious; and as Saint *Thomas* affirms, (*b*) *Moſt like to the goods of the mind*, whereupon *Salomon* ſays, (*c*) *A good Name is better than great riches.* Which is evident in matters of State, becauſe reputation conſerves the States of Princes many times, no leſs or rather more than wealth and force. In which reſpect *Tiberius Cæſar* was us'd to ſay, as *Tacitus* notes, (*d*) *That thô the deliberation of all other Men, commonly conſiſts in the conſideration of utility and profit; yet the State of a Prince is ſuch, that he ought chiefly to reſpect fame and reputation*; and the reaſon is, becauſe the loſs of reputation, is not only a ſign, or as I may ſay the preamble, of a Princes fall, but alſo many times the occaſion thereof; becauſe the affection of friends, and the reſpect, fear, and obedience of Subjects, do commonly fall and thereby decay; whereupon follows the Subverſion of States.

11. Now then, whereas the reputation of Princes conſiſts, eſpecially in four things, that is, Wiſdom, Valour, Vertue and Power; all Counſel tending to commodity is to be weigh'd with his reputation,

(*a*) Iſay. *ca.* 19. 11. (*b*) *Thom.* 22. 9. 73. *ar.* 2. *&* 3. (*c*) Prov. *ca.* 22. 1. (*d*) *Tacit. li.* 4. *annal.*

for

for nothing that may impair the honor of the Prince in any of theſe, can be accounted truly commodious for him; therefore *Philip de Comines* gives advice concerning the Princes Wiſdom, (*a*) that if he be not very wiſe, and of good parts, great care muſt be had, that Strangers be not admitted to his Preſence; eſpecially, to treat with him; leſt the diſcovery of his imperfection in that behalf, may blemiſh his reputation, and animate his Enemies to contemn him; and the *French* Hiſtorians affirm, (*b*) that the opinion which Men had of the Wiſdom of *Charles* the V. King of *France*, call'd the wiſe, avail'd him more againſt the *Engliſh*, than his force; inſomuch, that the diſpatches which he made in his Chamber, were more fear'd than his Armies in the Field.

12. The like alſo is to be ſayd of the opinion of valour in a Prince, which makes him no leſs formidable to his Enemies, then belov'd by his Friends and Subjects; whereas the opinion of his effeminacy or baſeneſs of mind, makes him contemptible to all Men; and often cauſes the depoſition, and deſtruction of Princes; as it did to *Sardanapalus* the great *Aſſyrian* King; (*c*) to *Childeric* King of *France*; (*d*) to *Wenceſlaus* the Emperor, (*e*) and to many others.

13. And as for vertue, wherein I include Religion alſo, *Ariſtotle* teaches, (*f*) that the only reputation, and opinion thereof, is a great ſupport,

(*a*) *Philip. de Com. cap.* 57. (*b Du Haillan du Charles le Sage.* (*c*) *Iuſtin. li.* 1. (*d*) *Paulus Æmilius in Chilper.* (*e*) *Naucler. chron.* 1400. (*f*) *Ariſt. lib.* 5. *Poli.*

and

and ſtay to a Princes State; in reſpect that all Men commonly conceive, that a Vertuous and Religious Prince, is in the favor, and protection of Almighty God; and therefore, *Achior* chief Captain of the *Amonites*, Counſell'd *Holofernes* when he made War upon the Children of *Iſrael*, to inform himſelf, whether they had committed any great offences againſt their God, whereby they might looſe his favor; aſſuring him, that otherwiſe 'twould be in vain to aſſaile 'em; becauſe their God wou'd defend 'em. And the like conceit, it ſeems, *Lewellin* Prince of *Wales* had of *Henry* the III. King of *England*; (*a*) for when certain Biſhops, who were ſent by the King to Treat with him, to reduce him to Obedience, threaten'd him with the King's great Power, and Forces, he anſwer'd, that he fear'd more his Alms, than his Armies; meaning, that he doubted leſt in reſpect of his great Charity and Piety, God wou'd protect and aſſiſt him; and that otherwiſe he wou'd little value his Force and Power. So much it imports a Prince to have the reputation of Vertue and Religion, which ſerves for a bridle, both to his Domeſtick and Forraign Enemies, to with-hold 'em from all attempts againſt him; beſides, it cauſes alſo, that his faults and errors are either not believ'd, or more eaſily excus'd, or the blame thereof lay'd upon his Counſellors.

14. And for theſe cauſes *Machiavel* alſo Counſels his Prince, (*b*) to procure by all means to

(*a*) *Matthæus Paris in Henr.* 3. (*b*) *Mach. in prin.*

have

have the reputation of a Religious, Juſt, and Vertuous Prince; thô he teaches him withal to be a moſt wicked Tyrant: Wherein I cannot omit by the way, to note the abſurdity of his Doctrin, very much impugning and contradicting it ſelf, ſeeing he will have his Prince to ſeem a Lamb, and be a Woolf; and to make ſhew of a Saint, and be indeed a Devil; which is no more poſſible than as the Comical Poet ſays, (*a*) *Cum ratione inſanire*; *To be Mad with reaſon:* For all fain'd things, ſays *Cicero*, (*b*) fade and fall away like Flowers; and nothing that is diſſembl'd can laſt long: Which our Saviour himſelf confirms, ſaying expreſly of hypocriſie; (*c*) *Take heed of the leven of the Phariſes, that is to ſay, hypocriſie, for nothing is ſecret that ſhall not be reveal'd, nor any thing hid, that ſhall not be known.*

15. And this is more evident in diſſembling, and hypocritical Tyrants, than in any other ſort of Men; becauſe ſo violent is the flame of Tyranny, that it breaks out throu' the weak and cloven Walls of hypocriſie, and diſcovers it ſelf to the World; ſuch being the State of publick perſons, and eſpecially of Princes, whoſe actions are ſubject to the eyes and cenſures of all Men, that their leaſt faults cannot paſs either unknown, or uncontroll'd by the People; as *Plutarch* excellently affirms, (*d*) adviſing Princes, to have a ſpecial regard to all their actions, becauſe the leaſt defects, or imperfections are noted; which he

(*a*) *Terent. in Eunuch.* (*b*) *Cicero de Offi.* (*c*) Luc. *ca.* 12. 1. 26. (*d*) *Plutarch*, in his inſtructions for thoſe that mannage matters of State.

con-

confirms by the examples of divers Princes; as of *Pompey* the great, noted of ſingularity for ſcratching his head with one finger; *Lucullus*, cenſur'd to be over delicate in his Dyet; the famous *Scipio*, blam'd for ſleeping much; and *Cæſar* for going ill girded: What then ſhall we ſay of Tyrannical Acts, ſuch as *Machiavel* commends in his Prince; I mean Murders, breach of promiſes and oaths, frauds and deceit, and all kind of injuſtice? Can any man with reaſon think, that the ſame can be ſufficiently cover'd with any cloak of hypocriſie? Or can a people be ſo ſimple, or ſenſeleſs as not to know, and ſee a Tyranny, when they ſee the manifeſt effects, and feel the heavy weight thereof in themſelves? Wherefore, what elſe can follow of hypocriſie in a Tyrant, but that his Subjects will hate him much more, and the ſooner conſpire his overthrow, as of one no leſs odious to God, than Man? Whereby the Scripture will be fulfill'd, which ſays, that (*a*) *The Heavens ſhall reveal the iniquity of the hypocrite, and the Earth ſhall riſe againſt him.*

16. But becauſe I am to ſpeak on ſet purpoſe, and much more amply of this matter hereafter, it ſhall ſuffice to have ſayd thus much here by the way, and withal hereupon to infer, that the reputation of vertue which is neceſſary for the conſervation of a Prince, muſt be grounded upon true vertue, and not upon vain ſhews and hypocritical diſſimulations; for, as true Religion, Juſtice, and Vertue, joyn'd with Princely Power,

(*a*) Iob. *cap.* 20. *ver.* 27.

create

create in Subjects admiration, reſpect, reverence, and love towards their Prince: So impiety, injuſtice, and intemperance in him, breed in his Subjects either hatred, or elſe contempt of his Perſon; for of the Crimes of impiety, and injuſtice, as perjury, deceit, and cruelty, proceeds hatred; and of the Vices that grow of intemperance, as Laſciviouſneſs, Drunkenneſs, and ſuch like, is engendred contempt, as I wou'd declare here more at large, did I not reſerve a farther Diſcourſe hereof to a future Treatiſe, where I determine to ſpeak of the Princes vertues more particularly, and amply, in reſpect that all perfection of vertue, proceeds from God's Grace, and true Religion, whereof I am to treat there.

17. Nevertheleſs I think fit to ſay ſomewhat more in this place, concerning one ſpecial vertue very requiſite in a Prince for his reputation, to wit, truth, fidelity, and conſtancy, in the exact obſervation of his Oaths, Promiſes and Word; whereof I am the more willing to treat, ſince *Machiavel* allow's, and commends all manner of falſhood, deceit, treachery and perjury in a Prince, when he may hope to gain, or to benefit his State thereby. But how impious and abſurd this Doctrin is, and how pernicious to Princes and their States, it will appear more evidently, if we conſider how dangerous and dammageable all falſhood, and deceit is to the Common-wealth; for the conſervation whereof, nothing is more neceſſary then truth, and fidelity, as well in the Prince as in the People.

18. Therefore *Cicero* says, (*a*) that *Fides*, which we may call *Fidelity*, consisting as he says, in the *Verity*, *and constant performance of words*, *promises*, *and covenants*, is *Fundamentum justitiæ*, *The foundation of justice*, which is the special prop and stay of the State, in which respect he calls it *Commune omnium præsidium*; *The common defence*, *or refuge of all Men*: (*b*) and also says, that *Nulla res vehementiùs rempublicam continet quàm fides*; *Nothing do's more firmly unite and hold together the Common-wealth than fidelity*; (*c*) and *Valerius* calls it; (*d*) *Venerabile numen & certissimum humanæ salutis pignus*; *A venerable and Divine Power*, *and the most sure pledge of human security*; and the *Romans* so much esteem'd it that they Built, and Dedicated a Temple to it, as to a Goddess, (*e*) in which Temple all Leagues, Truces, Covenants, and Important Contracts, were publickly made and sworn; which were so Religiously observ'd, that whosoever broke 'em, was held for a curs'd and damn'd Creature, and unworthy to live in human society: And with great reason, for if falshood and fraud were permitted to have course in Common-wealths, what trust and confidence, wou'd there be amongst Men, what Traffick or Commerce with Strangers or Friends? What assurance in Leagues with Forraign Princes, in Contracts and Marriages, in Promises and Contracts, in Buying or Selling? What Love? What Society? What Common-wealth? Which consists in the Communication

(*a*) *Cicero li.* 1. *de Offic.* (*b*) *Idem pro Sext. Ros.* (*c*) *Idem. li* 2. *de Offic.* (*d*) *Valer. li.* 6. *ca.* 6. *Dionis. Halicar. li.* 2. (*e*) *Livi. li. &* 2.

of

of Commodities one with another, and flouriſhes ſo much the more, by how much every one tenders, and deſires the publick good more then his own, in which reſpect it is call'd *Res publica*, that is, *weal publick*. And therefore if truſty and faithful dealing ſhou'd fail among Men, there wou'd be no more civil ſociety amongſt 'em then amongſt Tygers, and Bears, Foxes, and Wolves, Cats, and Dogs; which the Apoſtle inſinuates very well when he exhorts the *Epheſians*, and in them all other Chriſtians to uſe all ſincerity, and truth one with another, becauſe we are all combin'd in one Myſtical Body; (*a*) *Wherefore*, ſays he, *laying aſide all Lyes, let every one of you ſpeak the Truth to his Neighbour. Becauſe we are all Members one of another.*

19. Hereupon it follows, that fidelity is not only moſt neceſſary in Subjects, but alſo in a Prince, for the preſervation of the Common-wealth; for ſeeing nothing is more requiſite for the maintenance of the Body-politick than the union of the Head with its Members, the Prince with his People, and nothing again more neceſſary, then their truſt and confidence one in another, which cannot be where there is no fidelity; it follows, that nothing is more requiſite for the conſervation of both Prince, and People, than fidelity in both; without which neither the Subjects can aſſure themſelves of their Princes Protection, nor the Prince be ſatisfi'd of the Loyalty of his Subjects.

(*a*) Epheſ. *cap.* 4. *ver.* 25.

20. And to ſpeak here particularly of the Prince; 'tis to be conſider'd, that the want of fidelity and ſincerity in him, is moſt dangerous not only to the Common-wealth, but alſo to himſelf; as 'twill evidently appear if we weigh the force and effect of the Princes good or bad example, and how potent a Motive 'tis to induce his Subjects to Vertue or Vice; ſeeing as *Salomon* ſays, and experience teaches, (*a*) that; *Such as is the Governor of the City, ſuch is its Inhabitants.* Wherefore as the example of the Princes fidelity redounds both to the good of the Common-wealth, and alſo to his own ſecurity, becauſe the People Learn thereby to be not only faithful one to another, but alſo dutiful, and loyal to him, ſo alſo the example of perfidiouſneſs and double dealing in him, works the contrary effect, and teaches his Subjects to be no leſs faithleſs, and Traiterous towards him, then fraudulent, and Treacherous one towards another, which may turn as well to his deſtruction, as to the hurt of the Common-wealth.

21. But perhaps ſome *Machiavillian* may ſay, that thô the Prince for his own commodity uſes ſometimes to violate his Faith, yet he may ſo ſeverely puniſh it in his Subjects, that no inconvenience will follow from example, either to the Common-wealth or to himſelf.

22. Whereunto I anſwer, that the Prince cannot with reaſon, expect that the ſeverity of Laws, or other Politick means ſhall repreſs in his Com-

(*a*) Eccleſ. *cap.* 10. *ver.* 2.

mon-wealth

mon-wealth any Vice which ſhall be Authoriz'd by the Example of his own practiſe; for as the Poët ſays, (*a*) *Totus componitur orbis Regis ad exemplum, nec ſic inflectere ſenſus Humanos edicta valent, ut vita regentis. The world is fram'd after the Model of the King, and no Laws or Edicts can ſo move the minds of Men, as the Life of the Governor*; which *Plutarch* excellently confirms, ſaying, *That as a Square, or Rule, muſt be ſtraight in it ſelf, before it can make things ſtraight; ſo the Prince, who is, as 'twere, the Rule of his Subjects, ought firſt to rectifie himſelf, before he go about by Laws, or other means to rectifie his Common-wealth: For he who is failing in this, is not fit to uphold others; no more then he that is ignorant, is fit to teach; nor he that is incorrigible to correct; nor he that is himſelf diſorder'd, to put others in order.* Whereby we ſee, that a vicious Prince, who ſeeks to make his Subjects Vertuous by rigorous Laws, labors in vain, like one who builds with one hand, and pulls down with the other, and ſo deſtroys more in one day, than he can build in many: The ſame do's the bad example of a Prince, it corrupts more in a day, than his Laws can correct or amend in a year; as is evident enough by that which I have largely Diſcours'd elſewhere of Mans proneneſs to vice, with the facility, and different means found in every Common-wealth to evade and eſcape the Penalties of Laws.

23. This the Ancient *Romans* ſo well conſider'd that their Magiſtrates, and Senat were moſt exact,

(*a*) *Claudian.*

and punctual in the observation of Oaths, and Promises even to their very Enemies; for the regard they had not only to justice, and their own reputation, but also to the consequence of their good example in the Common-wealth; to which purpose I alledg'd before (*a*) upon another occasion the example of the worthy Consul *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, who being taken Prisoner by the *Carthaginians*, and dismis'd upon his Oath, promising either to procure the delivery of certain Prisoners, or to return himself to *Carthage*, was sent back by the Senat with his own consent, because the Senat did neither think it convenient to deliver the Prisoners, nor to recover and retain their Consul contrary to his Oath. The like I have also noted before in the same place, of *T. Veturius*, and *Spurius Posthumius* Consuls, and of *T. Mutius* and *Q. Æmilius* Tribunes of the People, who were deliver'd Prisoners to the *Samnits*, because the Senat wou'd not Ratifie the Peace which the said Consul and Tribunes had made with them; to whom I may add *L. Minutius*, *C. Manlius*, *Q. Fabius*, and *C. Apronius*, Men of great dignity, (*b*) deliver'd also by order of the Senat to the Embassadors of *Carthage*, and of the City of *Appollonia*, for some abuses which they committed against the said Embassadors contrary to the Law of Nations.

34. The like remarkable examples of particular Men amongst the Pagans may also be alledg'd,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap. 5. Nu. 5. Cicero lib. 3. de Offic.* (*b*) *Valer. lib. 6. cap. 6.*

whereof

whereof for brevities ſake I will relate only one or two. *Sextus Pompeius*, Son to *Pompey* the great, having Wars with *Antonius* the *Triumvir*, and meeting with him at the Sea-ſide upon a Treaty of Peace, invited him to Sup with him in his Galley, giving him his Oath for his aſſurance, and being ſecretly aſk'd by *Metrodorus* the Pirat whilſt they were at Table, whether he wou'd have him weigh Anker, and ſet Sail, and ſo make himſelf Lord of the World; he anſwer'd, that 'twas not his cuſtom or condition to forſwear himſelf, eſteeming it neither honorable, nor profitable for him, to gain the Empire of the World by perjury. (*a*)

25. No leſs care of fidelity had *Lycurgus* Brother to *Polidectes* King of *Lacedæmon*; (*b*) for, having taken upon him the Goverment of the Kingdom after his Brothers Death, at the inſtance of the people, till his Brothers Wife, who was great with Child, ſhou'd be brought to Bed, and the Child of years to Govern, and being ſolicited by her, to Marry her, upon her promiſe to kill the Child in her Womb, thereby to aſſure his Kingdom, he not only refus'd it, but alſo Proclaim'd her Son King, as ſoon as he was Born; taking only the Tuition of him until he came to Age, as I have before declar'd more at large. (*c*)

26. I need not add hereunto any examples of Chriſtian Princes whoſe Religion both teach

(*a*) *Plut. in Antonio.* (*b*) *Plut. in Lycur.*
(*c*) *Tom. 1, Chap. 8. Nu. 1.*

and bind 'em to be more exact and precise than Pagans in like cases; ne ertheless, I cannot forbear to speak of a mem rable act in this kind of the most Christian and Vertuous Prince *Ferdinand* Brother to *Henry* the III. King of *Castile*; which *Ferdinand* being left by his Brothers Testament Tutor to his Son King *John* the II. an Infant of Eight Months old, and being much urg'd by the three States of *Castile* to take the Crown to himself, wou'd by no means consent thereto, saying, *That he wou'd never be false, either to his Brother Dead, or to his Nephew Living, to whom he had promis'd fidelity*; (*a*) for which God rewarded him, six years after with the Kingdom of *Aragon*, whereunto he was chosen by the free Election of the Nobility, and Commons of the Realm. Behold then, how great respect not only this Christian Prince, but also the Pagans before nam'd, had to sincerity and fidelity, as well for the causes before mention'd, as also for the very detestation, and hatred of perfidiousness, being a vice of it self most odious, and unworthy of Princely Dignity.

27. For whereas all other vices and sins for the most part, are or may be attributed, either to frailty, or error, whereby they seem many times more worthy of pardon; perfidiousness is ever presum'd to proceed from a treacherous, maligne, vile, and base nature; and therefore not excusable in Princes, whose proceedings ought to be in all things real, generous, noble and

(*a*) *Luc. Marin. Siculus de reb. Hisp. li.* 11.

heroical;

heroical; in which reſpect one falſe, and treacherous act ſuffices to eclipſe, and obſcure the glory of many great vertues, as *Plutarch* notes in *Alexander* the great, (*a*) who cauſing certain *Indian* Soldiers to be kill'd after they had render'd themſelves unto him upon his Word, ſpotted and ſtain'd, ſays he, the Renown of all his glorious Conqueſts, and Royal Vertues with the Ignominy of this one act; and the reaſon is, becauſe Mans credit and reputation in matter of truſt, is ſo nice and delicate, that confidence, which is like a Glaſs, being once broken is not to be repair'd, wherefore he that is once known for a Lyer, is not believ'd when he ſpeaks Truth, and he that is once reputed to be falſe, is ever ſuſpected, and according to the common axiom of the Law. (*b*) *Qui ſemèl malus, ſemper præſumitur malus in eodem genere mali. He who is once wicked is ever preſum'd to be ſo in the ſame kind of wickedneſs*; whereupon it follows, that a faithleſs Prince, is hated of his Subjects, ſuſpected of his beſt Friends, irreconcilable with his Enemies, belov'd and truſted by none, and betray'd or forſaken by all Men, even in his greateſt neceſſities, and that worthily; ſeeing he himſelf gives the bad example, which other Men follow to his overthrow.

28. But here the Politick, or *Machiavillian* will ſay, that a Wiſe Prince has ſufficient remedies againſt theſe inconveniences, as ſtrong Guards,

(*a*) *Plut. in Alexand.* (*b*) *L. ſi cui ff. de accuſat. Bart. in l. Caſſius de Sena.*

Garriſons,

Garriſons, and Fortreſles, beſides his own Policy, aſſiſted with the prudence of faithful and vigilant Counſellors, whereby he may ſecurely make his advantage in all occaſions, without fear of any dammage that may thereby enſue to his Perſon, or State. Thus ſays the *Machiavillian* moſt abſurdly, as 'twill appear if we conſider whence grow's the danger which the Prince incurr's by perfidious and deceitful dealing, being moſt hateful not only to Man, but alſo to God, whereby he draws upon him both Divine, and Human puniſhment, againſt which neither theſe, nor any other *Machiavillian* remedies can warrant him.

29. And firſt to ſpeak of the offence of God and Divine puniſhment that follows it. We find in Holy Scripture, that nothing is more deteſtable to Almighty God then a deceitful, or double-dealing Man, and therefore the Holy Ghoſt ſays in the Proverbs: (*a*) *I deteſt a double Tongu'd Mouth.* And again in the ſame place. (*b*) *Every deceiver is abominable before God.* And the Royal Prophet coupling the deceiver with the blood-ſucker, ſays of them both. (*c*) *God abhors the bloody, and deceitful Man*; and ſpeaking of the deceitful Tongue of *Doeg*, he threatens him and all others with God's Vengeance, ſaying; (*d*) *Our Lord will deſtroy deceitful Lips.* Then how odious all deceitful and double-dealing is to Almighty God, who being, *Ipſa veritas*, *Truth it ſelf*, exacts nothing more of

(*a*) Prov. 8. 13. (*b*) Ibid. *ca.* 3. 32. (*c*) Pſal. 5. 7. (*d*) Pſal. 11. 4. Pſal. 119. 3. 4.

Man

Man Created to his Image, then verity and truth, and much more of a Prince than of any private perſon, becauſe the Prince is his Image, not only by reaſon of the natural gifts of his Soul, as all other Men are, but alſo in reſpect of his Office; whereby he repreſents his perſon, as his Lieutenant, in the adminiſtration of Juſtice, whereof fidelity and truth is the foundation, as I have declar'd before. (*a*)

30. Nevertheleſs, 'tis to be underſtood, that thô all real, plain and true dealing be moſt requiſite in a Prince, yet he is to uſe great diſcretion, and prudence therein, becauſe infinite occaſions occur, wherein Princes ought to conceal and cover their intentions, with more care and circumſpection than all other Men, eſpecially in matters to be executed: Wherefore great difference is to be noted betwixt telling a Lye, and concealing the truth, which the *Latins* do ſignifie in two proper words, that is, *Simulatio*, and *Diſſimulatio*, whereof the firſt, which we may term *Simulation*, or *Fiction*, is ever unlawful, and therefore never to be us'd, and the latter, which we may call *Diſcreet Diſſimulation*, is both lawful and commendable, and even ſometimes ſo neceſſary in Princes, that it may well and truly be ſayd; *Qui neſcit diſſimulare, neſcit Regnare. He who knows not how to diſſemble*, that is to ſay diſcreetly to cover and cloke his intentions when occaſion requires, *knows not how to Reign.* Whereas, of Simulation, Fiction, or Lying,

(*a*) *Num.* 18.

Salomon,

Salomon, being himself a most wise and potent Prince, sayd; (*a*) *A Lying Lip or Mouth do's not become a Prince*; in which respect he also prays to God; (*b*) *O Lord preserve and keep me far from Lying words*; and again in another parable he says; (*c*) *He which trusts to Lyes feeds the wind*; that is, as Saint *Austin* expounds it, (*d*) *Fit esca Spiritibus malis*; *He becomes the Meat, or Prey of wicked Spirits*, or of the Devil, whose imitator, or rather whose Child he makes himself. For as our Saviour says, (*e*) *The Devil is a Lyer and the Father of Lyes*, and is therefore call'd *Diabolus* which signifies a *Deceiver*.

31. What then shall we say of a most treacherous, perfidious, and perjur'd person, such a Prince as *Machiavel* frames; can he deserve to be call'd the Image, Lieutenant, or Minister of God? Whose similitude, and likeness, he defaces in himself, whose Commission he abuses, and whose Holy Name he shamefully prophanes? What else can he expect at the hands of God, but severe punishment, not only in the World to come, but also in this Life, if he repent not? This may appear by manifest examples, whereof I will alledge some, both Antient and Modern, out of approv'd Authors, to shew the impious absurdity of *Machiavels* Doctrin, allowing perfidiousness and perjury in a Prince, as necessary sometimes for the benefit of his State.

(*a*) Prov. *ca.* 17. 7. (*b*) Ibid. *ca.* 30. 8. (*c*) Ibid. *ca.* 10. 4. (*d*) *Aug. contl. Crescon. li.* 3. *ca.* 9. (*e*) Ioan. 8. 44.

32. And

32. And first to speak of those Holy Scriptures, we Read in *Genesis*, (*a*) that *Simeon* and *Levi* the Children of *Jacob*, were curs'd by their Father at his Death, because they had violated their League made with *Sichem*, and *Hemor*, whom they destroy'd with their City, contrary to their promise and covenant. (*b*) *Cursed*, says *Jacob*, *be their fury because it was obstinate*; and prophecying farther of the Temporal punishment, which God wou'd inflict upon their posterity for the same, he adds, *I will divide them in* Jacob, *and disperse them amongst the Children of* Israel. Which was fulfill'd afterwards, as Saint *Hierom* witnesses, (*c*) because their Tribes had not their habitation apart as the others had, for the Tribe of *Levi* was divided, and sent into divers Cities amongst the other Tribes, to be their Levits, and Priests; and the Tribe of *Simeon*, had their dwelling with the Tribe of *Iuda*; and as the *Hebrews* affirm, (*d*) serv'd for School-masters in all the other Tribes, and got their living by teaching Children.

33. In like manner the punishment of God was remarkable upon King *Sauls* posterity, (*e*) for his breach of League which *Josue* made with the *Gabaonits*; (*f*) wherein 'tis to be noted, that thô the *Gabaonits* craftily circumvented *Josue*, and induc'd him by fraud and deceit to make a League with 'em, putting on their old Shooes and torn

(*a*) Genes. 34. (*b*) Genes. 49. 5. 7. (*c*) *Hieron. in traditionibus hebraicis in Genesim.* (*d*) *Pererius in Genes. cap.* 49. (*e*) 2 Reg. *cap.* 21. (*f*) Iosue 9.

Cloths,

Clothes, and affirming that they were a people dwelling in a far Country, who being mov'd with the fame of his Victories, were come ſo many days Journy to meet him, that they had worn out their Shooes and Clothes in their Voyage, whereas they dwelt not far of, and in the very Land of Promiſe which God had given to the Children of *Iſrael*, nevertheleſs when *Joſue* diſcover'd their deceit he had ſuch regard to his Oath, that he wou'd by no means violate it, but anſwer'd to the Children of *Iſrael*, when they murmur'd againſt him, ſaying, (*d*) *We have Sworn unto them in the Name of the Lord God of* Iſrael, *and therefore we may not touch 'em leſt the wrath of God falls upon us if we break our Oath.* Thus ſays *Joſue* whereby we may learn how great the obligation is of all juſt, and lawful Leagues, or other Covenants paſs'd by Oath; and how dangerous the breach thereof is, in reſpect of God's juſt and ſevere judgment upon the offenders in that behalf, whereof the experience was ſeen above three hundred years after *Joſues* time in the breach of that League made by *Saul*, for which the Children of *Iſraël* were afflicted with three years Famine in *Davids* time, and ſeven of *Sauls* Children, and his family were deliver'd into the hands of the *Gabaonits*, and Crucifi'd by them in puniſhment of *Sauls* offence. (*b*)

34. Moreover we Read in the Book of *Machabees* (*c*) that *Andronicus*, a favorite of King *Anti-*

(*a*) Ioſue *cap.* 9. *ver.* 19. (*b*) Reg. *cap.* 21. (*c*) 2 Mach. *cap.* 4.

echus,

echus, was by the juſt judgment of God, and the Command of *Antiochus* himſelf, ſhamefully put to Death, in the ſame place where he had kill'd *Onias* the High Prieſt, who had render'd himſelf upon his promiſe of ſecurity. Alſo the examples hereof are very remarkable amongſt the Heathens who obſerv'd diligently the Judgments of God upon traiterous and perfidious perſons; and therefore when *Tiſſaphernes* the *Perſian* made War againſt the *Grecians*, and broke a Truce which he had made with 'em for three Months. *Ageſilaus* greatly rejoyc'd, ſaying, (*a*) *We are beholding to* Tiſſaphernes, *for making the Gods his Enemies, and our Friends, wherefore let us boldly give him Battel*, and ſo he did, and gave him a great overthrow.

35. *Plutarch* alſo recounts a memorable example of *Cleomenes* King of *Lacedæmon*, (*b*) who having made Truce with the *Argians* for ſeven days, ſet upon their Camp in the Night, and taking 'em unprovided by reaſon of the Truce, made great Slaughter of 'em, and being reproach'd with the breach of his promiſe and oath, he jeſted at it, ſaying, *That he Swore Truce for the Days, and not for the Nights*, but ſo it fell out, ſays *Plutarch*, in puniſhment of his falſhood and perjury, that it ſerv'd him to no purpoſe; for whereas he aſſail'd the City preſently, hoping to take it with all facility, he had a ſhameful repulſe by the Women, who dwelt therein; and after

(*a*) *Polim. li.* 2. (*b*) *Plutar. in Apoph. Lacedemon.*

falling

falling furiously Mad, he took a Knife and ripp'd up his own Body, from his very Heel to his Heart, and so dy'd laughing.

36. The same Author also signifies, (*a*) that one *Calippus* being justly charg'd with a Conspiracy against *Dion* of *Sicily*, and having deny'd it with many Solemn Oaths in the Temple of *Ceres*, was by God's just Judgment Slain with the same Dagger wherewith *Dion* was kill'd before by his consent. I omit divers other examples, which might be alledg'd out of prophane Historians, to add a few out of Christian, and Modern Authors.

37. The severe Judgments of God upon Men for the sin of perjury, have been always so evident amongst *Christians*, that the custom was in the Primitive Church to decide matters in Controversie by Oaths at certain holy places, and the Tombs of Martyrs, where Almighty God ordinarily extended his Justice upon perjur'd persons, which custom as Saint *Austin* witnesses, (*b*) was in use in his time at *Milan*, whereof he says; *I my self have known, that in* Milan *at the Shrines of Saints, where Devils do Miraculously and terribly confess the truth, a certain Thief who went thither with intention to deceive by perjury, was compell'd to confess his Theft, and to restore that which he had Stol'n.* Signifying withal, that he had sent a Priest of his call'd *Bonifacius*, and another who had accus'd him of certain Crimes, to the Body of Saint *Felix* at *Nola* in *Italy*, where he says great

(*a*) *Plut. in Dione.* (*b*) *Aug. ep.* 137.

Miracles

Miracles were then wrought, to the end that the bad Conſcience of one of 'em, might there be diſcover'd, either by fear, or Divine puniſhment; (*a*) and farther debating in the ſame place, why God, who is every where, and to be Ador'd in Spirit and Truth, do's ſhew his power and judgments Miraculouſly in ſome places, more then in others? He concludes, (*b*) that 'tis to be left to the inſcrutable Judgments of God; for, ſays he, as he gives his Graces, and gifts differently to his Servants, to one the Grace to heal and cure diſeaſes, to another to diſcern Spirits, and not all gifts to all alike: So alſo he will not, that theſe kind of Miracles be done in all places alike.

38. But to proceed, Saint *Gregory* teſtifies, (*c*) that the ſame cuſtom of the diſcovery of truth, by Oaths in Holy places, was alſo us'd in his time; namely in *Rome*, at the Bodies of the Saints *Proceſſus*, and *Martinian*; where he ſays, *Perjuri veniunt, & à demonibus vexantur, demoniaci veniunt & liberantur. Perjur'd perſons come thither, and are vex'd with Devils, and ſuch as are poſſeſt with Devils are deliver'd.* And the like is alſo witneſſed by S. *Gregory* of *Tours* (*d*) of the Body of Saint *Pancratius* in *Rome*; whom he therefore calls; *Valde in perjuris ultorem*; *A ſevere puniſher of perjury*; affirming, that as ſoon as the party, who came thither for his purgation, did forſwear himſelf, he was either preſently poſſeſt by the Devil, or elſe fell down

(*a*) *Aug. ep.* 137. (*b*) Ibid. (*c*) *Grego. Hom.* 38 *in Evan.* (*d*) *Greg. Turo. de gloria Mart. ca.* 39.

dead upon the ground; and recounts the same of the Body of Saint *Polieuctus* in *Constantinople*. (a)

39. But of this matter we have a most famous, and Authentical example in our own Histories. *Elfred* a Noble Man of *England*, in the time of King *Adelstan*, with some others Conspir'd against him, and being accus'd thereof, stood upon his justification, and because the evidence was not sufficient to convince him, he was sent to *Rome*, as the custom was then, to make his Purgation by Oath at the Body of Saint *Peter*; where he Swore contrary to his own Conscience, and presently fell down before the Altar, and dy'd within three days after; (b) upon notice whereof, King *Adelstan*, to shew his Gratitude and Devotion towards Saint *Peter*, gave all the Lands of *Elfred* unto the Church of Saint *Peter* in the Abby of *Malmesbury* by Letters Patents, wherein, after the grant of the said Lands, he declar'd the whole matter, as it pass'd, in these words.

40. *Be it known to all Wise Men of this our Country, that we have not taken unjustly the foresaid Lands, nor giv'n to God an unlawful Spoil, but we receiv'd 'em, as well by the Judgment of all the Nobility of* England, *as also of* John *the Apostolical Pope of the* Roman *Church, by the Death of* Elfred, *who was the Enemy of our Life, and Felicity; and consented to the wickedness of other our Enemies, which Conspir'd to put out our Eyes at the Town of* Winchester, *after our Fathers Death; from*

(a) Idem Ibid. *cap.* 103. (b) *Guil. Malmesb. de gest. Reg. Angl. li.* 2. *ca.* 6.

which

which God of his great Mercy deliver'd us; whereupon their Conſpiracy being diſcover'd, and Elfred *ſent to* Rome *to purge himſelf before* John *the Apoſtolical Biſhop, he took his Oath at the Altar of Saint* Peter, *and preſently fell down to the ground, and was carry'd away by his Servants to the (a) School of the* Engliſh, *where he dy'd the third Night after, and then the Apoſtolical Biſhop ſent to us, to know what we wou'd have to be done with the Body, and whether it ſhou'd be Bury'd with Chriſtian Burial, which at the earneſt, and humble ſuit of his Kinsfolks, and others of our Nobility, we were content to grant; and ſo we ſigniſi'd unto the Pope, by whoſe conſent he was Bury'd amongſt other Chriſtians, thô unworthy thereof; and ſo all his Poſſeſſions little and great, were adjudg'd to us, which we have thought good to ſignifie by theſe Letters Patents, to the end that ſo long as Chriſtianity ſhall Reign, it may be known how we got the foreſaid Poſſeſſions, which we have now given to God and Saint* Peter, *it ſeeming to us moſt juſt, to give the ſame to them who overthrew our Enemy in the ſight of all Men, and gave us the proſperous Reign and Kingdom which we enjoy. VVilliam* of *Malmesbury*, (*b*) who liv'd in *VVilliam* the Conquerors time, cites theſe Letters Patents, out of the Original then extant in the Abby, where he Writ his Hiſtory.

(*a*) This School of the *Engliſh* was not where the *Engliſh* Hoſpital is now, as *Polidore Virgil* erroneouſly conceives, but where the Hoſpital of *S. Spirito* is near to Saint *Peters*. (*b*) *Gul. Malmesb. de geſt. Reg. Angl. li.* 2. *ca.* 6.

41. Alſo ſome Years after in the ſame Age, (*a*) *Lotharius* King of *Auſtraſia*, which contain'd all *Lorrain*, *Flanders*, and ſome part of *Germany*, *Burgundy* and *France*, came to *Rome* accompany'd with all his Nobility in the time of *Adrian* the II. to be Abſolv'd from the Excommunication which he had incurr'd, in the time of Pope *Nicolas* the I. for his Divorce from his lawful Wife *Theutperga*, and his Marriage with *VValdrada* his Concubine; and whereas he had been alſo farther accus'd to the See Apoſtolick, of divers Crimes concerning the ſame matter, he was content for his juſtification, to receive the Bleſſed Sacrament at the hands of Pope *Adrian*, together with his Nobility, which he did, proteſting for his part, that he was innocent of thoſe things, whereof he had been accus'd, which his Nobility alſo confirm'd, thô 'twas moſt falſe; as afterwards it evidently appear'd by God's examplar puniſhment upon 'em all; for whereas they departed homewards ſhortly after from *Rome*, there fell amongſt 'em ſuch a ſtrange diſeaſe, that *Lotharius* having ſeen the Death of moſt of his Noble Men, before he came to *Luca*, fell ſick there himſelf, and a few days after, dy'd at *Placentia*; (*b*) and of all thoſe who receiv'd the Bleſſed Sacrament with him, there liv'd not any one to the Years end, as teſtifies *Regino*, *Aymonius*, *Sigonius*, *Naucleru*s and divers others.

(*a*) *Regino. Chron. Aymoyn. li. 5. ca. 21. Sigon. de reg. Ital. an. 869. Naucler. Chron. an. 867. Baron. an. 868.* (*b*) *Vbi ſupra.*

42. But

42. But to return to our own Country. (*a*) Earl *Godwin*, Father to King *Harold*, having procur'd the untimely Death of *Alfred*, Brother to King *Edward* the Confeſſor, continually deny'd the fact by Solemn Oath, and eſpecially once, when he Din'd with the King; at what time, occaſion being offer'd to ſpeak of that matter, he took a piece of Bread and pray'd God, that the ſame might be his laſt, if he were any way conſenting, or privy thereunto, and ſo eating the Bread he was chok'd therewith, and dy'd there in the Kings Preſence.

43. 'Tis alſo obſerv'd and teſtifi'd by moſt of the Ancient Hiſtorians of our Country, that the overthrow of King *Harold* by *William*, the Conqueror, was a juſt puniſhment of God upon him for his perjury; the Story is briefly thus. *Harold* being in *Normandy* with Duke *William*, in the time of King *Edward* the Confeſſor, promis'd to aſſiſt him in his pretence to the Crown of *England*, after the Death of the King, which he alſo confirm'd by Solemn Oath: Whereupon Duke *William* fianc'd his Daughter unto him, and becauſe ſhe was not then of years to be Marry'd, he took *Harolds* Oath to perform the Marriage within a certain time after. But when the time appointed for the Marriage was expir'd, and *Harold* ſhew'd no care, to perform any part of his promiſes, the Duke ſent Meſſengers to him to deſire him to fulfill what he had promis'd, but

(*a*) *Henry Hunt. Hiſt. li. 6. Ingulphus Hiſt. Angli. an. 15. Polidor. Hiſt. Angli.*

he instead of giving satisfaction to the Duke, derided and abus'd his Messengers; causing some of their Horse Tailes to be cut off, and others to be lam'd; and afterwards when King *Edward* dy'd, he endeavour'd not only to exclude the Duke from the Crown, but also to procure it for himself; pretending that his promise to the Duke was made out of fear, and that therefore it cou'd not bind him. And when the Duke was enter'd in *England* with his Army, and solicited him by Messengers to have care of his Conscience, representing to him the severe judgments of God upon perjur'd persons, offering to come to some reasonable composition with him; he made no account thereof, nor of the admonition of his own Brother call'd *Gurth*, who advis'd him seriously before the Battel to retire himself, and to leave the conduct of the Army unto him, and others who were not bound to the Duke by any Oath or Promise; lest otherwise God shou'd suffer 'em all for this cause to be overthrown; whereunto he answer'd, that he wou'd put it to a venter, and that God shou'd be Judge thereof; and so giving Battel was Slain himself, and all his Army overthrown; whereupon also follow'd the Conquest of his Country. And thô the said Conquest might seem to be a punishment of God upon the whole Kingdom, for the sins of the people, as I have already declar'd, (*a*) yet the particular disgrace which happen'd to King *Harolds* Person, may well be

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 21. *Nu.* 21. 22. & 23.

thought

thought to have proceeded from God's juſt judgment for his perjury; which the *Engliſh* Hiſtorians who Writ in that Age, or near that time, do ſignifie; (*a*) as *Ingulphus*, *William* of *Malmesbury*, *Henry Huntindon*, *Matthew* of *Weſtminſter*, *Matthew Paris*, and *Roger Hovedon*, who ſpeaking of that Victory, ſays, *Vere & abſque dubio Dei judicio abſcribenda eſt; qui puniendo ſcelus perjurij, oſtendit ſe Deum nolentem iniquitatem; Truly and without doubt 'tis to be aſcrib'd to the judgment of God, who puniſhing the Crime of perjury, ſhew'd that he is a God who do's not allow of iniquity.*

44. But to come nearer to our time, *Philip de Comines* notes (*b*) the manifeſt Juſtice of God, in the diſgraceful Death of *Charles* late Duke of *Burgundy*, throu' the Treaſon of *Campobachio* an *Italian*, ſoon after the ſaid *Charles* had betray'd the Count Saint *Paul*, and ſent him Priſoner to *Lewis* the XI. King of *France*, notwithſtanding he had given him a Paſs to come into his Country.

45. Moreover, I cannot omit *Caſar Borgia*, thô I have ſpoken of him divers times before. For as *Machiavel* truly makes him a Mirror for his Tyranny, in reſpect of his many Vices; ſo he may truly be propos'd for an Example of God's Juſtice, in reſpect of the many Judgments that God divers ways inflicted upon him; and particularly in the puniſhment of his perfidiouſneſs and perjury; whereby he deceiv'd and ruin'd

(*a*) *Ingulphus Hiſt. Angl. Hen. Hunt. Hiſt. li. 6. Gul. Malmesb. lib. 3. Roger Hoved. Annal. par. 1.*
(*b*) *Philip. de Comines. Chron. du Roy Louis ca 8. & 9. 01.*

divers principal persons, (*a*) as *Liverotto*, *Vittellozzo*, *Pagolo Vrsino*, and the Duke of *Gravina*; whom he caus'd to be Strangl'd, after they had rendr'd themselves unto him upon composition, and employ'd themselves faithfully in his Service; wherein God's Justice upon *Liverotto* may be noted, who a little before, had cruelly and traiterously Murder'd his own Uncle, and divers other principal Citizens of *Fermo*, having invited 'em to a Banket in his own House: Which perfidious treachery of his, God punish'd as it seem'd, by the treachery, and perfidiousness of *Cæsar Borgia*; (*b*) who also receiv'd the like measure himself of others, soon after; for whereas he had taken the Oaths of forty principal persons to assist him after his Fathers Death, he was forsaken by them all, and afterwards putting himself into the hands of *Hernando Gonsales* Governor of *Naples*, upon his promise to protect him, he was also betray'd by him, and sent Prisoner into *Spain*, as I have signifi'd elsewhere. (*c*)

46. The like Justice of God may be noted also in *Christiern* King of *Denmark*, and *Norway*, who Marry'd a Sister of the Emperor *Charles* the V. in the time of *Henry* the VIII. King of *England*. (*d*) This *Christiern* besieging *Stockholm* in *Suecia* took it by composition, binding himself to certain conditions, not only by Oath, but also by receiving the Blessed Sacrament, which conditions he observ'd for some days, till he had the

(*a*) *Guicciard. li.* 5. (*b*) Ibid. (*c*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 3. *Nu.* 42. (*d*) *Surius anno* 2617.

Castle,

Caſtle, and all the ſtrongeſt places of the Town in his own hands, (*a*) and that he had furniſh'd 'em with Men, and Ammunition; and then inviting all the Noble Men, and Magiſtrates to a Banket, to the number of ninty four, he impriſon'd 'em, and after kill'd 'em, with a great number of the Citizens; and finding that many eſcap'd by hiding themſelves, he promis'd by Proclamation, Life and Liberty to all thoſe, which were left alive, whereupon they all diſcover'd themſelves, and were all of 'em miſerably Slain. And within a while after he was driven out of his Kingdom by his own Subjects; and when he had wander'd from Country to Country, in all Poverty and Miſery, for the ſpace of ten years, he was receiv'd again by ſome of the chiefeſt of his Nobility, who thô they promis'd him obedience and aſſiſtance under their Hands and Seals, nevertheleſs they took him Priſoner upon his Entrance, and within a while poyſon'd him in Priſon; whereby his perfidious falſhood was juſtly repay'd in the ſame kind; after whoſe depoſition and Death, his Uncle *Frederick* a Worthy Prince, was choſen King of *Denmark*, of whom Queen *Ann*, Wife to King *James* the I, Lineally Deſcended.

47. About the ſame time alſo, the Duke of *Burbon* (*b*) being fled from *Francis* the I, King of *France*, to the Service of the Emperor *Charles* the V, who made by him Governor of *Milan*, ſo

(*a*) *Olaus Mag. li.* 8. *ca.* 39. (*b*) *Munſter. Geograph. li.* 3. *Martin du Belley anno* 1527.

exaſperated

exasperated the people by his exactions and cruelty, that they rose up against him; who to pacifie 'em, bound himself by Oath to certain conditions, praying also to God, that in case he did not exactly perform 'em, he might be kill'd with a Bullet in the first occasion of War that shou'd be offer'd; nevertheless, he fell afterwards again to his former course, without regard of his Oath, and being within a while after, made General of the Emperors Army in *Italy*, he was tumultuously carry'd by the Soldiers against his Will to the Siege of *Rome*, (*a*) where he was presently Slain with a piece of Artillery of his own, negligently discharg'd by his Soldiers, and so he pay'd the penalty of his perjury, according to the Judgment and Sentence he had Prophetically given against himself. To conclude, to these may be added *Henry* the III, King of *France*, (*b*) on whom Almighty God wonderfully extended his Justice in this kind, as I have particularly declar'd in this Chapter upon another occasion, and therefore shall not need to repeat it here.

48. Wherefore, I wish all *Machiavillians* wou'd consider three things, which are made evident by these examples. First, how detestable perfidiousness and perjury is in the sight of God; Secondly, how dangerous also 'tis to Princes, in regard of God's wrath, which throu' the severity of God's Justice will fall upon 'em, and their States for the same; against which no human wit, or power is able

(*a*) *Paulus Iovius de expug. urbis Romæ.*
(*b*) *Supra Nu.* 8.

to

to defend 'em; Thirdly, that all *Machiavillian* remedies, conſiſting as I ſayd before, partly in human prudence and diligence, and partly in force, and ſtrength of Guards, Gariſons, Fortreſſes, and ſuch like, are moſt frivolous and vain, when God is offended, and will puniſh for ſin; whereupon it follows, that the foreſaid remedies are in like manner inſufficient to protect a perfidious Prince from the danger of human puniſhment, which is commonly but a ſequel and effect of the juſt Judgments of God, in whoſe hand are the Hearts and Wills of all Men, and who uſes the ſame as his Inſtruments to execute his Juſtice upon Princes when they deſerve it; as I have before ſignifi'd, (*a*) and purpoſe to declare more fully hereafter in the Seventh Chapter.

49. Beſides, 'tis evident enough in true reaſon of State, that thô there were no danger at all of God's wrath, yet theſe and ſuch other *Machiavillian* Policies, are not only inſufficient to prevent or remedy the inconveniences which wicked Princes incur by the hatred of Men, but alſo many times encreaſe their dangers, and help to precipitate 'em into their utter ruin and deſtruction; whereof I forbear to treat more particularly here, partly becauſe 'twould require a longer Diſcourſe than is convenient for this place, and partly becauſe I ſhall have a ſufficient occaſion to ſpeak thereof at large in the Fourth Chapter, where I will examin certain principles of *Machiavels* Doctrin, and ſhew the vanity thereof, for the better inſtruction

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Chap.* 7. *Nu.* 7.

of

of a young States-man. And in the mean time this ſhall ſuffice, for what concerns the vertue of fidelity in a Prince; with this concluſion, that becauſe the danger that Princes incur by fraud and deceit, proceeds principally from the juſt Judgments of God, as I have fully declar'd; therefore the young States-man and Counſellor whom I inform, ought to underſtand what concerns this vertue of fidelity, as well as all other vertues; that the reputation, which he is to deſire and procure in his Prince, muſt be grounded, not upon vain ſhew's and appearances of counterfeit vertue, which God in Juſtice will diſcover, and puniſh ſooner or later, but upon the ſolid foundation of ſincerity and truth, which is the ſureſt pillar and ſtay, of all human actions, and moſt grateful both to God and Man; and therefore the Wiſe Man ſays, (*a*) *He who walks ſimply, and plainly, walks boldly and ſurely; And he who runs an indirect courſe, ſhall be diſcover'd.*

50. It requires now, that I ſay ſomewhat thô very briefly, of the reputation of a Princes power and greatneſs, the loſs and decay whereof emboldens his Enemies, diſcourages his friends, and expoſes his perſon to the contempt of all Men, and his State to infinite dangers. For as the reputation of a Princes greatneſs, wealth, and power, ſtrikes a terror and fear into the hearts as well of his Subjects, as of Strangers, and withholds 'em from Conſpiring againſt him: So alſo

(*a*) Proverb. *cap.* 10. 9.

the

the opinion of his weakneſs, works the contrary effect, and is the very Mother, and Nurſe of Rebellions, Conſpiracies, and all Hoſtile attempts; and no Man knows how ſmall an attempt may overthrow the greateſt State in the World; ſeeing it depends only upon the ſucceſs, which no Man can warrant; and many times is ſuch, that it deceives all Mens expectation; and therefore the ſureſt and wiſeſt way is, to uſe all preventions, that nothing be attempted againſt the State.

51. To which purpoſe the reputation of a Princes power, force, and greatneſs helps very much; which *Auguſtus Cæſar* knew ſo well, that having loſt an Army in *Germany* of forty thouſand Men, yet he continu'd the War for no other neceſſity or reaſon as *Tacitus* notes, (*a*) than to maintain the opinion and reputation of his power; leſt otherwiſe he might grow to be contemn'd as the great *Xerxes* was, who having terrifi'd all *Greece* with his great Army of a Million of Men, was upon his overthrow and return into *Perſia* ſo diſpis'd, that he was kill'd by one of his own Subjects. So dangerous 'tis for a Prince, how great ſoever he is, to looſe his reputation: Wherefore I conclude, that it imports a Wiſe Counſellor to meaſure and weigh all the commodity and benefit of his Prince, as well with his Reputation, as with his Conſcience, thô not in a like degree.

52. For thô Reputation be the chief external good of Man, as I have before ſignifi'd, yet 'tis

(*a*) *Tacit. li. 1. annal. Juſtin. li.*

inferior

inferior to the internal, which conſiſts in the goods of the mind, whereof a pure Conſcience is the chief; becauſe therein conſiſts the chief felicity of Man in this Life, as Saint *Ambroſe* ſays: (*a*) Beſides, the benefit which redounds to Princes from purity of Conſcience, is the favor and protection of Almighty God to them and their States in this World, and alſo an Eternal Reward and Salvation of their Souls in the next; and the dammage that enſues from a corrupt and ſinful Conſcience, is God's indignation in this Life, whereby the greateſt Monarchs and their Monarchies have periſh'd; and Everlaſting Damnation in the World to come: Whereas on the other ſide, all the benefit or dammage, that the gain or loſs of Reputation can yield, being conſider'd in it ſelf, extends no farther, than to the favor or diſfavor of Men; who can neither uphold whom God overthrows, nor overthrow whom God protects; for as the Apoſtle ſays, (*b*) *If God be with us, 'tis no matter who's againſt us.*

53. Whereupon it follows, that whether we regard the dignity and benefit of Conſcience and Reputation, or elſe the dammage that enſues from the blemiſh of either of 'em; the reſpect of Conſcience is far to be preferr'd before the other; and the loſs of Reputation is then principally to be fear'd, when Conſcience is alſo ſtain'd; for then the Prince lying open to the contempt and hatred, as well of God as Man, has no defence, but may well fear and expect puniſhment from

(*a*) *Ambroſe l.* 1. *de Offi. c.* 12. (*b*) Rom. 8. 31.

both;

both; and the rather, because the loss and want of Reputation, is one special means whereby God is us'd to execute his just Judgment on wicked Princes; it being most consonant to justice and reason, that those who contemn and disobey their Soveraign Lord, King, and Creator, shou'd be ruin'd by the contempt, hatred and disobedience of their own Subjects; which danger is justly to be fear'd, when both Reputation and Conscience are stain'd.

54. But when Conscience is pure and entire, the loss of Reputation is nothing so dangerous; for thô the most just and best Men, are sometimes so calumniated, that they incur infamy and disgrace, throu' the practice of the wicked; yet for as much as the fame has no ground at all, it vanishes away like smoke, and is ever throu' God's Justice, discover'd and clear'd in the end, to their greater reputation and Honor; and in the mean time they have the comfort, not only of God's protection, as I have sayd, but also of their own Consciences; the good testimony whereof gives in such cases an inestimable consolation, and therefore the Apostle says, (*a*) *The testimony of our Conscience is our glory.* In which respect Wise and Vertuous Princes, thô they always have due care of their reputation, yet do not so much regard false rumors, when their Conscience is clear, as to forbear the execution of any good and necessary design, for fear thereof, but follow the example of the Wise and Valiant

(*a*) 2 Cor. *cap.* 1. *ver.* 12.

Consul

Consul *Fabius Maximus*; (a) *Qui non ponebat rumores ante salutem: VVho preferr'd not rumors before the good of the Common-wealth.* For thô his delays against *Hannibal* were throu' the malice of his Enemies much caluminated and generally condemn'd, by the common people, as proceeding out of cowardize; yet he was nothing mov'd thereby, thinking it, as he sayd, a greater cowardize to leave a good purpose for fear of Mens Tongues, than to leave the Field for fear of an Enemy. In which respect he continu'd his course, till he had thereby wasted and consum'd the Forces of *Hannibal*, with security to the *Roman* State, for which, he was afterwards highly commended, because, as *Ennius* says, (b) *Cunctando restituit rem. He repair'd and restor'd the State of the* Romans *by delays.*

55. Nevertheless in such cases also, all diligence is to be us'd by Princes and their Counsellors, to take away the scandal, that may follow the Erroneous conceit of their actions, thô their Consciences be never so clear; whereupon Saint *Austin* says, (c) *That he who trusting to his Conscience, neglects his Fame or good Name, is cruel.* Whereof he gives this reason, *Because*, says he, *he kills the Souls of others*; for thô he do's not the evil that is suppos'd, yet the very supposition thereof, serves for a stumbling-block to overthrow such, as are weak and ill disposed; and therefore Saint *Austin* also says, (d) *That Con-*

(a) *Plut. in Fabio. Cicero li. 1. Officio.* (b) *Ennius apud Ceron li. 1. de Offic.* (c) *Aug. Ser. 49. ca. 1. & de bono viduitatis ca. 21.* (d) *Aug. Ibid.*

science

ſcience and fame being two things, the one of 'em is neceſſary for us, and the other for our Neighbour, and that he, *who keeps his Conſcience clear, do's good to himſelf, but he who preſerves his fame, do's good to others.*

56. For this cauſe alſo, *Plato* requires, (*a*) in every good and vertuous Man, that he takes ſpecial care to leave behind him an everlaſting reputation and fame of his vertues, thereby to ſtir up not only Men of his time, but alſo all Poſterity to the imitation thereof; the which is moſt neceſſary in publick perſons, and eſpecially in Princes; becauſe their example incites to vertue or vice much more, than the example of private Men; and therefore not only reaſon of State, but Conſcience alſo binds 'em to be moſt careful of their reputation and good name, and not to permit the leaſt blemiſh therein, thô it be never ſo unjuſt, if it can be conveniently remedy'd; but when it cannot be help'd without ſome greater detriment to themſelves, or to the Common-wealth, then 'tis to be tolerated and borne with patience; for both Reaſon and Conſcience require, that the publick and common good be preferr'd before any Mans particular benefit; and that of two inconveniences the leſs is to be choſen, whereof Conſcience is to be Judge.

57. Wherefore I conclude, that whereas Commodity, Conſcience, and Reputation, are to be reſpected in all deliberations concerning Princes affairs, Conſcience ought always to predominate,

(*a*) *Plut. ep. ad. Dionyſium.* 2.

and to serve for the Touch-stone and Rule, as well of Reputation, as of all Temporal Commodities; and therein a Counsellor will well discharge his Duty, if in all his Consultations he holds the known axiom of *Cicero* for his ground, (a) *Nihil est utile quod non sit honestum. Nothing is profitable which is not honest*; which point *Cicero* discourses and teaches very well in his *Offices*.

CHAP. IV.

What a Counsellor is to consider in the matters which are to be Consulted.

AND now to come to the last point of my division, which is to shew what a Counsellor is to regard in the matters to be consulted; 'tis to be understood, that thô the affairs of State are infinite, and therefore cannot be sufficiently reduc'd to particular Rules; yet some things are generally to be consider'd in all matters whatsoever, whereof I will here touch some that at present occur to me.

2. First, for a necessary preamble, or preparative to all deliberations in matters of State, 'tis to be consider'd, that in respect of the connexion

(a) *Cicero de Offic. lib.* 1.

which

which particular affairs of State, either have, or may have with the general State of Forraign Princes, 'tis convenient and neceſſary for a Counſellor to have been a Traveller, or otherwiſe, that he by all means procure, an exact knowledge and underſtanding, not only of his own Princes State and affairs, but alſo of the Eſtates and affairs of other Princes, eſpecially of ſuch as are Neighbours, Enemies, or Confederates of his own Prince.

3. For this end two things are requiſite, that he be affable and courteous towards all Men, willing to hear, and confer with 'em, eſpecially ſtrangers; becauſe by them he may learn very many things, of the State of Forraign Princes and Countries. For as the *Spaniſh* Proverb ſays; *Mas ſabe el necio en ſu caſa, que el cuerdo en la agena; A fool knows more in his own Houſe, than a wiſe Man do's in another Mans.* And thô a Counſellor may perhaps by this facility, be many times troubl'd with impertinent matters; yet he ſhall withal underſtand many things, which may import him to know, and there is no Man ſo wiſe but he may ſometimes hear of a ſimple Man, ſomewhat that may ſerve to very good purpoſe; and therefore the trouble in this caſe is to be borne with patience, in reſpect of the benefit he may reap thereby.

4. The other thing neceſſary for a Counſellors better information, is to procure frequent advices, and intelligence by Letters from all parts, of the State, Humors, and Diſpoſitions of Forraign Princes; of all changes and innovations in their

Courts and Countries; of their Marriages and Alliances, as alſo of their Children, and moſt powerful Subjects; of Embaſſies to and fro, and their Treaties; of proviſions and preparations for War, by Sea and Land, and their intentions therein; of all Taxes and Impoſitions laid upon the people, or other levies of Mony; of the diviſions and diſcontents that happen amongſt the Nobility, or common people; and finally, of all other matters that may tend either to the eſtabliſhment and ſtrengthning, or to the innovation or weakning of other Princes States. For thô a Counſellor by this means hear's many untruths; yet he ſhall very often receive advice of important matters, whereof he may make good uſe and benefit; and being a Man of Judgment, and keeping correſpondence with divers, he may eaſily diſcern truths from falſhoods, by conferring their advices together, eſpecially if he takes order that his correſpondents know not of one another. Finally, he will by this means, not only Judge better, and more clearly of all matters that may concur to his Princes Service; but will alſo make himſelf much more grateful to his Prince, by his diligence; and become more intimate with him, by occaſion of his frequent advices of Forraign News, which Princes are always moſt deſirous to hear.

5. Secondly, a Counſellor is to conſider, that in all matters of Counſel, three things are ſpecially to be regarded; as Saint *Thomas*, (*a*) following

(*a*) *S. Tho. 22. q. 5. Ariſt. li. 6. Ethic*

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle, do's note: The firſt, is a due end; the ſecond, a convenient means; and the third, a fit time and ſeaſon: That is, that the end and means be not only lawful, juſt, and honorable in themſelves, and in their own natures, but alſo convenient, and proportionable as well one to another, as alſo to the Perſon, State, and Power of the Prince; for if there be any inconveniency, or diſproportion in any of theſe, I mean if the means be not convenient for the obtaining of the end, or if the end or means be impoſſible, or above the reach and power of the Prince; or baſe, and any way unfit for his State and Perſon; or if the Counſel be giv'n out of due time and ſeaſon, eſpecially too late; it looſes all its force and eſteem, and cannot be accounted either good or prudent.

6. To this purpoſe I ſay, that according to *Plato's* Rule, (*a*) he, who is to give his opinion of any matter whatſoever, ought firſt fully to underſtand and know the State of the queſtion, with all the circumſtances thereof. For Mans Judgment is grounded upon his knowledge, and guided thereby; and ſome one little circumſtance unknown, may wholly alter the caſe, and cauſe great error in the reſolution, inſomuch that a ſimple Man who knows more of a matter, may judge more wiſely thereof, than a far wiſer Man that knows leſs: And the reaſon why wiſe Men do not always judge with like wiſdom and prudence in all cauſes, is commonly, becauſe they do not underſtand 'em alike.

(*a*) *Plato in Phodro.*

7. But to proceed, the substance and circumstances of the matter being once fully known to the Counsellor, he is then to pass to the consideration of the inconveniencies, difficulties, dangers, discommodities and commodities thereof, which may afford different arguments, *pro & con*, in the discussion and decision, whereby the prudence of a Counsellor is especially discover'd.

8. And here I note by the way, thô perhaps, I may seem somewhat to digress from the matter, that some Men who have great vivacity and sharpness of wit, to find out inconveniencies, to foresee dangers, and to propound objections, doubts, and difficulties, have not maturity of Judgment to clear and decide 'em, or to find out remedies; and others who are more mature and sound in Judgment, are less sharp of wit: And again, that some who are of good capacity, have so little courage, that they are dismay'd with every difficulty, and therefore cannot easily resolve upon any thing; whereas others of less capacity, and more courage, resolve far more easily, and far better in any occasion; so that we may say with the Poët; *Non omnia possumus omnes*; *We cannot all deal all things.* And therefore *Philip de Comines* observes very well, (*a*) that 'tis convenient for Princes to have many Counsellors, to the end that one may supply the defects of another; *For the wisest*, says he, *do often Err, either throu' passion, or throu' hatred or affection, or throu' the indisposition of their persons, especially after Dinner; and if any*, says he, *think that such ought not to be made Coun-*

(*a*) *Phil. de Com. Cron. du Roy. Louis ca.* 27.

sellors

ſellors, it may be anſwer'd, that we are all Men, and that whoſoever will have none to be of a Princes Council, that Err at any time in Speech or Opinion, or are at other times mov'd and led with paſſion or affection, he muſt ſeek 'em in Heaven, for in Earth, none ſuch are to be found. Thus ſays this grave and wiſe Counſellor; which I note here by the way, to the end that young Counſellors may learn, neither to rely too much upon their own opinion, nor raſhly to condemn their fellow Counſellors, if they Err and be ſometimes deceiv'd.

9. And to proſecute this digreſſion yet a little farther, I alſo add, that 'tis neceſſary for a Prince to have his Council compos'd like Man's Body, that is to ſay, of Men of different complexions and humors, to the end that the Cholerick heat and haſty fervor of ſome, may be temper'd with the Flegmatick coldneſs, and ſlow reſolution of others; and that the vivacity of ſome Men's Sanguine Spirits, and Elevated Wits, may be ſomewhat kept down and counterpois'd with the maturity of other Melancholly Judgments, which *Ariſtotle* holds (*a*) to be ſoundeſt in matters of State, whereby the whole Body of the Council may be reduc'd to a perfect temper; ſo that the predominant quality therein, be ſound Judgment in moſt, or in ſome at leaſt; which may help to correct the peccant and offenſive humors of the reſt, and reſtrain the ſuperfluity of overflowing conceits, clear doubts and difficulties, and ſatisfie objections, which proceed many times from them, who are not able to reſolve 'em, and ſerve to

(*a*) *Ariſt. problem. Sect.* 30. *quæſt.* 1.

great purpoſe in Councils, to whet the Wits and open the Underſtanding of Men of Judgment. This I have thought good to touch by the way, that the young Counſellor whom I adviſe, may underſtand ſomewhat as well the nature of a Council, as of the Office and Duty of a Counſellor.

10. But now to return to the conſideration of matters to be conſulted, 'tis requiſite that a Counſellor prudently weighs, and compares the incommodities with the commodities; the inconveniences with the remedies; the difficulties and dangers, with the poſſibilities, and probability to overcome 'em; and not to reject a very commodious and honorable deſign becauſe 'tis coſtly, or ſome way inconvenient, difficult or dangerous; for as the Proverb ſays, *Omnis commoditas fert incommodia ſecum*; *There is no commodity without an incommodity*: As alſo, *Difficilia quæ pulchra*; *Things that are honorable, are alſo difficult*; and therefore 'tis to be foreſeen, and provided that the commodities overweighs the dammages; that the gain quits the coſt; that every inconvenience has ſome convenience, and that every difficulty be ſome way facilitated; that every important danger may be probably either eſcap'd or prevented; that of commodities which cannot be had together, the greater be choſen; and of inconveniences, when all cannot be avoided, the leaſt be admitted; all which being foreſeen, and probably provided for, any important action whatſoever, may be determin'd, counſell'd, and undertaken; notwithſtanding that ſome difficulties, and dangers may be

be incident thereunto. For he that will not take pains to crack the Nut, cannot eat the Kernel, and he that will not hazard any thing, will gain nothing; *For nothing venture*, ſays the Proverb, *nothing have.*

11. Yet this is to be underſtood, that the danger muſt not be over great; which may partly be provided for, if it be foreſeen; as alſo, that the greateſt danger rather concerns ſome circumſtance of the matter, than the principal part, or the whole body of the plot; and that the benefit expected, far exceeds the loſs or detriment which may be fear'd: Otherwiſe no certain thing of moment muſt be left, or adventur'd for a thing uncertain ſince as the Proverb ſays, (*a*) *A Bird in the hand is worth two in the buſh*, and in doubtful matters which cannot fully be reſolv'd, the leſs doubtful or more aſſur'd are to be preferr'd; and finally the hope of benefit muſt be grounded upon probable reaſon, and ſufficient means to compaſs the ſame, and not upon chance; which is ſo uncertain that no Man can ſafely build any important matter thereupon. And therefor *Tiberius Cæſar* held it for a great Maxim of State, as *Tacitus* witneſſes. *Non omittere caput rerum, neque ſe in caſum dare*; *Neither to let ſlip the firſt opportunities, nor to adventure himſelf or his affairs upon chance*, that is, not to hazard himſelf or his Eſtate in any enterpriſe, when he had not a ſufficient probability of good ſucceſs.

12. For thô the event of all Plots that are put in execution, is caſual, depending upon the

(*a*) *Tacit. Annal.*

Will

Will of God, as I have before amply declar'd, yet 'tis a Wise Mans part to do that which lies in him, to assure it, by all probable and convenient means, and then to leave the rest to God's disposition; for otherwise he shou'd tempt God and offend him by his negligence; as I have before signifi'd; (*a*) wherefore without this probability of assurance, no matter of importance ought to be attempted by any Wise Man, except in desperate cases, when the necessity and exigence is so great and sudden, as sometimes it falls out to be, that there is no time or place for discourse; for then there is no remedy, but to trust only to God and a Man's good fortune; which falls out many times better than according to human prudence cou'd be expected or imagin'd; as it did to *Iulius Cæsar*, (*b*) who finding himself unable to give Battle to *Pompey*, because his Forces were not arriv'd, and being in the mean time constrain'd to disguise himself, and go to Sea in a little Fregat, in such stormy weather and rough Seas, that the Pilot wou'd not venture out, discover'd himself unto him, bidding him set Sail and fear nothing, because he carry'd *Cæsar* and his fortune; which succeeded well, for thereby he escap'd at that time, and afterwards overthrew *Pompey*, and became Emperor of the World; but this he did because he had no other remedy, thinking it better rather to expose himself to the mercy of the Sea, than of his Enemy.

13. And in such desperate and sudden exigences when there's no time and place for Wisdom or

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Chap.* 1. *Num.* 6. (*b*) *Plut. in Iulio Cæsare.*

Discourse,

Diſcourſe, the Counſel of ſome ſimple Idiot may be better than of the Wiſeſt Man; for as *Ariſtotle* ſays, ſome ſuch being by the Providence of God born fortunate, and following the impulſe and motion of Nature, may adviſe or execute more happily than Men of great Wiſdom, who pondering all things in the ballance of reaſon and diſcourſe, do not follow many times a fortunate motion in themſelves, or the happy Counſel of others, becauſe they ſee not ſome good and reaſonable ground for the ſame, whereby they neglect and looſe their good fortune. And to this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* alledges the old Proverb; *Fortuna favet fatuis*; *Fortune favor's Fools*, as I have before ſignifi'd, where I have ſpoken of this Point.

14. Hereupon I conclude two things; the one that except in caſe of neceſſity, a Wiſe Man ought to leave nothing to chance, that may be any way aſſur'd by reaſonable means, becauſe of the danger that may thereby enſue; for thô dangerous Counſels grounded upon hope of good fortune, ſpeed well ſometimes by meer chance, yet they prove moſt commonly pernicious, and therefore the Wiſe Man ſays well; (*a*) *He who loves danger ſhall periſh in it.*

15. The other concluſion is, that ſeeing Men are many times put to ſuch ſudden extremities, that they have no time or opportunity to take advice, or ſufficiently to conſult with others, 'tis moſt neceſſary, that they provide and arm themſelves againſt the ſame by frequent Prayer, and

(*a*) Eccli. *cap.* 3. *ver.* 27.

by

by a daily recommendation of all their actions to Almighty God, the Author and giver of all good success, to the end that he may in such cases, guide, protect and prosper 'em; as I before have sufficiently declar'd, (*a*) and cannot repeat too often, because I esteem it to be the best advice that any Counsellor can give to his Prince.

16. The third shall be to ponder and examen diligently, not only the present state of the matter, and the immediate or next sequels thereof, but also what may be like to succeed from time to time, and especially what may be the conclusion or upshot of the whole; for many times it falls out, that designs prosper and succeed well for a while, and yet overthrow the Authors and attempters in the end; not so much by fortune or chance, as by oversight of the Counsellor or contriver thereof, who being deceiv'd with the appearance or hope, of some present or near commodity, foresees not, or else neglects to avoid some future and final disgrace: Much like to the sick Man, who following his own appetite, Eates or Drinks something which refreshes and contents him for the present, but augments his Disease and kills him in the end. In this Point all wicked and *Machiavilian* Counsels fail for the most part, which often succeed well for a time throu' God's permission, for secret causes known to his Divine Wisdom, but in the end both destroy Princes and their States, partly throu' the Justice of Almighty God, and partly by Error of the Coun-

(*a*) Tom. 2. Cap. 1. Num. 8.

sellors

ſellors in true reaſons of State, as I hope amply, and ſubſtantially to prove hereafter. (*a*)

17. In the mean time I add for the preſent a fourth conſideration to the ſame purpoſe, which is, that a Wiſe Counſellor ought to weigh the commodity of every thing with the ſtability and ſecurity thereof; and not to adviſe his Prince to purchaſe with a few years of preſent pleaſure, or benefit, many years of future pain or inconvenience; but rather to endure ſome diſadvantage or dammage for a time, when thereby he may afterwards attain to ſome ſtable and permanent good; which nature teaches us by the courſe it takes in human and worldly affairs, ordaining motion, for reſt; buſineſs, for repoſe; labor, for eaſe; and pain, for pleaſure. In which reſpect a Wiſe Man labors when he is Young, to reſt in his Old Age. and takes a loathſome potion or bitter Pill, to recover health; and willingly endures all Temporal Miſery, to attain in the end to Eternal Felicity. This I ſay not only Nature, but alſo true Wiſdom, which always follows the courſe and ſteps thereof do's teach us, no leſs in matters of State, than in all other human affairs.

18. Wherefore for the ſame reaſon, a Counſellor ought alſo to prefer a certain and laſting commodity, thô it be leſs, before a greater that is ſhort and uncertain; to which purpoſe. *Theopompus* King of *Lacedæmon*, anſwer'd the Queen his Wife very well, (*b*) when ſhe lamented that he wou'd leave leſs Royal Authority to his Children,

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Cap.* 6. 7. (*b*) *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe whether a Prince ought to be Learned.

than

than he had receiv'd of his Father, becauſe he had ordain'd certain Controllers of the Kings call'd *Ephori*: No, ſays he, *I ſhall leave it 'em greater becauſe 'twill be more firm and ſecure*; thus he anſwer'd very Wiſely, meaſuring the benefit of Princely Authority, not ſo much by greatneſs, as by ſecurity and ſtability, whereunto all the Counſels and Endeavours of Wiſe Counſellors and States-men ought chiefly to tend; yet with this conſideration, that thô of Worldly things ſome are more ſtable and permanent than others, yet there is no true ſtability in any of 'em, and therefore all Wiſe Men's Counſels, are chiefly directed to the attaining of Heavenly things, in which there is true ſtability, they being everlaſting; whereof I ſhall ſay more hereafter. (*a*)

19. Now foraſmuch as ſufficient Rules cannot be giv'n in particular concerning State affairs, becauſe they are infinite and variable, and by reaſon of the infinite occaſions and accidents that fall out daily to be conſider'd, all which may require different conſiderations, according to the different nature and quality of the matters, and the ſundry circumſtances of times, places and perſons, I have therefore thought good for example ſake, and the inſtruction of young States-men, to handle and debate here, ſome one matter of State by way of diſcourſe. And becauſe occaſion is offer'd oftentimes to deliberate about the maintenance of a Civil War in a Forraign Country, I will ſet down my own opinion, what advice a young States-man may ſafely give concerning the ſame.

(*a*) Tom. 3. *Cap.* 9. *Num.* 27. *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

For the better and more particular inſtruction of a Young Counſellor, concerning matters to be Conſulted: The Queſtion or matter of State is debated, and taken into a deliberation, about the maintenance of a Civil War in a Forraign Country.

WHoſoever ſhou'd give advice concerning the maintenance of a Civil War in a Forraign Country, 'twould be convenient for him, in my opinion, chiefly to conſider theſe following points.

2. Firſt, the equity and juſtice of the cauſe, as well of his Princes part, whether it may be juſt and lawful for him to give the aſſiſtance demanded, as alſo whether the quarrel of thoſe who demand the ſame, be lawful and juſt, or no? For if juſtice and equity be wanting in either, no commodity that a Prince can receive or expect, can countervail the diſhonor, danger, and dammage, which he will aſſuredly incur by the offence of Almighty God; (*a*) *Who takes away the Life of Princes, and is terrible to the King's of the Earth*; And will aſſuredly ſooner or later exact of him a

(*a*) Pſal. 75. 13.

ſevere

severe account thereof, or perhaps of his State, or of both; which is the chief and highest point to be consider'd in all deliberations of Princes, seeing the destruction and utter ruin of them and their Estates, proceeds chiefly from the offence of God; as I have partly made evident already, (*a*) when I treated of the Justice of God, and will make more manifest hereafter. (*b*)

3. 'Tis also to be consider'd what good and just Motives his Prince may have on his own part, to give the succours demanded, which may be reduc'd to four cases. The first, when he may do thereby some notable service to God, which is always in it self not only honorable, but also profitable; and as it were, Mony put to interest in respect of the reward, he shall receive assuredly at God's hands for the same, howsoever it succeeds for the present.

4. The second case is, when he is bound by Oath, Promise, or Gratitude, to succour the party that crav's his assistance: For in such a case the omission thereof, when it may justly and conveniently be done, were both offensive to God, and also dishonorable, and dangerous to a Prince, as well in respect of God's punishment of his perjury, whereof I have before spoken at large, (*c*) as also for the bad example and just occasion he wou'd give to others, his Allies, and Confederates, yea, and to his own Subjects to forsake him in his necessity.

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Cap.* 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. *&c.* (*b*) Tom. 2. *Cap.* 7. (*c*) Tom. 2. *Cap.* 3. *Nu.* 17. 18. *&c.*

5. The

5. The third caſe is, when the Prince, of whom ſuccour is demanded, has a juſt pretence to a Forraign Crown or State; for the obtaining whereof, he may hope to gain a party, by maintaining a juſt quarrel in the ſame State or Country; wherein, reſpect is to be had, whether the Prince's own Forces be ſo ſufficient for the execution of his enterpriſe, that he ſhall need to rely no farther upon his party, than only to facilitate the ſame; for if his hope of good ſucceſs, either in obtaining his pretence, or in conſerving or maintaining of it afterwards, chiefly depends upon the good Will, Fidelity, and Strength of ſuch a party, he Builds, as a Man may ſay, upon the Sand, and puts to a venture his labor, charges, and reputation.

6. Hereof we have had a lamentable example not many years ſince in *Sebaſtian* King of *Portugal*, (*a*) who, hop'd to make himſelf King of *Morroco*, under colour of reſtoring thereunto *Muley Mahomet*; whereof he made ſo ſure an account, that he carry'd a Crown with him to Crown himſelf King there; not conſidering that his adverſary *Muley Moluco*, who was then in Poſſeſſion of that Kingdom, was not only moſt Valiant for his Perſon, but alſo able to bring into the Field for his defence, above a hundred thouſand Horſe and Foot; againſt whom nevertheleſs King *Sebaſtian* undertook the enterpriſe, with an Army only of three thouſand Soldiers, or thereabouts; the moſt part of 'em undiſciplin'd: Beſides that neither he himſelf, nor any that

(*a*) *Hieron. Conestagio del unio de lib. reg. di. Portugallo lib.* 2.

commanded the Army under him, had ever born Arms before; inſomuch, that he truſted, as it ſeem'd, to the Conduct and Forces of *Muley Mahomet* his Confederate, who when it came to the up-ſhot, was not able to bring to the Field two thouſand; ſo that adventuring with ſo few, to fight with above forty thouſand Horſe, and ten thouſand Foot, and as ſome ſay a far greater number; his Army was preſently inclos'd on all ſides, and ſo oppreſt by the multitude of his Enemies, that he loſt both the Battel and his Life. So dangerous a thing it is, for a Prince to ground any deſign of a Forraign War, upon a falſe conceit, either of the weakneſs of an Enemy, or of the ſtrength of a Confederate, and not upon ſufficient forces of his own.

7. The fourth caſe is, that when to avoid ſome eminent danger of Invaſion or War at home, or ſome other great vexation; a Prince is forc'd to hold his Enemy employ'd in his own Country, by ſupporting there a juſt quarrel againſt him: Wherein thô he may ſpend largly without fear of loſs, in reſpect of the preſent ſecurity which he purchaſes; and exemption from greater expences and danger at home: Nevertheleſs 'twill be Wiſdom for him in my opinion to practiſe the Counſel, which *Alcibiades* the *Athenian* gave to *Tiſtæfernes*, in the like caſe; which was, not to give greater ſuccour than may ſuffice to keep the War ſtill on foot, as well to gain time, which often remedies the greateſt inconveniences, as alſo to extenuate and weary out both parties; in ſuch ſort, that whether the War end by Victory or Compoſition, they may not be able to aſſail him; which he may

may very well fear, thô the party he aſſiſts ſhou'd prevail.

8. For this purpoſe 'tis to be conſider'd, that Civil diſſentions, end many times to the coſt of the Forraign Prince, who maintain'd the ſame; whether they end by Victory of his Enemy, or of his Confederate, or elſe by their compoſition; for his Enemy if he overcomes remain's more irritated, and more oblig'd to ſeek revenge than before; and his Confederate if he vanquiſhes the other, and ſucceeds him in his State, is more like to prove an Enemy than a Friend; eſpecially, if the quarrel of the other was not perſonal, proceeding from ſome particular injury done to him, but, as commonly it happens, a quarrel of State; for in that caſe, whoſoever ſhall be Governor of the ſame State, will be his Enemy, notwithſtanding any benefit receiv'd; for experience teaches that the reſpect of gratitude for paſt benefits, little avail's, when it meets with reaſons of State; which, as *Guicciardin* ſays, (*a*) *With Princes, overweighs all other conſiderations*, and ſo differs according to the variety of occaſions and ſucceſs of affairs, that it changes daily; and of a Friend to Day, mak's an Enemy to Morrow: In which reſpect, the Leagues and Amities of Princes, are commonly very uncertain and unſecure, be the obligation never ſo great.

9. *Henry* the VII King of *England*, became an Enemy to *Charles* the VIII King of *France*, in defence of the Duke of *Britany*, for reaſons of State,

(*a*) *Guicciard, nadi auiſi polit.*

(*a*) thô the ſaid *Charles* did a little before aſſiſt him with Men and Mony againſt King *Richard* the III, and help'd to make him King of *England*. And what greater benefit cou'd one Prince receive of another, than *Elizabeth* Queen of *England* receiv'd of *Philip* the II King of *Spain*, (*b*) who when he was King of *England*, and Marry'd to her Siſter, ſav'd her Life, which otherwiſe ſhe had loſt upon account of her Conſpiracy againſt her ſaid Siſter; yet nevertheleſs ſhe became the greateſt Enemy he had, and continu'd ſo during his Life.

10. Moreover, it commonly fall's out, that the party whom a Forraign Prince help's to advance, remain's his debtor for the charges beſtow'd in his ſuccour; whereupon it follow's many times, that the creditor looſes both his friend and his Mony; for if he truſts to bare promiſes of repayment, he is in danger to be ſerv'd as *Edward* the Black Prince was, (*c*) who going in perſon with a great Army into *Spain*, to ſuccour *Peter* King of *Caſtile*, upon his promiſe to repay him all his expences, was after the Victory ſo delay'd and deluded by him, that he was forc'd to return without any ſatisfaction; by means whereof he was conſtrain'd to lay ſuch impoſitions upon his own Subjects in *Aquitane*, for the payment of his Soldiers, that they Rebell'd, whereby he loſt the greateſt part of that Country.

11. And put the caſe he ſhou'd have any places, or Towns deliver'd him in conſideration of his ex-

(*a*) *Polid Virgil. hiſt. Angl. li.* 26. (*b*) *Sand. li.* 2. *de Schiſm. Angl.* (*c*) *Polid. Virg. hiſt. Angl. lib.* 19.

pences,

pences, or for his better ſecurity, which any Prince that ſhall give ſuccours to Forraigners, has reaſon to require; many times his Friend for reaſons of State becom's his Enemy, to recover the places, he before gave him: And ſo alſo it commonly fall's out that whenſoever Civil Wars and diſſentions come to an end, by compoſition of the parties divided, who for the moſt part willingly agree and joyn together, againſt the Forraigner that maintain'd their diviſion, eſpecially if he has any hold or footing in their Country, thô it were at the firſt with thir own conſent: Whereof I will alledge a few examples as well Ancient as Modern.

12. In the Baron Wars in *England* in the time of King *Iohn*, *Lewis* the VIII, Son to *Philip* the II King of *France*, aſſiſted the Barons againſt their King; and being call'd by them intô *England*, and Proclam'd King thereof, was ſhortly after by common conſent, as well of them as of all other *Engliſh*, driv'n out again. (*a*)

13. *Philip* Duke of *Burgundy* alſo to be reveng'd of the Duke of *Orleans* and of *Charles* the VII. whilſt he was yet but Dolphin, call'd *Henry* the V. King of *England* into *France*, and aſſiſted him firſt to make him Regent, and afterwards to Crown, not only him, but alſo *Henry* the VI his Son, King of *France* in *Paris*; yet in the end he made his Peace with King *Charles* aforeſaid, and help'd him to deprive the *Engliſh* of all that, which either they had got by his means, or elſe held before by Title of Inheritance. (*b*)

(*a*) *Polidor. Virgil. hiſt. Angliæ li.* 15. *Paul. Æmil. in Philip.* 2. (*b*) *Pol. Virg. in Henr.* 5. *&* 6.

14. In like manner *Charles* the VIII King of *France* was moſt earneſtly ſollicited to the Conqueſt of *Naples* by the *Neapolitans* themſelves, (*a*) who nevertheleſs ſhortly after help'd to expel the Garriſons and Forces he left there, notwithſtanding they had receiv'd great benefits from him.

15. *Elizabeth* alſo Queen of *England*, ſupported the Proteſtants in the firſt troubles of *France* againſt their King, with great charges, and expences; and when they made their Peace, in the Year of our Lord, 1562. they all joyn'd with the Catholicks againſt her, to recover *Havre de Grace*, which they had before giv'n her, for the aſſurance of the Mony, ſhe had lent 'em.

16. And now laſtly, notwithſtanding the chargeable and coſtly ſuccours of Men and Mony that the *French* Catholicks receiv'd of *Philip* the II King of *Spain*, of Glorious Memory, yet they forſook him almoſt all in the end, and joyn'd with his and their adverſe party; and made War againſt him to recover from him ſome few Towns in the Frontiers of *Flanders*, which they had giv'n him before, for his and their ſecurity.

17. Wherefore, thô things do not always ſucceed in this manner; yet foraſmuch as moſt commonly they do, and that nothing is more uncertain than that which depends upon the Will, Affection, or Gratitude of other Men; or upon reaſon of State, which, as I have ſayd, do's change and vary daily, according to the variety of occaſi-

(*a*) *Philip. Comin. in Carol.* 8. *ca.* 2. *&* 39.

ons,

ons, I hold it for a ſpecial point of prudence in a Prince, to take the ſureſt way, by not engaging himſelf too far, nor adventuring more than he cares not to looſe, in the maintenance of a Civil War in a Forraign Country; except when either the ſervice of God, ſome juſt obligation, or the conſervation of his own State, neceſſarily require it. Thus much concerning ſuch points, as are to be weigh'd, in behalf of the Prince, that is to give the ſuccour.

18. Moreover, great conſideration is alſo to be had of the State and Condition of the parties that demand it; as whether they be able to overcome their adverſaries? Or at leaſt to ſtand and maintain their quarrel, with the aſſiſtance which they crave or may be giv'n them? For otherways 'twere great imprudence in any Prince, to undertake their maintenance, but rather to endeavour by way of Treaty betwixt 'em and their adverſary, to compound the quarrel, and thereby to make himſelf grateful to both parties.

19. And foraſmuch as it many times fall's out, that the ability and power of the party, that crav's aſſiſtance, conſiſts not in the ſtrength of ſome one Potent and Abſolute Prince, but in the force of many Princes, Towns, or States, Confederated and Leagu'd together; 'tis in ſuch a caſe chiefly to be conſider'd, how, or upon what reaſons the ſaid party is united?

20. To this purpoſe 'tis to be noted, that in all Confederacies and Leagues, wherein many unite themſelves, the Confederates are mov'd thereunto, either with one motive or end, as in

the *Cantons* of the *Switzers*; or in the League which the Pope, the King of the *Romans*, the King of *Spain*, the *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Milan* made againſt *Charles* the VIII King of *France*, for the difference of *Italy*; (*a*) wherein all of 'em were intereſſed. Or elſe they are mov'd thereunto, with divers and ſundry motives, ſome with one, and ſome with another; as for example, in the late *French* League or Union, ſome enter'd only for the conſervation of the Catholick Religion, which was the common and pretended end of all that party; others enter'd for particular reſpects, as either for paſſion, or ambition, or for the friendſhip of ſome Man on the one ſide, or hatred of ſome one on the other, or for hope of future gain, or for preſent profit and commodity, or ſuch like motives.

21. Now then thoſe that are led by particular reſpects, do not for the moſt part remain any longer in any League, then they may hope to obtain their deſires, and when they are perſuaded that they may ſooner obtain the ſame by adhereing to the adverſe party, they are eaſily induc'd thereunto; and hereupon commonly follows the diſſolution of ſuch Leagues and Confederacies; for which cauſe the ſtrength and power of any League, is not to be meaſur'd ſo much by the multitude of Confederates, be they never ſo great and powerful, as by their concurrence and agreement in one and the ſelf ſame end: For as few Men under one head, are ſtronger than many

(*a*) *Philip de Com. Cron. du* Roy *Charles ca.* 23.

under

under many and different heads, as *Philip de Comines* notes (*a*) very well, ſo few principal perſons or Towns, united together for one and the ſelf ſame cauſe, are to be reputed far ſtronger, and more like to ſtand, than very many, thô much more potent, if they have many and different ends.

22. Wherefore, it much imports a Prince who ſupports a Forraign League, to diſcover as much as he is able, what end or motive induc'd the heads and principal Confederates to enter into it, whereby he will the better diſcern, what their force and ſtrength may be, and how like they are to ſtand and maintain their quarrel; for if they have all one end, they may be reputed the ſtronger; but if their ends be different they cannot long ſtand; as we have ſeen by experience of late, in the *French* League; which notwithſtanding the great ſuccours both of Men and Mony giv'n 'em by the Catholick King, diſſolv'd rather of it ſelf, than by any force of Enemy; by reaſon that very many of the Governours of Towns and chief Pillars thereof, concurr'd not in one end with the whole League; and therefore when they receiv'd ſatisfaction of their particular ends and deſires, or ſaw themſelves out of hopes thereof, they eaſily chang'd their party.

23. To ſuch Leagues, united only in exterior ſhew, and not in one common end, I hold it not ſecure or convenient for a Prince to give ſuccour, except he be mov'd thereunto by ſome

(*a*) *Philip de Com. Cron. du Roy Louis. ca. 26.*

eminent

eminent danger of Invaſion, or other great dammage, which he fear's to receive from the Enemy of ſuch a League: In which caſe neceſſity may force him to hold his ſaid Enemy employ'd, as I have ſignifi'd before in this Chapter, (*a*) whilſt he prepares for his better defence at home, or at leaſt may win time, which in all extremities is to be ſought, and often hinders the greateſt inconveniences.

24. Moreover, foraſmuch as the ſuccours demanded, or giv'n, conſiſt commonly either in Mony, Men, or in both; and that it imports a Prince for the furtherance of ſome juſt pretence, or obligation of his own, or for ſome publick good, liberally to employ not only his forces, but alſo his Mony, to maintain and ſupport a Forraign League; I will add ſomewhat concerning the ſame, to the end that a Young Statiſt may the better underſtand, both what to adviſe, and alſo how to act therein.

25. Firſt therefore, concerning the beſtowing of Mony, I ſay, that althô it cannot be deny'd, but that Mony do's very much in all buſineſs of this nature, for *Quid non mortalia pectora cogit auri ſacra fames? What do's not the inſatiable hunger of Gold compel Men to do?* Yet ordinarily the effect that Mony has, is but to diſpoſe the Wills and Minds of Men, to the deſir'd end; which diſpoſition nevertheleſs, in ſome that receive the Mony, is none at all, in others very little, and in moſt very doubtful, and to be ſuſpected;

(*a*) Tom. 2. Cap. 5. Nu. 7.

for

for thoſe to whom thou giv'ſt thy Mony either are thy Enemies, Friends, or Neutrals, if they be thy Enemies, commonly they take thy Mony, to impoveriſh thee, and to enrich themſelves, and to employ thy own Mony againſt thee when time ſerves; if they be Friends, thy Mony works little, becauſe their own good Will and Friendſhip, bind's 'em more to thee, than thy Mony; if they be Neutrals, and become thy Friends for the profit they gain by thee; their Friendſhip will laſt no longer than the profit continues, and when they ſhall think to get more by thy Enemy than by thee, they will be his Friends for the ſame reaſon, that they were thine; and althô they ſhall reap never ſo great benefit by thee, they will perſuade themſelves, that thou ſeekeſt thy own commodity and not theirs, and that thou art beholding to them, becauſe they vouchſafe to take thy Mony.

26. And foraſmuch as the hunger and deſire of Mony, encreaſes with the poſſeſſion and uſe thereof, the more thou giveſt 'em, the more they will deſire, for as *Cicero* ſays, (*a*) *Fit deterior qui accipit, & ad idem ſemper expectandum paratior*; *He who takes or receives Mony, is made worſe thereby, and is always the readier to expect more.* So that if you do not give 'em, when, and what they ſhall expect or demand of you, they will hate you more becauſe you refuſe to give 'em, than they lov'd you for what they have already receiv'd; for as *Seneca* ſays, *Vetus & nota*

(*a*) *Cicero Offi. l. 2.*

ingratitudo

ingratitudo eſt, dati immemores, meminiſſe negati; ideoque raræ & tepentes gratiæ, feruidæ & frequentes querelæ; *'Tis an old and notorious ingratitude, to forget a benefit receiv'd, and ſtill to remember a benefit deny'd. whereupon it ſollows, that thanks are rare and cold, and complaints frequent and ſervent.*

27. I ſay not this becauſe I think it not convenient to Negotiate with Mony, to gain and entertain the affections of Men, but only to ſignifie that 'tis to be done with great conſideration; for as *Pliny* ſays, (*a*) *Inconſideratæ largitionis comes, Pœnitentia eſt*; *Repentance ever accompanies the inconſiderate Employment of Mony.* Therefore to ſay ſomewhat of this point, my opinion is, that 'tis convenient for any one, that Negotiates with Mony in a ſtrange Country, to have his Purſe always open, for ſuch as are true Friends to him, and the League; as well to gratifie them, and recompence their good Wills and good Offices, as alſo to help their neceſſities, and enable 'em to uphold their party.

28. And thoſe may be accounted true Friends, whoſe End is either the common End of the whole League, or ſo dependant thereupon, that it cannot be otherwiſe obtain'd, but by the good ſucceſs of the League; and to ſuch, Mony may always be ſecurely giv'n, when their neceſſities, or the Publick good of the League ſhall require it: But to others in my Opinion, little or nothing is to be giv'n, unleſs it be to buy of 'em ſome important Places, or to recompence Intelligences, or other ſervices already done; and there-

(*a*) *Plin. lib. 7. ep.*

fore

fore it will be convenient to uſe all diligence, as before I ſignifi'd, to diſcover the true Motives that induc'd thoſe to enter into the League to whom Mony is to be giv'n.

29. And in caſe it may ſeem needful, to venture ſomething to entertain ſome few principal Men, thô Neutrals or ſuſpected, to divert 'em from compounding with the Enemy, I think 'twill be convenient to give 'em largely, and more than the Enemy is like to give 'em; and preciſely to accompliſh whatever elſe ſhall be promis'd, for otherwiſe they will acknowledge no obligation, and when the Enemy ſhall give 'em more, they will follow him; and if promiſe be not kept with 'em, they will eſteem themſelves to be mock'd, and for very diſdain will paſs to the Enemy; of all which, I ſaw daily experience in time of the League in *France*, where the King of *Spain* beſtow'd many Millions in Penſions, that many receiv'd, who afterwards became his open Enemies; ſome of 'em becauſe they were not punctually pay'd their Penſions; others becauſe, as they pretended, promiſe was not kept with 'em in other things; and ſome others again, either becauſe they cou'd not have whatſoever they demanded, or becauſe others had more than they.

30. But how much ſoever ſhall be beſtow'd upon one, or other, there is no ſecurity or aſſurance, in Negociating with Mony alone; except the ſame be either accompany'd, or ſhortly ſeconded with ſufficient Forces, which concurring therewith, may work great effect, and therefore the Oracle ſayd to *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Haſtis pugna argentatis*,

argentatis, & omnia vinces; *Fight with Silver Spears, and thou ſhalt overcome all*; adviſing him thereby, to employ Mony and Forces together; for a Negociation with Mony alone, the longer it continues, the more danger there is to looſe both the Mony and the buſineſs; for no truſt is to be had in affection bought with Mony, and not grounded on Reaſon and Vertue. In which reſpect *Philip* King of *Macedon*, ſayd very well to *Alexander* his Son, who ſought to gain from him the good Wills of the *Macedonians* with gifts and bribes, (*a*) *What a miſchief*, ſays he, *perſuaded thee to think, that thoſe will ever be faithful unto thee, whom thou haſt corrupted with Mony.*

31. Thus much for this matter, whereof much more might be ſayd, if the Queſtion were reduc'd to particular perſons and Countries, that might Miniſter other important conſiderations of difficulties, according to the nature, ſtrength or weakneſs of the places, conditions, and abilities of the perſons who were to be ſuccour'd or impugn'd; which I forbear to proſecute any farther, to paſs to another matter, I mean to debate; whether the remedies which Politicians teach, againſt the dangers and inconveniences proceeding from wickedneſs, be ſufficient in reaſon and true Policy, to ſecure the State of a Wicked Prince? By occaſion whereof, I will examen divers principles of *Macchiavel*'s Doctrin, and ſhew the abſurdity thereof; to the end that the Young Statiſt whom I inform, may underſtand, as well

(*a*) *Cicero Offic. lib.* 2.

what

what to avoid, as what to embrace in matter of Policy; and be convinc'd that a Princes's State, cannot be aſſur'd by wickedneſs.

CHAP. VI.

Another Queſtion is debated for the farther Inſtruction of Young Statists: Whether a Princes State can be aſſur'd by Wicked Policy? Whereupon many principles of Machiavel *and Polititians his followers, are examin'd, and confuted by reaſons of State; without the conſideration of God's Iuſtice.*

NO Man endow'd with reaſon will deny, that Wickedneſs in a Prince, makes him hateful to his Subjects, and conſequently endangers his State; which all *Machiavellians*, and Polititians know ſo well, that the greateſt part of their Policy conſiſts in deviſing remedies againſt the ſame; to the end that their Prince may be ſecurely wicked; that is, that he may purchaſe and enjoy all Worldly pleaſures, and commodities *per fas & nefas*, by right or wrong, without danger of any revenge from Man, or fear of the Wrath and Juſtice of God, becauſe they believe not, that there is

a God, or at leaſt that he meddles with the Affairs of Men.

2. Now foraſmuch, as I have already ſufficiently prov'd throughout this whole Treatiſe, that God diſpoſes of Princes, and their States, and puniſhes 'em for ſin when they deſerve it; whereupon it alſo follows, that all *Machiavillian*, and wicked Policies, tending to the conſervation of wicked Princes, are not only frivolous and vain; but alſo noiſome, and pernicious to their Eſtates: Therefore I will here in this Chapter, lay aſide the conſideration, of God's Providence and Juſtice, and examen the ſufficiency of *Machiavellian* Policies according only to reaſons of State; to ſhew thereby the abſurdity of Polititians, who think themſelves able to warrant and defend a Prince in wickedneſs; by plunging him firſt into needleſs dangers, and then endeavouring to apply ſome remedies: As if a Man ſhou'd Poyſon his Friend, making full account to Cure him afterwards; whereas 'tis the part of a Wiſe Phyſician, rather to prevent the danger and inconvenience, than to admit it upon confidence in remedies, whereof no Man living can warrant the ſucceſs. This I ſay, becauſe *Machiavillians* do moſt abſurdly endanger their Princes by their wicked Counſel, in hopes to deliver 'em afterwards by their Policies; whereof the ſucceſs is not in their hands, but ſo uncertain and ſubject to chance and hazard, that no Wit or Power of Man, can aſſure it, as I have heretofore moſt amply prov'd. (*a*)

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Cap.* 11. 12. & 13.

3. But

3. But let us ſee ſome of their remedies. One of the principal, according to the Doctrin of their great Maſter *Machiavel*, is, (*a*) extremity of all miſchief and wickedneſs, which *Machiavel* teaches to be far more ſecure for a Prince, than Mediocrity betwixt Vertue, and Vice; therefore he wou'd have his Prince to be either the beſt Man living, or the worſt; that is to ſay, either to be a Saint or a Devil: Whereof his reaſon muſt needs be, if he have any at all, that he who holds the middle way betwixt Vertue, and Vice, and do's ſometimes ill, muſt needs incur the offence and hatred of ſome Men, whereby he will be in danger; wherefore he thinks it convenient for ſuch a one to practiſe the common Proverb; *Qui ſemel verecundiæ, &c. He that once has paſt the bounds of ſhame, muſt become very Impudent*; that is, he that is once over the Shoes in Sin, and Iniquity, muſt for his ſafty, plunge himſelf over Head and Ears; as thô the way to Remedy a Diſeaſe were to nouriſh and encreaſe its Cauſe; as to Cure a Dropſie, with continual Drinking; or a Burning Feaver with hot Wines, and Spices; or to caſt Oyle into the Fire to quench it; for ſo *Machiavellians* do, who to remedy the danger that grow's to a Wicked Prince by hatred, make him more hateful; and by the extremity and exceſs of wickedneſs, expoſe him to the extream and exceſſive hatred of all Men, and conſequently to ruin and perdition.

4. For as *Cicero* ſays, (*a*) *Multorum odijs, nullæ opes nullæ vires poterunt reſiſtere: No force, power,*

(*a*) *Machia. de princi.* (*b*) *Cicero Offic.*

or wealth are able to reſiſt the hatred of many; and much leſs of all Men; yes, ſay they; *Oderint dum metuant. Let 'em hate him* (be they never ſo many) *ſo they fear him*; for, fear ſhall ſo repreſs their hatred, that they ſhall not dare to attempt or execute any thing to his prejudice. Thus ſay they, but moſt abſurdly; for, fear in a mind poſſeſs'd with hatred, is nothing elſe, but, as it were; *Vnguis in ulcere*; *A Mans nail or a ſcratch in an Vlcer* or botch, which is exaſperated thereby, and the pain of the Patient greatly aggravated; and thô fear do's in ſome ſort delay and repreſs the fury of hatred, yet it makes it much more ſecure for the hater, and more dangerous to him that is hated.

5. For, thoſe who hate without fear, many times attempt unadviſedly their own deſtruction, but thoſe who hate and fear, deliberate, and execute, with much more maturity, and conſideration; and conſequently with leſs danger to themſelves, and more to their Enemy; ſo that when the Prince adds fear to the hatred of his Subjects, he redoubl's both his own fear, and alſo his own danger. Whereupon the Tragical Poët ſays very well. (*a*) *Qui ſceptra duro ſævus Imperio regit, Timet timentes, metus in Autorem redit. He who Governs by Severity and Cruelty, fears thoſe who fear him, and the fear fall's back upon the Author, or Cauſe thereof.* And as *Seneca* the Stoick ſays, *Neceſſe eſt ut multos timeat, quem multi timent. He muſt needs fear many, whom many fear. Cicero* alſo following *Ennius* the Poët, ſays, (*b*) *Men hate him whom they fear,*

(*a*) *Seneca Treged.* (*b*) *Cicero Offici. lib.* 2.

and

and every one desir's the destruction of him he hat's, and no force or power of Empire, be it never so great, can long stand if oppress'd with continual fear of it's Subjects. Thus *Cicero* declares the danger a Prince incurs by hatred and fear, which are most forceable and urgent Motives to move and excite Conspiracies, as well amongst Subjects as Forraigners, as well to deliver themselves, as to discharge their wrath and hatred upon their Prince. Wherefore *Aristotle* reckons hatred, and fear amongst the principal causes of the destruction of Monarchies, and Tyrannies. To conclude, *Seneca* speaking of a Tyrant, says very well: *He is hated because he is fear'd, and he fears because he is hated, and uses the execrable saying, which has ruin'd many. Oderint dum metuant; Let 'em hate me, so they fear me, not considering that a moderate fear moderates and tempers Mens minds, but great and vehement fear, provok's the most patient to fury, and fear seeks for security in danger.* (a)

6. But hereupon the *Machiavellians* say, that for this reason the Prince has his Guards, Armies, and Fortresses to defend himself from all attempts both Domestical and Forraign, besides the Vigilancy and Policy, which he uses to prevent Conspiracies, by disarming and impoverishing his Subjects, forbidding their Assemblies, and publick Conventions, and all other means which may breed love, trust, and confidence amongst 'em; frequently also terrifying 'em with a sight of his Guards, and Garrisons, to make 'em servile and base-min-

(a) *Arist. lib. 5. Polit.*

 ded,

ded; ſuffering 'em to be vicious, and diſſolute of Life, to make 'em Effeminate; not permitting 'em the uſe of Schools, or other means, whereby they may become Learn'd, Wiſe and Politick; employing his Spyes every where for the diſcovery of every Man's Intention; nouriſhing diviſion amongſt the greateſt, to counterpoiſe the one and the other; ſuſpecting all Men, be they never ſo much bound to him; and finally, cutting off by one means or other, all thoſe, whoſe Power, Courage, or Wit, he thinks dangerous to his State; whereby he will be ſecure and free from the danger which may happen to his Perſon or State by the hatred of his Subjects.

7. Thus ſay they; whereunto I Anſwer, that if *Machiavel* or ſome other Polititians, in theſe our Days, had been the firſt Inventors of theſe Policies, and that they had never been yet try'd and put in practiſe, it might with more reaſon be ſuppos'd, that there were or might be ſome aſſurance, and ſecurity therein for a wicked Prince; but ſeeing all this, or whatſoever elſe *Machiavel*, or any Polititians teaches for the conſervation of a Tyrant, has been practis'd in all Times and Ages, by Tyrants and Wicked Princes, who nevertheleſs have all, or the moſt part of 'em periſh'd, and been ruin'd by the hatred of Men; who ſees not the inſufficiency thereof, for the aſſurance of a Wicked Prince.

8. Can *Machiavel*, or any other Polititian teach more to this purpoſe, than we find Written above two thouſand Years ago by *Ariſtotle* (*a*) in his

(*a*) *Ariſt. lib. 5. Polit. ca. 11.*

Politicks,

Politicks, who ſhewing the means whereby Tyrants ſeek to preſerve themſelves, and their States, propoſes to *Machiavel* and his followers all the matter, and ſubſtance of their wicked Policies; which nevertheleſs were not approv'd by *Ariſtotle* as ſufficient for the conſervation of Tyranny, but reprov'd and utterly rejected by him; in which reſpect he declares how unſecure Tyranny is, and exemplifies the ſame, in all the Tyrannical States, which had been before, or in his time; ſhewing how ſpeedily they all periſh'd, excepting only four, whereof the firſt continu'd a hundred Years; the ſecond ſeventy three, and ſix Months; the third thirty three; and the fourth twenty one Years. (*a*) And the cauſe of the long continuance of the firſt and ſecond, he aſcribes to the moderate and juſt Government of the Tyrants, who, thô they got their States Tyrannically, and held 'em by Uſurpation and Force, whereby they were call'd Tyrants, yet they Govern'd with ſuch Moderation and Juſtice, that they were greatly belov'd by their Subjects.

9. To which purpoſe *Ariſtotle* alſo obſerves, (*b*) that the Reign of a Tyrant is ſo much the more ſecure, by how much more moderate it is, and nearer to the juſt Government of a King; wherein the *Machiavellians* may note, both by the Doctrin and Experience of *Ariſtotle*, that the extremity of Wickedneſs and Tyranny, is the highway to carry a Prince head-long to his deſtruction, notwithſtanding all their aforeſaid preventions; whereof ſome part are moſt neceſſary for

(*a*) *Ariſt. lib. 5. ca. 12.* (*b*) *Ariſt. Ibid. c. 11.*

the conſervation of any Princes State, as Guards, Garriſons, Fortreſſes, Vigilance of Counſellors, Diligence of Spyes, and Intelligencers; as alſo ſuch other part of thoſe Policies, as is conformable to Reaſon, Juſtice and Conſcience; but the reſt, I mean thoſe points of hindering love and confidence amongſt the Subjects; immoderate pilling and polling 'em; making 'em effeminate, ignorant and baſe-minded; nouriſhing debate amongſt great Perſons; and cutting off ſuch as are more eminent in Credit, Power, Courage and Wit; theſe I ſay, and all ſuch proceedings are againſt Charity, Juſtice, and Conſcience; as well as againſt all true Policy; and ſo far from helping to conſerve a Tyrant, that they help to ruin him; as here in this Chapter it will appear concerning ſome of theſe points, both in particular, and general, ſo far as ſhall be neceſſary for the preſent; leaving the examination of the reſt, to the Third part of this Treatiſe, whereunto they more properly belong.

10. And now to ſpeak of ſome of 'em; what can be more contrary to true reaſon of State, than to hinder truſt, confidence and love amongſt the People, without which there can be no Common-wealth? For without love, and confidence, there can be no fidelity; and without fidelity, no juſtice; and without juſtice no Common-wealth; as I have already ſufficiently declar'd. (*a*)

11. For this cauſe all Ancient Law-makers, and Founders of Common-wealths, have ordain'd in all Countries and Cities publick Feaſts, Plays,

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Chap.* 3. *Num.* 18.

and

and Aſſemblies, where the People may meet together, not only for their Recreation, but alſo to make 'em known one to another; to the end that love and friendſhip may ſpring from their acquaintance and converſation; and the ſame may produce a general union for the conſervation of peace in the whole Common-wealth; and therefore *Ariſtotle* ſays, (*a*) that friendſhip is; *Maximum bonum Civitatibus*; *The greateſt good that can be to Cities*, for ſays he; *By means thereof they ſhall be free from Sedition.* *Solon* alſo eſteem'd this amity, and union of minds, ſo neceſſary for the conſervation of human Society, that being ask'd, what Common-wealth was beſt, and moſt like to continue? (*b*) *Such a one*, ſays he, *wherein every Man takes the injury done to another, as done to himſelf*; and to the ſame purpoſe he made a Law in *Athens* giving leave to every one to take upon him the juſt quarrel of another, and to demand reparation of the wrong, as if the matter concern'd himſelf; which Conſtitution of *Solon*, *Plutarch* (*c*) highly commends; *As a means*, ſays he, *to accuſtom the People to feel and redreſs the grievances and injuries one of another, as being all members of one Body*; whereby we may underſtand that the union and love of the members of the Body Politick, or Common-wealth, is no leſs neceſſary, than the combination of the parts in the Natural Body; which *Seneca* teaches very well in theſe words. *As all the members and parts of Mans*

(*a*) *Ariſt. li.* 2. *Polit. c.* 2. (*b*) *Plutarch.* (*c*) *Plutarch in Solon.*

Body, agree together, for the conſervation of the whole, which alſo conduces to the good of every particular member; ſo all Men ought to like and procure anothers advantage, becauſe we are born to live in Society, which cannot be conſerv'd but by the agreement and love of the parts thereof.

12. How can it then ſtand with true Policy, or reaſon of State, to hinder this union and love of the People? Or to ſow and nouriſh factions amongſt 'em, eſpecially amongſt great perſons, whereby Seditions, Tumults and Troubles may ariſe in the Common-wealth? Yes, ſay the *Machiavellians*, it ſtands very well with the reaſon of our Princes State; who ſeek's not the general good of the Common-wealth, but his own particular benefit; and therefore, foraſmuch as the union and friendſhip of his Subjects may animate and enable 'em the ſooner to Conſpire againſt him, 'tis good policy and reaſon of State for him, to maintain factions amongſt 'em; according to the Tyrannical principle; *Si vis regnare, divide; If thou wilt Reign, ſow or make diviſion.*

13. Thus ſay they, of whom I wou'd fain learn, how they can in this caſe ſeparate the danger of the Common-wealth, from the danger of the Prince, to make this good Policy for him; can the Body be in danger without the Head be ſo too? Has it not been many times ſeen, that ſome private quarrel at firſt betwixt mean perſons, has afterwards paſs'd farther to many, and from them come to be univerſal, to the ruin of a whole State? And therefore *Plutarch* wiſely compares Sedition to a little ſpark of Fire, which falling into Straw,

or

or other dry matter, in ſome corner of a Houſe, ſets the ſame on Fire, whereby in the end a whole Town is burnt; in which reſpect he counts it for one of the moſt ſpecial Points of Political Science, to take away all occaſion of Sedition; and when it grow's, quickly to appeaſe it.

14. *Ariſtotle* alſo teaches the ſame very ſeriouſly, (*a*) affirming that Sedition is the chief cauſe of the change, and ſubverſion of Common-wealths, ſhewing how many ways it may ariſe, and how it may be remedy'd; and that 'tis always dangerous, but then moſt pernicious, when it grows amongſt great perſons; and therefore he adviſes to remedy the ſame if it be poſſible in the very beginning; becauſe (*b*) *Principium dicitur eſſe dimidium totius*; *The beginning is ſay'd to be one half of the whole*; and little Seditions at the firſt, grow afterwards to be great, eſpecially amongſt great Men; *Whoſe diſcord*, ſays he, *draws the whole Common-wealth after 'em*; whereof he alledges divers examples, which I omit, becauſe I have treated this matter already, (*c*) upon the occaſion of a Law of *Solon*; where I have ſhew'd how dangerous, and pernicious ſome Seditions have been, which have only ſprung amongſt Women and Boys; and I have alſo farther declar'd the danger of nouriſhing diviſion amongſt great perſons, by a Domeſtical example of the utter overthrow of King *Henry* the VI. (*d*) and of all the Houſe of *Lancaſter*, whereof the firſt ground

(*a*) *Ariſt. Polit. li. 5. ca. 2. 3. & 4.* (*b*) *Idem Ibid. c. 4.* (*c*) Tom. 1. *ca. 7. nu. 14. 19. 20, & 21.* (*d*) *Ibid. nu, 17.*

and

and occaſion was, that the Queen his Wife maintain'd diviſion betwixt the Duke of *Somerſet*, and Earl of *Warwick*. And to the ſame purpoſe I have alſo alledg'd other examples out of *Philip de Comines*, (*a*) with his opinion and advice to all Princes, to labor with all ſpeed to compound ſuch quarrels, as fall out amongſt their Nobility, and not to nouriſh 'em by any means; leſt they ſhou'd kindle a Fire in their own Houſe, which after they will not be able to quench. Whereby it may appear how dangerous and abſurd the Counſel is, which *Machiavellians* give to their Princes, to nouriſh factions in their Commonwealth, and eſpecially amongſt the greateſt perſons; as thô Princes were Omnipotent, and had the Hearts, and Wills of all Men in their Hands, to move, and ſway; incenſe, or appeaſe; in ſuch manner and meaſure, as it ſhall pleaſe 'em; which power is only in God's Hand. So that 'tis evident in this caſe, that *Machiavellians* expoſe their Prince to manifeſt danger without any aſſurance, or ſufficient probability of remedy, which in matter of State is moſt abſurd, as I have before declar'd. (*b*)

15. The like may alſo be ſayd of their other pernicious Policies before mention'd, conſiſting in all kind of cruelty, injuſtice and wickedneſs; whereby they make their Princes moſt odious to all Men, and by conſequence, draw them into manifeſt danger; from which they are not able to warrant or defend 'em by all their Policy: As it

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ca.* 7. *nu.* 16. *&* 18. *Philip de Com. de reb. geſt. Ludov.* 138. (*b*) Tom. 2. *ca.* 4. *nu.* 11. *&* 12.

may

may appear by the experience of all former Ages, to this very time wherein we live; ſeeing all Hiſtories teſtifie, that the more wicked and Tyrannical Princes have been, and the more they have incurr'd the hatred of Men, the ſooner they have been ruin'd; ſome by open Rebellions of their Subjects; ſome others by their general defection in favor of Strangers; others by ſecret Conſpiracies of a few; and others alſo by ſome deſperate attempt of ſome one Man; notwithſtanding all their Policies, Power, or force of Guards, Armies, Fortreſſes, or other human remedies.

16. This Point *Cicero* proves, (*a*) by the examples of *Phalaris* a moſt cruel Tyrant, whom the People of the *Agrigentins* oppreſs'd in a general Tumult; of *Alexander* the Tyrant of *Pheræ*, kill'd by his own Wife; and of *Demetrius* King of *Macedon*, forſaken by all his Subjects in favor of King *Pyrrhus*: To whom we may add *Romulus* the firſt Founder of the *Roman* Empire, who having made himſelf hateful to his Senators, was Murder'd by them, in the very Senate-houſe. As alſo *L. Tarquinius Priſcus* (*b*) his third Succeſſor was kill'd by two Shepherds, being become odious to the People for his injuſtice and fraud towards the Children of *Ancus Marcius*; whom he depriv'd of their Kingdom, thô he was left their Tutor by their Father. In like manner *Tarquinius Superbus*, the ſeventh and laſt King of the *Romans*, who us'd all the Tyrannical Policies abovemention'd, violating all Laws both Human and Divine,

(*a*) *Cicero Offic. li.* 2. (*b*) *T. Livius Dec.* 1. *li.* 1.

for

for the conſervation of his State, who was nevertheleſs driv'n out of his Kingdom by his Subjects, and the Name of King and Kingly Authority aboliſh'd amongſt the *Romans* in hatred of him, for the ſpace of five hundred Years.

17. And if we look into the *Roman* Empire after *Julius Cæſar*, we ſhall find that neither Policy, nor Power, cou'd defend many Emperors of *Rome*, and *Conſtantinople*, againſt the hatred of Men, and to omit others who periſh'd upon other occaſions, it may appear by (*a*) *Julius Cæſar* himſelf, *Cajus Caligula*, *Claudius*, *Nero*, *Domitian*, (*b*) *Commodus*, (*c*) *Didius Julianus*, *Caracalla*, (*d*) *Opilius Macrinus* and his Son *Diadumenus*, (*e*) *Heliogabalus*, *Alexander*, *Severus*, *Julius*, *Maximinus*, (*f*) *Galienus*, (*g*) *Philippus*, (*h*) *Aurelianus*, (*i*) *Conſtans* the firſt (*k*) *Gratian*: *Valentinian* the third, *Baſilicus*, *Zeno*, *Mauritius*, *Phocas*, *Heracleonas* with his Mother *Martina*, *Conſtans* the ſecond, *Juſtinian* the ſecond, *Philippicus*, *Conſtantinus* the ſixth, *Nicephorus Stauracius*, *Leo Armenus*, *Michael* the Son of *Theophilus*, *Nicephorus*, ſurnam'd *Phocas*, *John Zemiſces*, *Michael Calaphates*, *Stratioticus*, *Michael Parapinaceus*, *Andronicus Comnenus*, and divers others who having incurr'd the hatred either of their Subjects in general, or of ſome particular perſons, were ſome of 'em Poyſon'd, and others violently Slain, either by the fury of the People,

(*a*) *Sueton Tranquil.* (*b*) *Ælius Lamprid.* (*c*) *Spartian.* (*d*) *Iul. Capito.* (*e*) *Lamprid.* (*f*) *Trebellius pollio.* (*g*) *Sextus Aurel. victor.* (*h*) *Fla. Vopiſcus.* (*i*) *Pomponius lætus.* (*k*) *Ioan. Baptiſta Egnatius. Zonaras. Nizetas Choniates.*

or

or by their Nobility, or by their own Guards, and Soldiers; or by their Wives, Concubines, or Servants; or by other particular Men: Beſides, that ſome others of 'em were depos'd, and either confin'd to Monaſteries, or depriv'd as well of their Eyes and Noſes, as of their Empire; and *Zeno* (*a*) amongſt the reſt, a moſt cruel and crafty Tyrant, was put alive into his Sepulcher, by the conſent of his Wife, whilſt he was Drunk; or as ſome Write, taken with a Fit of the falling Sickneſs; being alſo ſo hated of his own Servants, and Guards, that when he came to himſelf and cry'd for help out of the Sepulchre, (*b*) no Man aſſiſted or pitty'd him; and ſo he dy'd raging, and tearing his own Fleſh with his Teeth, as it appear'd afterwards when the Tomb was open'd.

18. And thô every one of theſe was not ſo ſubtile or politick, nor yet ſo wicked as *Machiavel* wou'd have his Prince to be, yet 'tis evident in 'em all, (*c*), that the hatred of Subjects is moſt pernicious to Princes, and in divers of 'em it manifeſtly appears, that no human power, or wicked policy, can warrant, and ſecure, the State of a Prince generally hated, ſeeing they excell'd not only in Imperial power, but alſo in ſubtilty, craft, perfidiouſneſs, perjury, deep diſſimulation, cruelty, and all ſuch wickedneſs, as *Machiavel* requires in his Prince. And to omit others, the laſt I nam'd of the Emperors of *Conſtantinople*, to wit, *Andronicus Comnenus*, was ſo eminent and egregious

(*a*) *Cedren. in Comp. Zonaras Annal. To.* 8. (*b*) *Ioan. Baptiſta Egnat. in Zenone.* (*c*) *Epito. Ioan. Bap. Egnatij.*

in

in all Tyrannical Policy, that *Egnatius* worthily calls him: (*a*) *Callidiſſimum mortalium*; *The moſt craſty of all Mortal Men*, of whoſe manner of Government I will briefly ſay ſomething, to the end it may appear how little ſecurity a Prince can have by wicked Policy, againſt the hatred of Men.

19. This *Andronicus* having with great art and ſubtilty, obtain'd to be Tutor to the Young Emperor *Alexius*, Son to *Emanuel*, made himſelf ſhortly after his Companion in the Empire, procuring the Death of the Empreſs Mother to *Alexius* and of divers others, whoſe Lives he thought to be prejudicial to his pretence; and within a while alſo caus'd the Young Emperor himſelf to be Murder'd, notwithſtanding his former Oath of Fidelity, Solemnly confirm'd by receiving the Bleſſed Sacrament. And being then Emperor alone, and finding himſelf to be hateful to his People, he practis'd all kinds of Tyrannical Policy, which cou'd be devis'd for his own preſervation; he guarded his Palace, and Perſon, with ſtrong Guards of Barbarous Strangers, and by the moſt deſperate Fellows that cou'd be found; who cou'd neither ſpeak nor underſtand the Language of the Country; and he had beſides every Night at his Chamber Door a huge Maſtiff-dog, ſo fierce that he durſt fight hand to hand with a Lyon, or with an Arm'd Man on Horſe-back; he was alſo provided of wicked Inſtruments for the execution of his Will in all caſes; as Spyes, Promoters, and falſe Witneſſes, whereby many Noblemen were kill'd

(*a*) *Nicetas Choniates in Andronico Comneno. li* 1.

kill'd, and impriſon'd, or baniſh'd, for no other reaſon, but becauſe he fear'd, that either their Credit with the People, or their Power, Wealth, or Wit, might prove in time dangerous to his State.

20. Yet nevertheleſs knowing very well, (*a*) that the more his Empire flouriſh'd in Juſtice, the more 'twou'd be to his Honor, Benefit, and Security; he ſhew'd ſuch ſpecial care thereof, that he excell'd many excellent Princes therein, not only in providing for the Election of Juſt and Wiſe Officers, but alſo ſeverely puniſhing thoſe, who either did, or permitted, any wrong to be done to the meaneſt or pooreſt Subject he had. Moreover, he ordain'd, and gave a moſt liberal allowance to all Magiſtrates for their maintenance, to the end, that they ſhou'd not have any need, or pretence to take Bribes; and ſuch as were prov'd Corrupt, he ſo exemplarly puniſh'd, that within a while, no Magiſtrate durſt take any thing of any Man, thô never ſo freely offer'd; he ſhew'd himſelf affable, and courteous to the poor, ſeem'd very full of pitty and compaſſion when he heard their complaints; and did 'em exact Juſtice; and moreover took ſuch order for the relief of the neceſſities of the common People, that all kind of Victuals were moſt cheap and plentiful; the grounds were well Till'd, and Manur'd; the Countries well Inhabited; Villages and Cities much augmented; and the Common-wealth greatly enrich'd.

(*a*) *Idem li.* 1. *&* 2. *Idem Ibid.*

21. Such

21. Such was the care he ſeem'd to have of Juſtice, and of the publick good; which nevertheleſs he reſpected no farther than it might turn to his own particular benefit or pleaſure, which he, as all other Tyrants do, preferr'd before all other things whatſoever. For as he provided the Common-wealth of excellent Magiſtrates, ſo he furniſh'd his Court and Council with wicked Counſellors and Judges, void of all Conſcience, who executed his Will upon all ſuch as incurr'd his ſuſpicion, or diſpleaſure; baniſhing ſome, depriving others of their Eyes and Goods, ſecretly Drowning and Murdering ſeveral perſons, and publickly Condemning many others, upon falſe pretences; of whom nevertheleſs he himſelf wou'd ſeem to have great compaſſion. As for example, underſtanding that one *Iſacius* (*a*) a Nobleman having taken Arms againſt him in the Iſland of *Cyprus*, he pick'd a quarrel againſt two of his own truſtieſt Servants and Favorites, becauſe they were great friends of the other, and caus'd 'em to be accus'd of Treaſon, Condemn'd, and Executed; and when ſute was made unto him after their Deaths, that their Bodies, which were Hang'd up, might be taken down and Bury'd, he ſeem'd ſo much to pitty their caſe, that he ſhed abundance of Tears, lamenting that Sentence of the Judges, and that the Severity and Authority of the Laws over-power'd, and out-weigh'd his inclination and affection towards 'em. (*b*) And when any were found guilty of Sedition, not only they

(*a*) *Idem. lib.* 1. (*b*) *Idem. lib.* 2.

them-

themſelves, but alſo their whole Kindred and Families were Condemn'd and Ruin'd; to the end that none of their Race ſhou'd be left to revenge it: Which nevertheleſs he ſeem'd rather to permit, and ſuffer to be done, than to ordain it himſelf: For he caus'd his Judges and Magiſtrates to give thoſe publick Sentences, and Edicts with plauſible preambles; ſhewing their care of the ſafety of the Emperor's perſon, and referring it not to his Command, but to the Divine Inſpiration, as a thing neceſſary for God's Service, and the good of the Common-wealth.

22. Now I appeal to any *Machiavellian*, whether *Andronicus* had not the Quinteſſence of *Machiavel's* Policy, before *Machiavel* was Born? And whether he wanted either deſire, wit, or wickedneſs, to conſerve his State againſt the hatred of Men, if it had been poſſible to have done it by wicked means? Therefore let us ſee the end, which was ſuch, that it may ſerve for an exemplar warning to all *Machiavellian* Polititians.

23. Whilſt *Andronicus* Govern'd in this manner, his cruelty and injuſtice did purchaſe him more hatred, than the good he did for the publick cou'd recompence; which fill'd him every day with new fears, ſuſpicions, and jealouſies; eſpecially after that he was preſs'd with Wars by *William* King of *Sicily*; who having overthrown ſome of his Armies, and taken *Theſſalonica*, and other Towns of importance, march'd towards *Conſtantinople*, wherewith the People began to take courage and to diſcover their hatred towards *Andronicus* daily more and more; which put him in

such fear of Conspiracies, that he consulted with Sorcerers, and Witches, and especially with one *Sethus* a Magician, who Divin'd by a Basen of Water; and one Day when *Andronicus* desir'd to know the Name of his Successor, *Sethus* shew'd him in the Water the two Letters *I.* and *S.* whereby he and his Counsellors conjectur'd that it must needs be *Isacius*, who actually Rebell'd against him in the Island of *Cyprus*, as I have declar'd; nevertheless, there was another *Isacius* surnam'd *Angelus* at the same time in the Court, but a Man of so mild a Spirit, and so small Courage, that *Andronicus* himself, as suspicious as he was, did no way suspect him; but one of his chief Counsellors suggested to him, that 'twere good to Command the said *Isacius Angelus* to be taken and put in Prison, to prevent the worst; lest, says he, we may seek the Viper abroad in the Field, when perhaps we have him in our Bosom: And thô *Andronicus* seem'd at first to contemn *Isacius*, as a Man no way to be fear'd, yet 'twas resolv'd by him and his Council, that he shou'd be taken, and for that purpose, *Stephanus* one of his chief Counsellors and worst Instruments, went himself with certain Sergeants to the House of *Isacius*, who defending himself, kill'd *Stephanus*, and ran presently with his Sword Bloody in his Hand, through the Market-place, to take Sanctuary in the chief Church of the Town, imploring as he went, the help of the People, and declaring what he had done; whereupon the People flock'd after him to the Church, and greatly pittying his Case, and commending his Act, their Courage

at

at length encreaſing with their Number, they began to embolden one another, firſt to defend *Iſacius*, and after to make him Emperor; which being propounded to the whole Aſſembly, was accepted and allow'd of by them all, thô he himſelf neither deſir'd, nor ſo much as dream'd of it, but wou'd have thought himſelf well pay'd, cou'd he but ſave his Life.

24. This reſolution being taken amongſt 'em, they Proclaim'd him Emperor, firſt in the Church, and after in the Streets; which was approv'd by a general conſent of all the Nobility, and People of the City, who came all to yield him Obedience and to aſſiſt him; *Andronicus* ſeeing himſelf forſaken of all his Subjects, durſt not truſt to the ſtrength neither of his Palace, nor of his Guards, nor of his great Dog, but fled away in a Boat, and was ſhortly after taken, and brought back loaden with Iron Chain's; ſcorn'd, and revil'd by the People, his Hair of his Head and Beard pluck'd off, his Teeth ſtruck out, his Right Hand cut off, and a few Days after, one of his Eyes being pull'd out of his Head, he was ſet upon a Scabb'd Camel, Apparrell'd ridiculouſly, and carry'd through the Streets, to be ſhew'd to the People; who caſt upon him all kind of Filth and Ordure, every one contending who ſhou'd, deride, or abuſe him moſt; and at laſt, he was hang'd up by the heel's, his Apparel torn from him, and his naked Body wounded by whoſoever wou'd ſtrike him; as many did after divers manners, ſome for ſport, ſome for revenge of injuries, ſome to try their Swords, and

others for trial of their ſtrength; till at length he was hack'd and hew'd to pieces. Behold here the fruit of *Machiavellian* Policy, the lamentable Iſſue of Wickedneſs and Tyranny, and the ſmall aſſurance that Tyrants have, againſt the hatred of their Subjects, either by Uſurp'd Power, or Impious Policy; whereunto I might add a ſpecial reflection upon God's Juſt Judgments, but that I have determin'd not to urge the ſame in this Chapter.

25. Having recounted theſe Examples out of the *Roman* and *Greek* Hiſtorians, I ſhall here add ſome of the Examples that happen'd, as well in our own, as other Countries. What caus'd the deſtruction of *Edmond Ironſide*, (*a*) who was Murder'd upon a Privy, or the continual Rebellions in the time of King *John*; (*b*) or the untimely Death of *Edward* the II broch'd with a Spit; (*c*) or of *Richard* the II, firſt Depos'd, and after Kill'd in Priſon; (*d*) or yet of *Richard* the III forſaken of his Nobility and Commons, and Slain at *Boſworth* Field; but the hatred of their Subjects? And as to the laſt of theſe, I mean *Richard* the III, if we conſider his Malignant and Treacherous Nature, his Cruelty, deep diſſimulation, deviliſh devices and inventions, as well to get the Crown, as after to conſerve it, his Murders, miſchiefs, and his other horrible impiety; we ſhall not find him inferior to the moſt famous Tyrants of former times, for all impious and

(*a*) *Polidor Virgil.* 17. (*b*) *Idem. lib.* (*c*) *Idem. lib.* (*d*) *Idem. lib.*

wicked

wicked Policy; which nevertheleſs cou'd not free him from the danger of deſtruction, which the hatred of his Subjects drew upon him.

26. But what need I alledge other Examples; ſeeing the Mirror of *Machiavels* own Prince, *Cæſar Borgia*, may ſerve for an evident proof of this matter; for thô he ſo far ſupaſs'd all former Tyrants in wickedneſs and Tyrannical Policy, that *Machiavel* made ſpecial choice of him, to frame his wicked Prince by the Model of his Tyranny, yet he cou'd not uphold and conſerve his State, againſt the hatred of Men, but being abandon'd by his Subjects, and Friends, (*a*) he became a lamentable Example, not only of human imbecility, but alſo of the woful end of ſuch as truſt to wicked Policy, as I have before declar'd. (*b*)

27. And thô all former Examples ſhou'd fail us, yet one or two of the laſt Age, ſtill freſh in Memory, may ſuffice for a warning to Princes, how they incur the general hatred of their Subjects, I mean the lamentable end of *Chriſtiern* King of *Denmark*, (*c*) firſt driv'n out of his Kingdom by his own People for his Tyrannical Cruelty, and after alſo taken, impriſon'd, and poyſon'd by 'em, as I have before ſignifi'd; and of *Henry* the III, King of *France*, who thô he be not to be number'd amongſt the Wicked Tyrants before mention'd, yet may ſerve for an Example of the ſmall aſſurance a Prince can have againſt the hatred of his People, ſeeing that an Army of forty thou-

(*a*) *Guicciar. li. 6.* (*b*) Tom. 1. *Cha. 3. nu. 4. & Cha. 13. nu. 4. & 5.* (*c*) *Sutius in Comment. an. 1517, Olaus Mag. li. 8. ca. 39.*

sand Men, cou'd not defend his Person against the resolution of one single Man, who Slew him in the midst of 'em all; whereby we may see how true it is which *Seneca* says; *Qui suam vitam contemnit, tuæ Dominus erit*; *He that contemnes his own Life, will when he pleases be Master of thine.*

28. Hereupon therefore it follows, that no Prince's power or policy, can sufficiently warrant, and assure his State, against the universal hatred of Men; especially, considering the little security, that wicked Princes, when they grow to be hated, have, of their own Guards, or Armies; which thô they are chiefly for their defence, yet serve many times for no other end, than to Butcher and Slaughter 'em; as I have before declar'd, (*a*) where I have alledg'd the examples of (*b*) *Caligula*, (*c*) *Caracalla*, (*d*) *Heliogabalus*, *Philip*, (*e*) *Gallien*, *Machrinus*, (*f*) *Aurelianus*, (*g*) *Maximinus*, and others; Slain partly by their Soldiers, and partly by their Guards; notwithstanding the great liberality which many of these Emperors us'd to purchase their affections and fidelity; as may be observ'd in *Maximinus*, of whom *Julius Capitolinus* says; (*h*) *Ea astutia fuit, ut milites non solum virtute regeret, sed etiam præmijs & lucris sui amantissimos redderet*; *He was so crafty, that he did not only Govern his Soldiers by courage, but also won their affections by gifts and rewards:* And yet nevertheless, they several times Conspir'd against him,

(*a*) *Num.* 11. (*b*) *Sueton.* (*c*) *Spartian.* (*d*) *Lamprid.* (*e*) *Trebellius pollio.* (*f*) *Flav. Vopiscus.* (*g*) *Iulius Capitol.* (*h*) *Iulius Capitol. in Maximin.*

and

and at length, when he was denounc'd publick Enemy by the Senate, and in his March towards *Rome* in great want of Victuals, they kill'd him, and his Son in their Tents, and ſent their Heads to *Rome*.

29. In this Relation I wiſh two things may be noted; the one, the fruit of Cruelty; for this *Maximinus* being Tyrannically made Emperor by his Soldiers, againſt the Will of the Senate, follow'd the principles which *Machiavel* teaches his Prince, perſuading himſelf, as *Julius Capitolinus* teſtifies; (*a*) *Niſi crudelitate, imperium non teneri; That he cou'd not hold the Empire but by Cruelty*; wherein he ſo exceeded, that ſome call'd him, *Cyclops*, ſome *Buſiris*, ſome *Scyron*, ſome *Typhon*, and ſome *Phalaris*; and therefore in the end he receiv'd the juſt reward thereof, at the hands of his own Soldiers; to whom notwithſtanding his great Donatives, he became no leſs odious than to other Men. The other thing which I wiſh may be obſerv'd, is, that which I have before handl'd, (*b*) concerning the great infelicity of ſuch Princes, as ſeek rather to be fear'd than lov'd; for thô they are forc'd for their own ſafety, to become Slaves to thoſe, by whom they keep others in Slavery, yet they are not ſecure thereby; being ſtill in danger not only of others, but alſo of them, who ſhou'd defend 'em; whoſe Mercenary minds, are ſo inconſtant, and ſubject to corruption, that the Lives of the Princes whom they Guard, are ever expos'd to Sale, and therefore

(*a*) *Ibidem.* (*b*) Tom. 1. *Cha.* 13. *nu.* 12. *&* 13.

can never be ſecur'd by any human policy, or power; for let the Prince give 'em never ſo much, to bind 'em to his Service, yet he that ſhall give, or but promiſe 'em more, ſhall win 'em from him; as it has divers times fall'n out to the *Roman* Emperors, who have been ſold by their Soldiers, and Guards, not for ready Mony, but for the promiſe of greater Summs, than even cou'd be expected; as *Plutarch* notes (*a*) in the Guards and Soldiers, of *Nero*, corrupted by *Nimphidius* in favor of *Galba*, upon promiſe of a greater Donative than cou'd afterwards be perform'd, which failing, he caus'd the deſtruction both of *Nero* and *Galba*; for the Soldiers forſook *Nero* in hope of the payment promis'd; and kill'd *Galba*; becauſe he cou'd not pay it: So tickliſh is the truſt that Princes repoſe in Mercenary Men, and ſo unſecure the State that is to be upheld by ſuch weak props, which many times fail, when there is moſt need of 'em.

30. Moreover, another ſpecial and inevitable danger is to be noted, which any Prince generally hated muſt needs incur, to wit, the defection of his Subjects in all occaſions of Invaſion from Forraign Countries, for thô he be never ſo ſtrong at home in Guards, Garriſons, and Fortreſſes, and his Subjects alſo ſo poor and weak, that they neither dare, nor can riſe againſt him; yet if any Forraign Princes Invade him, either upon a quarrel of State, which amongſt Princes that are Neighbors is never wanting, or upon

(*a*) *Plutarch in Galba.*

Ambition

Ambition to enlarge their Dominions; what remedy has he againſt the general hatred of his People, who have then ſufficient opportunity, and means to be reveng'd upon him, and to free themſelves from the Yoke of his Tyranny, by taking part with the Forraigner, whereof the experience has many times been ſeen.

31. We Read in *Juſtin*, (*a*) that the Subjects of *Demetrius* King of *Syria* abandon'd him, for the hatred which they bore him, and took part with a known Counterfeit, calling himſelf *Alexander*, pretending to be of the Royal Race, as *Perkin Warbeck* alſo did in *England*, which *Alexander* they accepted for their King, being ſo incenſed againſt *Demetrius*, that they were content, ſays *Iuſtin*, to admit any one, to be rid of him. Alſo the laſt Kings of *Naples*, (*b*) no leſs Rich and Potent than wickedly Politick, being moſt hateful to their Subjects, for their Tyrannical Government, were forſaken of 'em all, and betray'd to the *French*, to whom they yielded themſelves without any reſiſtance; as I have before ſignifi'd at large. (*c*)

32. Alſo *Lewis Sforza* Duke of *Milan*, may ſerve for an example of this matter. For when *Lewis* the XII King of *France*, made War againſt him, and had already taken divers of the chief Towns, and Forts in the State of *Milan*, (*d*) Duke *Lewis* knowing himſelf to be very odious to his Subjects for his great exactions, and impoſitions, and fearing leſt they wou'd abandon him; aſſembl'd

(*a*) *Iuſtin. li.* 39. (*b*) *Guicciard. li.* 6. *Philip. Comin. in Carolo* 8. (*c*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 22. (*d*) *Guicciardin. li.* 4.

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the People of *Milan*, to regain their good Wills, and not only remitted divers Taxes which he had impos'd upon 'em, but alſo gave 'em many reaſons and excuſes of his former proceedings; nevertheleſs, ſuch was the hatred which they had conceiv'd againſt him, that in a few Days after, they took Arms, kill'd *Antonio Landriano* his Treaſurer, forc'd him to fly, call'd in the *French*, and yielded the Town and themſelves to their Obedience. Have we not ſeen the like effect of hatred in *England*, (*a*) in the time of King *Iohn*, when the Barons and Nobility of the Realm, call'd in *Lewis* the VIII King of *France*, whilſt he was Dolphin, and Proclaim'd him King? Chuſing rather to live under the Ancient Enemies of the *Engliſh* Nation, than to Obey King *Iohn* their Natural King, who as *Matthew* of *Weſtminſter* Writes. *Made himſelf hateful unto them, as well for the Murther of his Nephew* Arthur, *as for his Adulteries, Tyranny, Exactions, and continual Servitude wherein he kept* England; *and laſtly, for the War which his demerits procur'd; in reſpect whereof, he ſcarce deſerv'd to be lamented by any Man.* I forbear to alledge many other remarkable Hiſtories to the ſame purpoſe, becauſe I eſteem it needleſs in ſo evident a matter as this.

33. What then ſhall we ſay of *Machiavels* peſtilent precepts for the preſervation of a Prince already infected, and poyſon'd with wickedneſs? Can we ſay any thing elſe, then that whilſt he, ſeek's by one poyſon to expel or remedy another,

(*a*) *Polidor. Vergil. in Ioan.*

he

he doubly poyſons himſelf, and kills himſelf out right? For a wicked Prince adding, as *Machiavel* adviſes, wickedneſs to wickedneſs, and cruelty to cruelty, draw's hatred upon himſelf upon hatred, which as I have declar'd, will break out ſooner or later to his utter ruin.

34. Neither can the *Machiavellian* help his Maſters cauſe, by ſaying, that ſuch wicked Princes, as have periſh'd by the hatred of Men, have committed ſome error or other, they ſhou'd or might have foreſeen, and avoided; for I have made it evident throughout this whole Diſcourſe, that the weakneſs of Man's Wit and Power is ſuch, that no Man living is able to foreſee and prevent all dangers and accidents, which in Men's affairs may occur to the overthrow of their deſigns; which I have evidently prov'd by examples of the abſurd errors, as well of the Wiſeſt Senates and Councils, as of moſt Politick Men. (*a*) Whereupon it follow's, that the Prince who expoſes himſelf to the general hatred of Men incurs very great danger.

35. For even as ſtrong Cities, or Fortreſſes, which have no Enemy near, do, or may commit many errors in matters relating to their defence, without any danger; but being beſieg'd by their Enemies, are ſometimes ſupris'd by occaſion of the leaſt overſight or negligence: So it fares with Princes, who, as long as they are generally belov'd, are little or nothing prejudic'd by many errors that happen in their Government, but

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 3. 4. *&c.*

being

being once, as I may term it, beſieg'd with the hatred of their Subjects, and Neighbors, they are ruin'd ſometimes with the leaſt error, which they or their Magiſtrates commit; for the hatred of Men when 'tis general, may be compar'd to a ſwelling Sea, which environing a Ship on every ſide, ſometimes overwhealms it with the impetuoſity of Waves, and at other times again enters in at every ſmall chink, and thereby ſinks it. So the general hatred of Men, do's in like manner not only overthrow a Princes State, by violent and powerful attempts, but alſo by taking advantage of every little error, or accident that may help to ruin it. And therefore, foraſmuch as the weakneſs of Man's Wit, and the variety of times, and occaſions, produce always ſome dangerous accidents in the States of Princes, either by their errors, or otherways; whereupon their induſtrious, and watchful Enemies, eſpecially Domeſticks, may take advantage; it follows, that no Prince generally hated can live long in ſecurity, be he never ſo diligent, vigilant, or ſuſpicious of all Men, as *Machiavel* wou'd have his Prince to be.

36. Who cou'd uſe greater vigilancy, or diligence for his own conſervation, or be more ſuſpicious then *Alexander* the Tyrant of *Phæres*? (*a*) Who thô he lov'd his Wife *Thebes* very dearly, yet never came to her Chamber, but he caus'd both her Coffers, and her ſelf to be ſearched, to ſee whether ſhe had any Weapon hid in her

(*a*) *Cicero de Offici. lib.* 2.

Gar-

Garments, yet he nevertheleſs was kill'd by her in the end. Cou'd any Man be more provident for his own ſafety than was *Claudius* the Emperor? (*a*) Who wou'd never go to any Banket, but where his own Guards and Soldiers ſerv'd at Table, and never Viſited any Sick Man, whoſe Chamber was not before ſearch'd by ſome of his Guards, even to the very Beds and Bed-ſtraw. And yet he was poyſon'd at laſt by his own Taſter, whom he never ſuſpected. What ſhou'd I ſay of *Domitian* the Emperor; (*b*) who was ſo fearful and ſuſpicious of all Men, that he made the Walls of his Galleries, where he us'd to walk, to be ſet full of a kind of bright and clear Stone call'd *Phengites*, wherein he might ſee whatſoever was done behind him. And nevertheleſs he was Murder'd by his own Chamberlains.

37. Many ſuch other examples might be alledg'd of Princes, who beſides their great Guards, and Armies for defence of their perſons, us'd alſo all human diligence, being jealous and ſuſpicious of all Men; and yet nevertheleſs were overreach'd, ſometimes by thoſe whom they moſt fear'd, and ſometimes by thoſe whom they leaſt ſuſpected, or moſt truſted. Whereunto I add, what I have alſo noted elſewhere, and cannot repeat too often, that ſometimes the moſt provident, and Politick Princes, are throu' the weakneſs of human Wit, overthrown by their own Policies; that is, by the ſame means, whereby they ſought either to benefit themſelves, or to hurt and de-

(*a*) *Sueto. in Claudio.* (*b*) *Idem in Domitiano.*

ſtroy

ſtroy others; as hath ſufficiently appear'd by the examples of *Cæſar Borgia* himſelf, (*a*) the Admiral *Chaſtillion* in *France*; *Henry* the III King of *France*; and divers others, of whom I have ſpoken before, in ſeveral places of this Treatiſe.

38. But what ſecurity can a wicked Prince have by Guards or other human Providence, and diligence? Since we ſee, that ſometimes the Wiſeſt, and beſt garded, being advertis'd of ſome eminent danger, either have not the good fortune to underſtand it, or the wit to believe it; ſo it happen'd to *Julius Cæſar*, (*b*) who as he was going to the Senate, receiv'd a Memorial, wherein the Conſpiracy againſt him was diſcover'd; and being deſir'd to Read it preſently, becauſe it greatly imported him, was ſo troubl'd with the preſs and importunity of Petitioners, that he cou'd not attend unto it; and ſo was kill'd the ſame Day in the Senate-Houſe. *Archias* alſo, the Tyrant in *Thebes*, (*c*) being invited to a Supper, where his Death was Conſpir'd, receiv'd a Letter from a friend of his, containing an advice of the Conſpiracy, and being deſir'd by him that brought it, to Read it out of hand, becauſe it concern'd matters of great importance, he anſwer'd, that it was no time then to negociate ſuch affairs; and ſo laying it aſide, was Slain within two hours after. In like manner *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*, (*d*) who as I have declar'd before, was kill'd at *Nancy*, by the Treaſon of *Campobachio* an *Italian*,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Cha.* 3. 4. & 13. (*b*) *Plutar. in Iulio Cæſar. Iulius Cæſar.* (*c*) *Idem. in pelopida.* (*d*) *Philip. Com. in Lodovico* 11. *c.* 83. & 91.

was

was advertis'd and forewarn'd thereof by *Lewis* the II King of *France*; nevertheleſs, perſuading himſelf, that his advertiſement proceeded either out of malice to *Champobachio*, or a deſire to deprive him of his moſt neceſſary, and truſty Servant, wou'd not believe it, but lov'd him the better for it; beſides that, one who was privy to the Conſpiracy being Condemn'd to dy for another matter, and determining to reveal it to the Duke, thereby to obtain his Pardon, made ſute unto him to ſpeak with him, promiſing to advertiſe him of ſomethings, which imported him very much to know, but the Duke wou'd not be intreated ſo much as to hear him, and ſo the Man was Executed, and the Duke Slain within a few Days after.

39. Now then I wou'd gladly know of *Machiavel*, and his followers, what ſecurity they can promiſe their Prince in extremity of wickedneſs, ſeeing 'tis evident by the reaſons and examples alledg'd, that the extream hatred that great wickedneſs draws upon 'em, do's, notwithſtanding all their power and policy, work their deſtruction by ſo many means, as I have declar'd; as by open Rebellions, or the general Inſurrection of a whole People; by the enterpriſe of a few, or the attempt of ſome one Man; by the defection of Subjects in favor of ſome Forraign or Domeſtick Enemy; by the negligence of Officers, and caſualty of all human affairs, and deſigns; and laſtly, by the errors whereunto all human wit and policy is ſubject, which to Princes that are generally belov'd, are nothing ſo dangerous, by all which means,

means, the ſtrongeſt, and moſt crafty Tyrants, have been overthrown at one time or other.

40. So that the abſurdity of *Machiavel*, is moſt evident in true reaſon of State, ſeeing that in Counſelling Princes to wickedneſs and Tyranny, upon confidence, in human force and policy, he expoſes 'em to aſſur'd danger, and gives 'em no aſſur'd or probable remedy, but rather heap's danger upon danger, by encreaſe of cruelty and all kinds of Tyrannical impiety; inſomuch, that it may be ſayd to *Machiavels* Prince, as *Diogenes* ſayd to a Diſciple of his, whom he had forbidden the Tavern; who ſeeing him one Day running from the Tavern Door, where he ſtood, into the Tavern to hide himſelf from him, he call'd unto him ſaying, *Come back thou Fool, for the farther thou go'ſt forward, the more thou art in the Tavern:* The ſame we may ſay to *Machiavels* Prince, that the farther he proceed's in his dangerous courſe of wicked Policy, the more he endangers himſelf, and as the Poët ſays, *Incidit in Scyllam cupiens vitare Charybdim; Seeking to avoid Scylla, he fall's into Charybdis*, or as our *Engliſh* Proverb ſays, *he leap's out of the Frying-pan, into the Fire.*

41. But put the caſe that a *Machiavellian*, or wicked Prince, cou'd by *Machiavels* Policies ſecure his Eſtate from all Forraign and Domeſtical danger, yet he wou'd infallibly pay ſuch a grievous Penalty for his wickedneſs, even in this World, that he wou'd reap neither pleaſure nor profit thereby; for ſuch exceſs of impiety, as *Machiavel* requires in his Prince, is ever accompany'd not only with hatred of Men, and infamy; but alſo

with

with grief and anguiſh of Mind; infinite ſuſpicions and fears, weary Days, reſtleſs Nights, dreadful Dreams, and continual torment and horror of Conſcience; and many times with diſtraction, madneſs and diſpair; as I have before ſignifi'd, (*a*) when I handl'd this Point in the ſame place, and therefore will be the briefer here, adding only two or three Examples I there omitted.

42. The Elder *Denis*, Tyrant of *Sicily*, (*b*) thô he Raign'd thirty eight Years in great Wealth, and Magnificence; yet liv'd in ſuch continual fear, jealouſie, and ſuſpicion of all Men; that he durſt never truſt any Barber to Trim him, but taught his own Daughters to Shave whilſt they were very young, and when they came to be of riper years, he wou'd not ſuffer 'em to uſe the Razor, but made 'em burn away the hairs of his Beard with Walnut-ſhells, made red hot; and having two Wives, he always caus'd 'em to be ſearch'd, before he wou'd come to them; and when he had occaſion to treat any thing with the People, he ſpoke to them from the top of a high Tower; and how miſerable his whole Life and State was, he himſelf ſufficiently declar'd, when *Damocles*, one of his Flatterers admiring his great Wealth, Dominion, Magnificence, and Majeſty, ſayd, *That he thought no Man living more happy than he.* Whereupon *Denis* ask'd him whether he wou'd try how happy he was, and take a taſt of his felicity; and when *Damocles* (*c*) conſented to accept his offer, he caus'd him to be ſet upon a Sumptuous Bed of State,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Cha.* 16. *num.* 2. 3. 4. 5. *&* 6.
(*b*) Cicero *Tuſcul. quæſt. li.* 5. (*c*) *Ibidem.*

as the custom was then, richly cover'd; and Cubbards of Plate to be furnish'd with Vessels of Gold and Silver; Tables repleniſh'd with all kind of delicate Meats; and most beautiful Boys attending upon him; besides that, there was no want of precious Oyntments, and sweet Perfumes, excellent Musick, and whatsoever else might delight his senses; insomuch, that *Damocles* thought himself a most happy Man. But at length, casting up his Eyes, he saw a bright, and sharp Sword hanging by a hair over his head, with the point downward, as *Denis* had ordain'd, which when he saw, he had no more pleasure in beholding his beautiful Attendants, and rich Furniture; nor to Eat of his dainties; nor to hear any Musick; but desir'd the Tyrant to give him leave to be gone; for he wou'd be no longer happy. Thus did *Denis* very well express the infelicity and misery of wicked Tyrants; how Splendid, Powerful, or Magnificent soever they may seem to be.

43. I omit to speak of the Emperors *Nero*, *Claudius* and *Domitian*; and of King *Alfonsus* of *Naples*, of whom I have spoken before; (*a*) and shall only touch the wretched state of King *Richard* the III, after he had Murder'd his Nephews, which Sir *Thomas Moor* describes as follows in the Story of his Life. *I have heard*, says he, *by the credible report of such as were intimate with his Chamberlains, that after this abominable fact, he never enjoy'd a quiet Mind, he never thought himself secure; when he went abroad he cast his Eyes every where, his*

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 16. *num.* 5.

Body

Body was privatly Arm'd, his Hand was ever upon his Dagger, his Countenance and Behaviour, like one always ready to ſtrike: He took no reſt at Nights, lay long awake muſing, much weary'd with care, and watching, and rather ſlumber'd then ſlept, he was troubl'd with fearful Dreams, he ſometimes ſuddenly ſtarted up, leap'd out of his Bed, and ran about the Chamber; thus his reſtleſs Heart was toſs'd, and perplex'd with the ſad impreſſion, and diſquiet remembrance of his abominable fact.

44. Whereby we may ſee that *Plutarch* had great reaſon to ſay, that *Wickedneſs is of it ſelf ſufficient to make a Man miſerable*; and that *wicked Men the longer they live, the more miſerable they are*; and that *the Doleful and Tragical ends which moſt Tyrants have, cannot be ſo properly counted the temporal puniſhment due to their wickedneſs in this Life, as the conſummation and end thereof.* Wherefore I conclude, that thô there were no Human or Divine puniſhment to be fear'd for wickedneſs; nor any danger to follow it in a Princes State, nor any Hell or Heaven after this Life, yet this continual torment and anguiſh of Mind; this Hell and horror of Conſcience, were enough to make all Princes deteſt, and abhor the abominable precepts of *Machiavel*, who wou'd perſuade Princes to conſerve their States by wickedneſs.

45. But perhaps the *Machiavellians* will ſay here, in defence of their Maſters Doctrin, that thô it wou'd not be amiſs for thoſe who come juſtly, and lawfully to Soveraignty by Succeſſion, or Election, to procure the Love and good Will of all Men, by their Vertuous and Juſt Govern-

ment, yet a Prince who com's to his State by Intruſion, Uſurpation and Injuſtice; as by Murders and other miſchiefs, to the prejudice of the right Heirs, or Owners thereof, cannot hope to conſerve and maintain himſelf therein by Vertue and Juſtice, or by the Love of the People, whoſe hatred he has already incurr'd, but by force and fear, and by the continuance of wickedneſs and Tyranny; which *Cicero* may ſeem to have inſinuated in *Denis* the Tyrant of *Sicily*, of whom he ſays, (*a*) that *Salvus eſſe non poſſet, ſi ſanus eſſe cœpiſſet. He cou'd not have been ſafe, if he had begun to be ſound;* that is to ſay, he cou'd not have been ſecure, if he had become Juſt and Vertuous. Which *Solon* (*b*) alſo the Wiſe *Athenian*, ſeem's to ſignifie of all Tyrants; for when he was mov'd by his Friends to make himſelf Tyrant of *Athens*, with intention to Govern well and juſtly afterwards, he refus'd it ſaying, that *Tyranny is like to a Laberinth, which has no Iſſue of it.* Meaning, as it may ſeem, that a Tyrant cannot with his ſecurity, return from wickedneſs to Vertue, but that he muſt proceed, and go on in Impiety, and Tyranny; having as it were, a Wolf by the Ears, whom if he lets go, he ſets upon himſelf. Thus ſays the *Machiavellians*, or at leaſt may ſay, for I am content to plead their Cauſe for 'em.

46. For the ſatisfaction hereof, 'tis to be conſider'd, that *Cicero* and *Solon* ſayd what is above mention'd, not becauſe they thought that the way and paſſage from Vice to Vertue is not open

(*a*) *Cicero Tuſcul. quæſt. lib.* 5. (*b*) *Plutarch in Solon.*

as

as well for Tyrants, as for other Men; but to ſignifie the malignity of their Natures, and their miſerable State; becauſe Tyrants are commonly of ſo vile, malign and beaſtly natures, that 'tis ſeldom ſeen that any of 'em come to embrace Vertue: In which reſpect *Cicero* thought Tyrants to be moſt miſerable. Moreover, *Solon* being moſt Wiſe, and Prudent, was not ignorant that as the Proverb ſays, *Honores mutant mores*; *Honors change manners*; and therefore he greatly fear'd, that if he ſhou'd once give way to Ambition, and violate Juſtice by the oppreſſion of the Common-wealth, he ſhou'd hardly ever after repair the wrack of his own Conſcience. For whoſoever looſes, as I may term it, the Anchor of integrity, and ſuffers himſelf to be ſo far carry'd away with the Wind of Ambition, that he runs the Ship of Conſcience, againſt the Rocks of Tyranny, let him not wonder if he makes an irreparable Shipwrack, of all Juſtice and Vertue. Nevertheleſs, if a Prince that has got a Crown or State unjuſtly, holds ſuch a Vertuous courſe, that he converts his Tyranny into a Regal and Juſt Government, 'tis evident, both by reaſon and experience, that thô he holds not his ill gotten State lawfully, yet he ſhall poſſeſs it with far leſs danger, and much more ſecurity.

47. And this is conformable not only to the Opinion and Doctrin of *Ariſtotle*, as I have before declar'd in this Chapter, (*a*) but alſo of *Plato*, (*b*) who Counſell'd the two Tyrants of *Sicily*

(*a*) *Num.* 8. *&* 9. (*b*) *Plutar. in Dion.*

call'd *Denis*, the Father and the Son, to change their Tyrannical courſe into a juſt manner of Government; aſſuring 'em that they cou'd not otherwiſe long conſerve and ſecure their States: The truth whereof ſufficiently appear'd, as well by the miſerable Life of the Father, of whom I have lately ſpoken, as alſo by the ignominious baniſhment, and unfortunate end of the Son: Whom *Dion* with very ſmall Forces caſt out of his Kingdom; by reaſon that he was hated and forſaken of all his Subjects; whereas divers other Tyrants, of other Countries, changing their courſe of Tyranny, to a Juſt and Vertuous Government, liv'd and Raign'd no leſs glorious than ſecurely.

48. Such a one was *Anaxilaus* Tyrant of *Sicily*, of whom *Juſtin* Writ's thus. Anaxilaus *who was one of the Tyrants, did by his Juſtice and Vertue, ſtrive to ſurpaſs the Cruelty, and Impiety of others, which wrought a wonderful effect, for when he Dy'd, and left his Children very Young, in the Tuition of* Nicithus *a Slave of his, whom he dearly lov'd for his Fidelity, ſuch was the love that all his Subjects bore unto the memory of him, that they choſe rather to Obey his Slave, than to forſake his Children, and all his Nobility forgetting their Dignity, and the Majeſty of their Kingdom, offer'd themſelves to be Govern'd by a Slave.* *Plutarch* alſo teſtifies, (*a*) that *Hieron* and *Gelon*, Tyrants of *Sicily*, and *Piſiſtratus* the Son of *Hyppocrates* having moſt wickedly poſſeſt themſelves of their States, did nevertheleſs

(*a*) *Plutar. de ſera, num. vindict. Hieron. Gelon. Piſiſtratus.*

Govern

Govern afterwards with ſuch Moderation, Juſtice, and Equity, that they became very popular Princes; as alſo, that *Lidiades* (*a*) the Tyrant, reſtor'd to his Subjects their Old Laws, and Priviledges, and afterwards Dy'd glorioufly in the Field in defence of his Country.

49. In like manner, *Auguſtus Cæſar* (*b*) after he had oppreſt his Common-wealth by force of Armes, and us'd ſuch Cruelty for many Years together, that he was hated of all Men, inſomuch, that he cou'd neither Eat, Drink, nor Sleep in quiet for fear of Conſpiracies; chang'd his courſe by the Counſel of his Friends, and gave himſelf wholly to the exerciſe of Vertue, Piety, and Juſtice; whereby he was at length exceedingly belov'd of all his Subjects, and eſteem'd to be *Pater Patriæ*, *The Father of his Country*. And paſs'd the reſt of his Life in no leſs ſecurity, than honor and felicity. Whereas very many of his Succeſſors, truſting partly to the ſtrength of their Guards, Garriſons, and Armies; and partly to their Policies; loſt their Honor, Empire, and Lives by the continuance of cruelty, and wickedneſs: Whereby it appears, that according to the Latin Proverb. *Nunquam ſera eſt ad bonos mores via*; *'Tis never too late to be good*; and that 'tis not only eaſie, but alſo moſt ſecure for a Tyrannical Prince to paſs from Cruelty to Clemency, from Vice to Vertue, and from Tyranny to Juſtice and Piety.

(*a*) *Lidiades.* (*b*) *Dion. in Auguſto. Auguſtus Cæſar.*

50. But do you, ſay the *Machiavellians*, count it Wiſdom for a Prince, ſo to confide in Juſtice, and Vertue, that he truſt thoſe whom he has once injur'd, or that he thinks himſelf ſecure from 'em ſo long as they live, ſeeing that according to the *Italian* Proverb. *Chi offend non perdona mai*; *He who offends*, that is to ſay, he who do's the injury, *never pardons*, and much leſs he who receives it?

51. To which I anſwer, that I grant to the *Machiavellian*, that his Tyrant ſhou'd never repoſe ſo great confidence in any reconcil'd Enemy, as to put his Life or State into his hands; to which purpoſe I have ſhew'd in the beginning of the Firſt Treatiſe, (*a*) how the *Wiſdom of the Serpent*, *is to be conjoyn'd with the ſimplicity of the Dove*, (*b*) in pardoning and loving our Enemies; and yet in being wary and circumſpect how we truſt 'em, but that which I require of a Tyrant for his ſecurity, is, that he ceales to heap Coal's upon his own Head, by a continuance and encreaſe of Injuſtice, Cruelty, and Tyranny; and that he labor by all convenient means, to pacifie the exaſperated minds of thoſe whom he has offended; not only with Words, but alſo with Deeds, recompenſing injuries with benefits, and diſgraces with favors, cruelty, and ſeverity with clemency, benignity and affability; doing Juſtice to all Men, and ſhewing himſelf to have a particular care of the Common-wealth, by preferring the Publick good before his own private pleaſure, or commo-

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 3. *nu.* 10. (*b*) Matth. 10. 16.

dity,

dity, by being the Patron, and Protector of Vertue, the Puniſher of Vice, a Refuge to the Poor and Afflicted, and finally a common Father to all: Whereby he will purchaſe to himſelf the general and univerſal Love of all; and either extinguiſh the hatred of thoſe whom he had wrong'd, and offended; or at leaſt ſo temper and mitigate the ſame, that 'twill be much leſs dangerous for him, when all Men generally Honor and Love him.

52. Moreover, I allow not only to a reform'd Tyrant, but alſo to the moſt lawful and beſt Prince living, all lawful means of defence, as ſtrong Guards, Garriſons, Armies, Fortreſſes, the Vigilance of Counſellors and Magiſtrates, the diligence of Spyes and all other lawful Policies; all which concurring with the Vertuous, and Juſt Government of a Prince, and being fortifi'd with the general love of his People, which Vertue and Juſtice procur'd, will yield him the greateſt aſſurance, and ſecurity that can be had by any human means.

53. But perhaps the *Machiavellians* will yet reply, and ſay, that for all this, I render not the reform'd Tyrant, no nor any other lawful Prince ſecure; for thô he ſhall be never ſo well, or never ſo generally belov'd, yet, as I have already prov'd ſome one Man offended, may notwithſtanding all his force and lawful Policies, take revenge upon his perſon, and therefore the only remedy for the Prince, ſay they, in that caſe, wou'd be to cut off by ſome means or other, all ſuch as he may think likely to ſeek revenge, or to be any

way

way dangerous to his State; for as *Theodotus* ſayd to *Ptolomeus* King of *Ægypt*, when he Counſell'd him to kill *Pompey*, *Mortui non mordent*; *Dead Men bite not.*

54. But what need the Dead bite him, when not only his own Conſcience ſhall bite and ſting him, as I have before ſignifi'd, (*a*) but alſo there will be Men left alive to ſeek revenge; as their Children, if they have any, or their Kindred, Servants and Friends; as for example. *Erotho* King of *Denmark* the Fifth of that Name, (*b*) caus'd his own Brother to be Murder'd, and after kill'd the Murderer, leſt he might reveal it; for which he was ſmother'd with Smoke by his Brothers Children. (*c*) *Valentinian* the third Emperor of that Name, having ungratfully kill'd the famous Captain *Ætius* with his own Hand, was kill'd by two Soldiers of *Ætius*, in revenge thereof. (*d*) Alſo *Amurates* Emperor of the *Turks*, the firſt of that Name, was Slain with a Dagger by a Servant of *Laſcarus*, the *Deſpota*, or Lord of *Servia*, for revenge of his Lord and Maſters Death; notwithſtanding that *Amurates*, as *Paulus Jovius* reports, (*e*) was one of the moſt crafty and vigilant Princes that the *Turks* ever had.

55. But amongſt all thoſe who have ſought to ſecure their States by Murders, none ever ex-

(*a*) *Num.* 41. 42. 43. & 44. (*b*) *Olaus Mag. li.* 8. *ca.* 36. (*c*) *Saxo gram. lib.* 7. *Paul. Diacon. lib.* 15. (*d*) *Caſſiodor. Chron. an.* 454. *c.* & 455. (*e*) *Evagri li.* 2. 7. *Paul. Iovius in Amurate.*

ceeded

ceeded *Andronicus Comnenus* Emperor of *Conſtantinople*, (*a*) who as I have before declar'd, (*b*) us'd to condemn and extirpate whole Families, for the ſuſpicion which he had ſometimes of ſome one Man; thereby to free himſelf from all fear of revenge; (*c*) which nevertheleſs was reveng'd upon him moſt notoriouſly, not only by the friends and well-willers of the Dead, but alſo by all the People; ſuch being the horror of injuſtice, and cruelty, that it do's not only offend thoſe which are injur'd, but alſo all other Men; and therefore it has been often ſeen, that Subjects have made attempts againſt the State or Perſon of a Prince, for the hatred of ſome Murder, or ſome Cruel Act. *Juſtin* Writes, (*d*) that when *Seleucus* King of *Syria* began his Government with the Murder of *Berevice* his Step-Mother, and of her Son his own Brother; all the Cities which were ſubject to him in *Aſia*, *Exemplo crudelitatis territæ*; *Being frighted with this example of Cruelty*; ſuddenly revolted from him, and yielded themſelves to the Obedience of *Ptolomæus* King of *Ægypt*; *Tantum illi odium*, ſays *Juſtin*, *paricidiale ſcelus attulerat*; *So great was the hatred his wicked and parricidial Act, caus'd in his Subjects towards him.* But what need I alledge old Examples for this matter, ſeeing we have one of later date, whereof I have had occaſion to ſpeak divers times; that is, the lamentable ruin of *Henry* the III. King of *France*, who perſuading himſelf, that Dead Men bite not,

(*a*) *Idem.* (*b*) *Ibidem.* (*c*) *Nicetas Choniat in Andronico Comneno, lib.* 2. (*d*) *Juſtin, li.* 37.

thought

thought it moſt ſecure for him to Kill the Cardinal, and Duke of *Guiſe*, which was reveng'd, as I have before ſignifi'd, not only upon his State, by the greateſt part of his Subjects, who preſently upon the News thereof, took Armes againſt him; but alſo upon his Perſon, by one, who was not any way dependant of the *Guiſes*, nor ever had receiv'd any injury in his whole Life from him; ſo unſecure and dangerous is the remedy of dangers, by Murder and Cruelty; that the danger is many times encreas'd and redoubl'd thereby. And therefore *Seneca* ſays very well, Cruelty repreſſes the Malice of few, and incenſes, and kindles the hatred of all, and *As the cropping of a Tree*, ſays he, *encreaſes the Boughs, ſo a cruel Prince, by cutting off his Enemies do's multiply them.*

56. But now, the Polititian may ask me here, whether I, who inculcate ſo often the danger of wicked Policy, can ſo ſecure a Princes State by Vertue and Juſtice, that the ſame ſhall not be ſubject to any danger or inconvenience? Whereunto I anſwer, that thô ſuch is the natural infirmity of Man's ſtate and condition, and ſo infinite the hazards and inconveniences whereunto he is ſubject, and ſuch alſo the malice of ill Men, that no Human Force or Policy can warrant the beſt Prince living, from all dangers incident to his Perſon or State; yet all the aſſurance and ſecurity which any Prince can poſſibly have of the one or the other, by Human means, is to be attain'd principally by Vertue, Juſtice, and ſuch Policies as are grounded thereupon; and not by injuſtice, impiety and wicked Policy; for whereas the juſteſt

Prince

Prince may have ſome one, or a few Enemies, who may endanger him, yet the wicked muſt needs have many; and the more wicked and cruel he is, the more Enemies he will have, and conſequently the greater will be his danger; for if a Prince cannot be ſecure from one Enemy, or from a few, he will be much leſs ſecure from many; and leaſt of all from the general hatred of all Men; which infallibly ſprings from ſuch exceſſive cruelty and wickedneſs as *Machiavel* requires in his Prince.

57. Therefore, foraſmuch as 'tis the part of all Wiſe Men, eſpecially in matters of State, to chuſe the leaſt of all dangers or inconveuiences, which cannot be remedy'd; and to ſeek, prevent and avoid the worſt, as I have ſufficiently declar'd in my Rules for Young Statiſts, (*a*) 'tis alſo evident, that as nothing is more dangerous to Princes and their States than injuſtice and wickedneſs, which makes 'em odious to all Men, ſo nothing is more to be avoided by them, than the ſame; and that the contrary means of Juſtice and Vertue is to be embrac'd and practis'd; whereby they may purchaſe the general Love of their Subjects, in which conſiſts the greateſt ſecurity of Princes: Such being the force and effect of Love, that it cauſes in the Lovers, as great a care of the beloved, as of themſelves; in which reſpect, *Seneca* ſays, *Vnum eſt inexpugnabile munimentum amor civium*; *The only impregnable Fortreſs of Princes, is the love of their Subjects.*

(*a*) Tom. 2. *Chap.* 4. *nu.* 10. 11. 12.

58. And

58. And this is ſo manifeſt, that *Machiavel* himſelf do's ſufficiently acknowledge it, teaching that the excellency of vertue may conſerve a Princes State, thô he alſo moſt abſurdly attributes the like force and effect to wickedneſs; which truly may be wonder'd at, if we conſider that he being well Read in Hiſtories, cou'd not but ſee, if he were not wilfully blind, that all ſuch Tyrants as have been infamous for their exceſſive cruelty and wickedneſs, have one way or other miſerably periſh'd, which has been obſerv'd in all Ages; and therefore *Cicero* ſpeaking of the violent Death of a Tyrant ſays, *Haud fere quiſquam eorum ſimilem interitum effugit; There is ſcarce any one Tyrant to be found, that eſcapes the like deſtruction.* Whereupon alſo the Tragical Poët ſays, (*a*) ---- *Quota pars moritur tempore fati? Quos felices Cinthia vidit? Vidit miſeros abitura dies, Rarum eſt felix idemque ſenex. How few of 'em live out the courſe of Nature, 'tis a rare thing to ſee any of 'em Old and Happy*; whereof alſo another Poët ſays thus. ---------- *Sine cade & ſanguine, pauci Deſcendunt reges, & ſicca morte Tyranni; Few Tyrants Die a Natural Death, or without Blood*; which *Machiavel* might have noted, if not out of other Hiſtories, yet at leaſt out of *Titus Livius*, (*b*) upon whom he made certain diſcourſes, for of Seven Kings of *Rome* from *Romulus* to *Tarquinius ſuperbus*, Four who got their States, or at leaſt Govern'd 'em Tyrannically, were Three of 'em Kill'd, and the other Baniſh'd, as I have obſerv'd before

(*a*) *Seneca.* (*b*) *Tit. Livius Dec.* 1. *li.* 1.

in

in *Romulus*, *Lucius Tarquinius*, *Servius Tullius*, and *Tarquinius ſuperbus*, (*a*) whereas the other three, *Numa Pompilius*, *Tullus Hoſtilius*, and *Ancus Martius*, who were lawfully Elected by the Senate, and Govern'd Juſtly and Vertuouſly, liv'd in ſecurity, and dy'd very well belov'd, and lamented by the People. The like might be obſerv'd in the *Roman* Emperors after *Julius Cæſar*, if it were needful.

59. But that which ſeems to me moſt ſtrange in *Machiavel*, is, that he cou'd not ſee the experience thereof, at leaſt in *Cæſar Borgia*, whom as I have often before ſignifi'd, he propoſes to his Prince for a Mirror of Tyrannical Policy, notwithſtanding that the ſucceſs thereof was ſuch in him, that all Princes may learn thereby to deteſt it; ſeeing he who in *Machiavels* opinion, (*b*) was moſt exact in the Speculation and Practice thereof, was utterly overthrown thereby, as well as all other Tyrants of former times; which cannot be attributed to Chance, as the Polititians wou'd have it, but either to the Juſt Judgments of God upon wicked Men, which is indeed the principal cauſe thereof, as I will declare in the next Chapter, or at leaſt to the next and immediate cauſe, which for the moſt part is the hatred of Men. And therefore ſeeing the miſerable end of wicked Tyrants, not only has ſuch notorious and known Cauſes, but alſo is ſo frequent and common, that it has been always held for a matter of common experience; it cannot be referr'd to Chance or Fortune, which are underſtood to

(*a*) *Supra nu.* 26. (*b*) *Guicciard. li.* 6.

be

be in ſuch things only, as happen ſeldom, and have no known, and ordinary cauſe, as I have before declar'd: (*a*) So that it may rather be counted caſual, or a matter of Chance, if any notable Tyrant comes to a good end; becauſe the ſame hath been ſeldom ſeen, and the cauſe thereof ſecret, or at leaſt uncertain.

60. Wherefore I conclude that *Machiavel* cannot be excus'd, either of groſs ignorance, if he knew not, as common experience teaches, that wicked Tyrants do commonly periſh miſerably; or of extream malice, if he knew it, and yet labor'd to induce Princes to wickedneſs and Tyranny. The later whereof, is now ſufficiently acknowledg'd by ſome *Florentines* of no mean Judgments, his own Country Men and Friends; who in their ordinary diſcourſes, concerning his Policies, do not ſtick to confeſs, that he himſelf knew them to be contrary to true reaſon of State, and pernicious to Princes; and that nevertheleſs deſiring the overthrow of the Dukes of *Florence*, and of their Monarchy, he publiſh'd his peſtilent Doctrin, hoping ſo to corrupt 'em therewith, that they ſhou'd ruin themſelves by the practice thereof, whereby the State of *Florence* might return to the old Democracy, or popular Government, wherein it had continu'd many Years before. Thus ſays his Friends; but how they defend him therein, excuſing him of folly, and accuſing him of malicious impiety, as well in regard of all other Princes, as of *Coſmo* Duke of *Florence*,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *Chap.* 11. *nu.* 6. 7.

whoſe

whoſe Servant and Secretary he was, I leave it to the Judgment of the diſcreet Reader. And this ſhall ſuffice for the examination of *Machiavellian* Policies, only by reaſon of State; whereunto I will in the next Chapter, add the conſideration of God's Juſtice, for the farther confutation thereof.

CHAP. VII.

The Argument of the precedent Chapter is proſecuted, with the conſideration of God's Juſtice in puniſhing wicked Princes, by the Miniſtry of all his Creatures, where alſo ſomething is ſayd of the Enormity of Murder, and of God's ſevere puniſhment thereof.

IN the laſt Chapter I have ſhew'd the abſurdity of *Machiavellian* Policies, only by reaſon of State, (*a*) and now for the farther manifeſtation thereof, I will add in this, the conſideration of God's Providence in the diſpoſition of Kingdoms, and of his Juſtice in puniſhing wickedneſs in all Men, and particularly in Princes; whereof I have lay'd the foundation before, (*b*) having clearly prov'd that all States,

(*a*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 17. *per totum.* (*b*) *Ibid. nu.* 4. 5. 6. & 7.

and Kingdoms, are very particularly directed, govern'd, and diſpos'd by the Providence of God; which I have made manifeſt, not only by the accompliſhment of *Daniels* Prophecy's, (*a*) concerning the Tranſlation of the Empire of the World, from one Nation to another; but alſo by notorious examples of God's Juſtice in puniſhing whole Common-wealths, Kingdoms, and States, for the Sins, ſometimes of the Princes, ſometimes of the People, and ſometimes of both: And finally, I have declar'd, (*b*) as well by reaſon, and by the Authority of the moſt Learn'd and Famous Philoſophers, as alſo by very many examples, that all true Wiſdom and Policy is from God, and that all the Perfection thereof, proceeds from his Grace; and alſo that the wiſeſt Worldlings, and moſt Politick Governors, without the ſame, do commit infinite Errors, and go as 'twere, groping in the dark, in matters that concern as well their private, as publick affairs.

2. But I have already ſhew'd all this at large, (*c*) and therefore need not repeat it here, but only draw this infallible concluſion, from what has been ſayd before, that all *Machiavellian* or wicked Policies, are againſt true reaſon of State, and moſt pernicious both to Princes, and their States; for if all States depend upon the Providence of God, and are at his diſpoſition; if they be giv'n, conſerv'd, increas'd, puniſh'd, tranſlated, or deſtroy'd, by his ordination; as I have

(*a*) Dan. 2. (*b*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 18. 19. 20. 21. & 22. (*c*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 28. *num.* 19. 20. 21. &c. & *num.* & 36. 35. *Ibidem num.* 17.

clearly

clearly prov'd they are; and laſtly, if all true Wiſdom, and Policy be from God; it muſt needs follow, that no act can be truly Wiſe and Political, which is offenſive to God; nor any thing good for a State, or conformable to true reaſons of State, which can provoke the wrath and puniſhment of God, upon whoſe Will all States depend: Whereupon it alſo follows, that not ſo much as a Venial Sin, I mean the leaſt that may be committed, and much leſs ſuch horrible Crimes as *Machiavel* allow's in his Prince, can be grounded upon true reaſon of State, thô by God's permiſſion, they may be beneficial to it, whereof I ſhall ſay ſomething hereafter. (*a*).

3. In the mean time I will here proſecute the former Argument a little farther, drawn from the conſideration of God's Juſtice, whereby 'twill be more clear than the Sun, that wicked Policy cannot ſecure, but utterly deſtroys the States of Princes; and foraſmuch as I treated of this point in the laſt Chapter, examining *Machiavels* Doctrine, only by reaſons of State, where I aſcrib'd the overthrow of wicked Princes to the hatred of Men, this being for the moſt part, one of the moſt ordinary cauſes thereof; therefore I here affirm, that neither hatred, contempt, ambition, nor any other paſſion of Man, or human means whatſoever, whereby wicked Princes may be overthrown, are any other than ſecondary, and inferior cauſes thereof; becauſe the firſt and principal cauſe is the Juſtice of God; who for the puniſhment of the Sins of Men, ſerves himſelf, not

(*a*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 8. *num.* 26. *&* 27.

only of Men, but alſo of Angels, and other Spirits, good and bad; of all living and ſenſible Creatures; of the Elements and all Elementary things, as 'tis ſignifi'd in *Eccleſiaſticus*; (*a*) where we Read, that *There are Spirits Created for revenge, or puniſhment of Sin*; and again, (*b*) *Fire, Hail, Famine, and Death, all theſe things are Created for Man's puniſhment, the Teeth of Beaſts and Scorpions, and Serpents, and the revenging Sword prepar'd for the utter extirpation of the wicked.* Thus ſays the Preacher concerning the Miniſtery of all Creatures in the puniſhment of the wicked, which the Wiſe Man alſo declares when he ſays, (*c*) *Thy Creatures, O Lord, ſerving thee their Creator, are incens'd with fury, for the torment of the unjuſt.*

4. This is ſo evident by the experience of all Ages, that 'twill be needleſs for me to lay down any particular examples thereof; and therefore I omit to ſpeak of the general Deluge (*d*) in the time of *Noe*; of the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorra* (*e*) with Fire from Heaven; of the Plagues of *Ægypt* (*f*) by Frog's, Fly's, and Locuſts; and of infinite Innundations, Burnings, Tempeſts, Peſtilences, Famin's, and Earth-quakes, whereby whole Cities, Provinces and Countries have been deſtroy'd for Sin; God uſing the Miniſtery of his Creatures of all ſorts, for the puniſhment thereof; all which I omit as needleſs, and will declare how differently God uſes the Miniſtery of Man for the puniſhment of Sin; whereof I

(*a*) Eccle. *ca.* 39. 33. (*b*) *Ibid* 35. (*c*) Sap. 16. 24. (*d*) Geneſ. 7. (*e*) *Ibid.* 19. (*f*) Exod. 7. 8. 9. & 10.

will

will firſt ſpeak in general, and afterwards exemplifie it particularly in wicked Princes.

5. The ordinary Miniſters of God's Juſtice, upon evil Men, are Kings and Princes, or ſuch others, as puniſh Malefactors by their Authority, in which reſpect the Apoſtle ſays, that the Prince. (*a*) *Do's not carry his Sword in vain, or without cauſe: For he is the Miniſter of God to puniſh in wrath him that do's evil*; nevertheleſs, private Men are ſometimes alſo the Miniſters of God's Juſtice upon other Men, either mov'd thereunto with the Zeal of God's Glory, as *Phinees* was, (*b*) who Kill'd the *Iſraelite* that committed Fornication with the *Madianite*; or elſe by meer accident, and chance, as it appears in *Exodus*; (*c*) where the Law of God ordain'd, that he who ſhou'd commit wilful Murder, ſhou'd be puniſh'd with Death, but he that ſhou'd by chance, or againſt his Will Kill a Man, whom God of his ſecret Judgments ſhou'd give into his hands (as the Scripture gives us to underſtand) ſuch a one ſhou'd have Sanctuary for his Refuge; whereby we may ſee that God makes ſome caſually the Miniſters of his Juſtice, againſt their Wills; as ſometimes alſo others in doing their own buſineſs are unwittingly his Inſtruments, even whilſt they follow their own affairs, not meaning to do God any Service therein, as I have before noted (*d*) of *Sennacherib* King of the *Aſſyrians*, whom God call'd in the Prophet *Iſay*, (*e*) *The Rod of his Wrath*, and compar'd him to *an Ax*, or *a Saw*, which Men uſe

(*a*) Rom. 13. 4. (*b*) Num. 25. 7. (*c*) Exod. 21. (*d*) Tom. 1. *cap.* 2. *nu.* 17. (*e*) Iſay. 10. 5.

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(*a*) Eccle. *ca.* 39. 33. (*b*) *Ibid* 35. (*c*) Sap. 16. 24. (*d*) Geneſ. 7. (*e*) *Ibid.* 19. (*f*) Exod. 7. 8. 9. & 10.

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(*a*) Rom. 13. 4. (*b*) Num. 25. 7. (*c*) Exod. 21. (*d*) Tom. 1. *cap.* 2. *nu.* 17. (*e*) Iſay. 10. 5.

for their ſervice; becauſe he meant to puniſh the *Jews* by him, whilſt he thought nothing of it: And as I have alſo noted of *Nabuchodonozor* King of *Babylon*, (*a*) who executed God's Juſtice upon the people of *Tyrus*, when he took and deſtroy'd their City, either for revenge of ſome injury, or to increaſe his Dominions.

6. Where by the way 'tis to be noted, that God do's not ordinarily uſe to ſtir up and move Princes or other Men to execute his Juſtice by Revelations, or manifeſt Inſpirations, or by the Voice of ſome Prophet; but by ſuch a ſecret operation, that it do's not appear to be his work: Which is ſignifi'd by *Iſay*, who Prophecying of the Invaſion of *Jeruſalem* by the King's of *Aſſyria* and *Ægypt*, ſays, (*b*) *Our Lord will whiſtle to the Fly in the utmoſt part of the Rivers of* Ægypt, *and to the Bee of* Aſſyria, giving to underſtand, that he wou'd ſecretly move the King's of thoſe Countries, to make War againſt *Jeruſalem*. The ſame may alſo be ſayd of the Innundations of Barbarous people, as of the *Goths*, *Wandals*, *Hunns*, and ſuch like, which have at divers times over-flow'd Chriſtendom, who were no doubt the Miniſters of God's Juſtice, for the puniſhmenr of Sin: In which reſpect *Attila* the *Hunn*, (*c*) and the great *Tamberlain* (*d*) were call'd, the one *Flagellum Dei*, *The Scourge of God*, and the other *Ira Dei*, *The Wrath of God*, thô they had no other intention but to ſatisfie their own Ambition. So it may alſo be ſayd of all the Wars amongſt

(*a*) Ezechiel. *cap.* 29. 18. (*b*) Iſa. 7. 18. (*c*) *Baron. an.* 451. (*d*) *Paul. Diac. lib.* 15.

Princes,

Princes, (*a*) whatſoever their Quarrels are; whereby they execute God's Juſtice in puniſhing the Sins of the people, thô they intend no ſuch matter. And the moſt wicked'ſt Man that is, when he Spoil's, Rob's, Ranſack's, and Murders others, is alſo the Inſtrument, and Miniſter of God's Juſtice; whoſe infinite Wiſdom, and Providence has ſo ordain'd, that whilſt wicked Men ſeek to ſatisfie their unbridl'd Appetit's, and Deſires, they exact the penalty of other Men's Sins; it being moſt conſonant to equity, and juſtice, that as one Sin is many times the pain, and puniſhment of another; ſo one Sinner ſhou'd puniſh another; and that Sinners ſhou'd alſo execute Juſtice upon themſelves; ſometimes willingly, as we ſee in ſuch as wilfully make away with themſelves; and ſometimes againſt their Will's, either Killing themſelves by chance, or overthrowing themſelves by their own deviſes, and policies; in all which God's Providence and Juſtice ſtrangely appears: For ſeeing that Man, with all the parts of his Body, and powers of his Soul, was principally ordain'd for God's Service; therefore when he imploys himſelf, his parts and abilities in offending God, 'tis moſt juſt that God imploys them and himſelf alſo, to his puniſhment, which turn's alſo to God's Service; who by that means is ſerv'd, and glorifi'd by his very Enemies, thô not in ſuch a manner as they ſhou'd, yet always in ſuch ſort, as his Divine Wiſdom ſees it convenient.

(*a*) *Naucler. in Chron. anno.* 1400.

7. To which purpoſe I wiſh alſo, that all wou'd obſerve, that thô wicked Men, are the Miniſters and Inſtruments of God's Juſtice upon Sinners, yet 'tis not either when, or where, or how they will; but in ſuch time, place, manner, and meaſure, as it pleaſes God to permit 'em. Which I ſay the rather; becauſe *Machiavel* ſeem's to imagine, that if *John Paul Baglione* (*a*) Tyrant of *Perugia* had been, as he term's it, *Magnanimamente Scelerato*; *Couragiouſly wicked*; he wou'd, or might have Kill'd Pope *Julius* the II. when upon Compoſition between 'em, the ſaid Pope put himſelf into his Hands, and came to *Perugia* without any Forces, or ſufficient Guards of his own: Wherein *Machiavel* ſhew's himſelf no leſs abſurd, than impiouſly ignorant of the courſe, and power of God's Providence; and of the infirmity of Man; or rather his impoſſibility, to execute his own deſigns farther, than God permits him: Which it pleaſes Almighty God to ſhew ſometimes moſt evidently, to the end we may acknowledge the ſame in all other occaſions. And this may be noted not only in the Holy Scriptures, in the delivery of (*b*) *Joſeph* from his Brethren; of (*c*) *David* from *Saul*; of (*d*) *Mardocheus* from *Aman*; of (*e*) *Suſanna* from the Judges; of the (*f*) three Children from *Nabuchodonozor*; and of (*g*) Saint *Peter* from *Herod*: But alſo in prophane Hiſtories, as will appear by the two or three following Examples.

(*a*) *Machi. in princ.* (*b*) Geneſ. 37. (*c*) 1 Reg. 18 19. & 20. (*d*) Heſt. c. 5. 6. & 7. (*e*) Daniel 13. (*f*) Ibid. ca. 3. (*g*) Act. 12.

8. The

8. The Emperor *Anaſtaſius* having diſcover'd a Conſpiracy againſt his State and Perſon, not long before he Dy'd, caus'd divers of the Conſpirators to be apprehended, amongſt whom were two principal Men, call'd *Juſtinus* and *Juſtinian*; (*a*) and having commanded 'em with divers others to be Executed, there appear'd unto him in his Sleep in the Night, a terrible Old Man, commanding him to ſpare 'em both; becauſe they were one Day to do God Service: Whereupon he pardon'd and releas'd 'em, and after his Death *Juſtinus* was his next Succeſſor in the Empire, choſen by the Soldiers, thô very baſely Born, and having been a Drover, or as ſome Write, a Swine-herd; and next after him ſucceeded *Juſtinian:* (*b*) So that 'twas evident, firſt by the Apparition, and afterwards by the effect, that God deliver'd 'em from the Hands of *Anaſtaſius*; becauſe he had deſign'd 'em to be Emperors.

9. The like may be ſayd of *Michael Balbus*, Emperor of *Conſtantinople*, who moſt ſtrangely eſcap'd the Hands of the Emperor *Leo Armenus*, and Succeeded him in the Empire. The Story is thus, *Michael Balbus* being of great Authority in the time of *Leo*, Conſpir'd againſt him, and the Conſpiracy being detected, he was taken, examin'd, convicted, and condemn'd to be Burnt; the Fire was made, he led to his Execution, and *Leo* himſelf follow'd to ſee it perform'd; either becauſe he truſted not his Officers, or to ſatisfie his revengeful mind, with the ſight of the miſer-

(*a*) *Zonat. Anal. To.* 1. (*b*) Ibidem.

able

able end and torment of his Enemy. (*a*) But it ſo fell out, that this being done upon *Chriſtmas* Eve, the Empreſs his Wife came to him, as he was going, and chid him bitterly for having no more reſpect to the Solemnity of the Feaſt; deſiring of him only to ſuſpend the Execution for one Day, until the Day after the Feaſt; which at length he granted, yet ſo much againſt his Will, that he ſayd unto her, he fear'd that ſhe, and her Children wou'd repent it; his own Heart foretelling him, as it ſeem'd, the danger that hung over him; and the rather, becauſe he had been long before advertis'd, either by ſome Prophetick, or Magical Prediction, that he ſhou'd be Kill'd upon a *Chriſtmas* Day. And therefore to make himſelf ſure of *Michael Balbus*, whom he moſt fear'd, he wou'd not commit him to any Priſon, but deliver'd him to one *Papias*, whom he moſt of all truſted; and caus'd him to be fetter'd with certain huge Bolts of Iron, lock'd with a Key which he kept himſelf, and for greater ſecurity he went himſelf in perſon the ſame Night to Viſit the Houſe of *Papias* where *Michael* was Lodg'd.

10. But ſee here the diſpoſition of God's Providence, for the delivery of *Michael*, and the puniſhment of *Leo*; this *Papias* was one of *Michaels* Confederates in his Conſpiracy, and therefore having now both of 'em this opportunity to Conſult together, they reſolv'd to procure the Emperors Death without any farther delay; and to that

(*a*) *Zonar. An. To.* 3. *in Michael Balbo.*

purpoſe

purpoſe, ſent preſently to the other Conſpirators, who were not yet diſcover'd, and threaten'd to diſcover 'em, if they wou'd not attempt to Kill the Emperor out of hand; repreſenting unto 'em the facility to do it the next Morning before Day, when he ſhou'd be in the Church at *Matins*, which they allow'd and executed; and *Michael* was the very ſame Day, Proclaim'd and Crown'd Emperor, in the ſame Church where *Leo* was Kill'd.

11. But now the *Machiavellians* may ſay, that the Emperor play'd the Fool, in ſparing him at his Wives requeſt; I grant this to be true, yet ſuch a Fool wou'd *Machiavel* himſelf, or any Man elſe have been, if he had attempted to do any thing contrary to the Will of God, as *Leo* did in this caſe: Which I affirm, not only becauſe the ſtrange effects ſhew'd it, but alſo becauſe it otherwiſe ſufficiently appears, that God had determin'd that *Michael Balbus* ſhou'd be Emperor. For many Years before, when *Leo* and he were both of 'em private Men, and Servants to the Duke, or Great Captain *Bardanes*, (*a*) it chanc'd that their Lord and Maſter aſpiring to the Empire, went to a Holy Man, who was eſteem'd to have the Spirit of Prophecy, and ask'd him whether he ſhou'd not in time be Emperor; the Holy Man told him, that if he attempted it, he ſhou'd looſe both his labor and his Eyes; and afterwards ſeeing *Leo*, and *Michael Balbus* bring him his Horſe at his departure, he took him aſide, and told him, that God wou'd not

(*a*) *Zonar. Ann. To. 3. in Leo Armenio.*

give

give him the Empire, but that thoſe two, who brought him his Horſe, ſhou'd be Emperors, the one after the other.

12. *Bardanes* contemning his Prediction, attempted to make himſelf Emperor, and failing of his purpoſe, had his Eyes put out, and was ſpoil'd of all he had; and ſome Years after, (*a*) *Leo* being advanc'd to the Service of the Emperor *Michael Rangabe*, and General under him, of great part of his Army againſt the *Thracians*, found means to make the Emperor ſo hateful, and himſelf ſo grateful to the Soldiers, that he eaſily made himſelf Emperor with the help of *Michael Balbus*, who was a Colonel at the ſame time under him, and in great credit with the Soldiers: So that there wanted no more for the accompliſhment of the Prophecy, but that *Michael Balbus* ſhou'd Succeed *Leo*, which he alſo did, as I have declar'd.

13. Wherefore in this Example, divers wonderful things may be obſerv'd, beſides that which I principally intended. The firſt is, the infirmity of Man's Wit, who when he thinks many times to take the ſureſt way, do's ſooneſt overthrow himſelf, as *Leo* did, in making choice of *Papias* to be the Jailer of *Michael Balbus*, whereby he ſav'd *Michael's* Life, and loſt his own.

14. The ſecond is, the great Juſtice of God in the puniſhment of the Tyranny of *Leo*, who having unjuſtly and Tyrannically got and Govern'd the Empire, loſt it again with his Life, by the like means.

(*a*) *Zonar. Ibid.*

15. The

15. The third is the courſe of God's Providence in the execution of his Juſt Judgments, turning the endeavours of wicked Men to his own Service and Glory, and to their puniſhment; ſerving himſelf not only of their beſt Friends, as he did here of the Empreſs, for the overthrow of her Husband, thô againſt her Will, but alſo of themſelves, and of their own Wits, and Policies. Wherein God's Juſtice greatly appears; for as the Pſalmiſt ſays, (*a*) *Our Lord ſhall be known by executing his Judgments*, and then declaring how and wherein, he adds; *The Sinner is overtaken in the works of his own Hands*; giving us to underſtand, that the Juſtice of God appears in nothing more, than in that he over-reaches wicked Men in their own works, and inventions; tripping 'em up, and over-turning 'em in their own play, as I have divers times before noted. (*b*)

16. Whereupon follows alſo the fourth conſideration, how vainly Men ſtrive againſt the Will of God; which when they ſeek to hinder, they help many times to effect, as *Leo* did; for whereas God had determin'd to give the Empire to *Machael Balbus*, *Leo* in laboring to prevent it by the Death of *Michael*, not only farther'd it, but alſo wrought his own deſtruction, of which obſervation I ſhall have occaſion to treat more in the next Chapter.

17. The fifth and laſt conſideration ſhall be, (*c*) that which I principally intended to ſhew by

(*a*) Pſal. 9. 17. (*b*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 3. *num.* 1. 4. & 13. & Tom. 2. *chap.* 3. *nu.* 5. 6. & c. (*c*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 8. *nu.* 5. 9. 10. 11. &c.

this

this example, that no Man has ſuch abſolute power over any other Man, as to execute his deſigns and will upon him at his own pleaſure, but only when God gives him leave as it appears in *Leo*, for who cou'd be more in another Man's power, and leſs in his own, than *Michael Balbus* when he was in the Hands of *Leo*? Being condemn'd to be Burnt, going to the Fire, and *Leo* following him to ſee the Execution, repleniſh'd with anger and hatred againſt him, inexorable, and reſolv'd to be reveng'd; when nevertheleſs God ſo diſpos'd, that a few brawling words of his own Wife, wreſted from him ſo much reſpite for the Priſoner, as ſuffic'd to ſave his Life, and gain him the Empire: And thus it always falls out by one means or other, when God will fruſtrate the deſigns of wicked Men, or puniſh 'em.

18. And thô theſe Examples might ſuffice for this matter, yet I cannot omit another no leſs wonderful in our own Country; which is that, of the delivery of *Henry* Earl of *Richmond*, who was afterwards King of *England*, from the Hands of King *Edward* the IV. and of *Richard* the Tyrant; for whereas King *Edward*, after the Death of King *Henry* the VI. and his Son, had no fear of any, but of *Henry* Earl of *Richmond*, who then liv'd a Baniſh'd Life, in the Court of *Francis* Duke of *Brittany*, (*a*) he ſent Embaſſadors to the Duke, pretending to deſire a Marriage betwixt his Eldeſt Daughter, and *Henry* the Earl; and for that purpoſe requeſted to have him ſent over unto him, which the Embaſſadors obtain'd, by corruptio[n]

(*a*) *Polidor. hiſt. Anglic. li.* 24.

of

of the Dukes Counſellors, and convey'd him to the Sea ſide to *Saint Malo's*, where he was to be Shipp'd preſently for *England*, being Sick both out of Sorrow and Fear; but in the mean time a Noble-man of *Brittany*, and a great Friend of his, being abſent from the Dukes Court, and hearing what had paſs'd concerning him, preſently repair'd to the Duke, and repreſented to him the fraud of King *Edward*, in his pretence of the Marriage, and conſequently the Earl's danger, if he ſuffer'd him to be tranſported into *England*; whereupon the Duke ſent one of his Council in all haſte, to overtake the Embaſſadors of King *Edward*, and to find ſome good pretence to hinder the Earl's paſſage, which he did, entertaining 'em with ſome plauſible Affairs, whilſt the Earl took Sanctuary in a Church, claiming the priviledge of the Holy Place, which the Duke wou'd not ſuffer to be violated, and ſo the Embaſſadors return'd without the Earl, and he eſcap'd the Hands of King *Edward*. And again afterwards, in the time of King *Richard* the Tyrant, Brother, and Succeſſor to *Edward* the IV. (*a*) the Earl being alſo in *Brittany* was in no ſmall danger, by the Tyrants endeavours, with a Counſellor of the Dukes, who wholly Govern'd him, of whom the Tyrant obtain'd by Mony, that the Earl ſhou'd be preſently taken, and either ſent over into *England*, or at leaſt kept Priſoner there; which deſign was diſcover'd to the Earl, before it cou'd be executed, whereby, he had time to ſave himſelf by Flight; and with-

(*a*) *Polidor. hiſt. Anglic. li.* 25.

in

in a while after procuring ſome ſmall aſſiſtance of *Charles* King of *France*, and paſſing over into *England*, became the Miniſter of God's Juſtice upon the Tyrant, whom he Slew at *Boſworth* Field, (*a*) and Succeeded him in the Kingdom; which was Prophecy'd many Years before by the Holy King *Henry* the VI. who ſeeing him when he was but Ten Years of Age, ſayd to ſome of his Nobility, that this ſhou'd be the Man, who ſhou'd decide, and end the Quarrel, betwixt the Houſes of *York* and *Lancaſter*, and become King of *England*.

19. By all this it appears, that thô wicked Men may infinitely extend their Malicious Wills, and deſires to all miſchief, yet they have no power or poſſibility, farther to execute any thing thereof, than God gives 'em leave for, thereby to accompliſh of his Will; in which reſpect the moſt wicked Man in the World, be he never ſo powerful, is but like a fierce Maſtiff-dog ty'd in a Chain; for thô he Bark's at every Stranger, and has a Will to Bite him, yet he can come no nearer him, than the Chain permits him; and therefore the Malice, not only of wicked Men, but alſo of the Devil himſelf, may be compar'd to the Bloody Thirſt of the Horſe-leech, or Blood-ſucker, with which skilful Phyſicians are wont to draw Blood at ſuch time, and in ſuch quantity, as he thinks convenient, for the Cure of his Patient; ſo do's Almighty God by his Omnipotent Wiſdom, uſe the Malice of the Devil, and wicked Men, ſo far forth as he

(*a*) *Polidor. hiſt. Anglic. li* 24.

ſees

ſees it neceſſary, for the execution of his ſecret Judgments, either in the exerciſe and trial of his Servants, for their greater Merit; or in the puniſhment of Sinners, for his own greater Glory.

20. For otherwiſe if the Devil, and his Inſtruments might do what they wou'd, they wou'd quickly deſtroy all the good Men in the World; and this is the true cauſe, why the bad deſigns of wicked Men do ſometimes take effect, and are ſometimes fruſtrated, and turn many times not only to their own deſtruction, as it appears by many examples before alledg'd in this Diſcourſe, (*a*) but alſo to the greater benefit of thoſe whom they ſeek to deſtroy; as I have before declar'd, (*b*) by the Example of one (*c*) who thinking to Kill another with his Sword, Lanc'd an inward Impoſtume in his Body, which otherwiſe cou'd have had no Cure. The like I alſo noted of *Joſephs* Brethren, (*d*) who Selling him for a Slave, procur'd his Advancement; whereunto I may add *Andronicus Comenus* (*e*) the Emperor, who meaning to Kill *Iſacius Angelus* for the aſſurance of his Empire, caus'd his Election to the Imperial Dignity, which he never expected. The Story is very much to this purpoſe, which I have related at large in the precedent Chapter. (*f*) Therefore I conclude, that neither *Machiavels* Prince, be he never ſo couragiouſly wicked, can

(*a*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 3. 4. 5. 19. & Tom. 2. *chap.* 3. *num.* 5. 6. 7. Tom. 2. *chap.* 7. *num* 15. (*b*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 24. *num.* 18. (*c*) *Plutar. li. de Vtilitate capiendâ ab inimicis.* (*d*) Geneſ. 37. 41. (*e*) *Nicetas hiſt. de Andron. Com. lib.* 2. (*f*) *Chap.* 6. *num.* 19. 23.

put in execution his deſigns for the benefit of his State, neither can private Men execute their Malice againſt Princes, farther than God particularly permits, as I have already prov'd. (*a*)

21. This was well conſider'd, as it ſeems, by *Philip* the II. King of *Spain*, who being adviſ'd by ſome about him, upon occaſion of the Murder of the King of *France*, to go better guarded than commonly he did, anſwer'd excellently well; *Bien guardado eſta, a quien Dios guarda, He is well guarded whom God Protects*; giving us to underſtand that how powerful ſoever any Prince is in his Guards, and Armies, yet his chief ſecurity conſiſts in God's Protection.

22. But to proceed, thô Almighty God differently ſerves himſelf, as well of Men, as of all other Creatures, for the Chaſtiſement of all ſorts of Sins, yet he uſes greater ſeverity in the puniſhment of Tyrants, and wicked Princes, than of any other, for three reaſons. The firſt is, becauſe their offences are far greater than thoſe of other Mens; both becauſe they commonly concern weighty and publick matters; as alſo becauſe they corrupt many by their bad Example; as I have elſewhere ſignifi'd. (*b*) The ſecond reaſon is; becauſe they are more ungrateful to God than other Men, ſince they receive greater Temporal benefits at his Hands than others; and therefore are bound to ſerve him with greater Love, Care and Duty than others are. The third reaſon is, becauſe they being above their own

(*a*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 6. *num.* 19. 20. *&c.*
(*b*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 3. *num.* 22.

Laws,

Laws, and not ſubject to the penalties thereof, their faults do properly belong to the Tribunial of Almighty God, whoſe Lieutenants and Miniſters they are, and to whom they are therefore to yield a ſtrict, and exact account of their Miniſtery.

23. This is expreſly taught in the Book of Wiſdom, where Almighty God ſays thus to Kings and Princes. (*a*) *Hearken O Kings, and underſtand, learn you who are Judges of the bounds of the Earth, by reaſon of that Power which is giv'n unto you from above, and Strength from the higheſt, who will Examin your Works, and Search your Thoughts; and becauſe when you were Miniſters in his Kingdom, you did not Judge rightly, nor keep the Law of Juſtice, nor walk in the way of God, he will quickly appear unto you with Terror, for moſt rigorous judgment is done unto them that Govern; with the Poor and Mean Man Mercy is us'd, but Mighty Men ſhall mightily ſuffer torments.* Thus ſays the Wiſe Man, which *Job* confirms ſaying. (*b*) *That God looſens the Girdle of Kings, and Girds their Reins with a Rope. He pours down contempt upon Princes, and makes 'em ſtagger like Drunken Men.* And therefore the Royal Prophet ſays, that Almighty God is *Terrible to the Kings of the Earth:* Which may appear by the ſtrange, and exemplar puniſhment which God has lay'd upon wicked Princes at different times, without the help of Man, in ſo evident a manner, that it cou'd not be deny'd but that it proceeded expreſly from his Hand: Whereof we have many

(*a*) Sap. 6. 2, &c. (*b*) Iob. 12. 18 21.

Examples, not only in the Holy Scriptures, (*a*) but alſo in Prophane Hiſtories. (*b*)

24. *Pharao* was Drown'd in the Red Sea purſuing *Moyſes* and the Children of *Iſrael*. *Nabuchodonozor* was caſt down from his Princely Throne, and made a Companion to Beaſts. (*c*) *Ozias* and *Joram* were ſtrucken by Almighty God; the firſt with a filthy Leproſie, and the latter with an incurable Flux in his Belly; whereby by little and little, he voided his Bowels, and Dy'd as the Scripture ſays, of a moſt filthy Diſeaſe: Alſo the wicked *Jezabel* (*d*) was Eaten with Dog's: (*e*) *Antiochus* the Tyrant rotted alive, in ſuch a manner, that Worm's abundantly iſſu'd out of his Body, and neither he nor any Man elſe cou'd indure the ſtench that came from it. (*f*) *Herod*, who Kill'd Saint *James*, and Perſecuted the reſt of the Apoſtles, was ſtrucken by an Angel, and devour'd by Worm's whilſt he liv'd.

25. And to come to later Hiſtories, (*g*) *Hunnericus* King of the *Wandals* in *Africk*, and an *Arian* Heretick, was alſo conſum'd with Worm's, wherewith his Body became ſo Rotten, that when he Dy'd it fell in pieces, and cou'd not be Bury'd whole; (*h*) *Mempricius* King of *Brittany*, being moſt Vicious, and Tyrannical withal, was worry'd by Wolves; (*i*) *Popielus* King of *Polony*, and his

(*a*) Exod. 14. Dan. *ca.* 4. (*b*) Paralip. *ca.* 16. & 21 (*c*) 4 Reg. *ca.* 9. 2 Mach. *ca.* 9. Act. 12. (*d*) *Iſidor.* (*e*) *Victor. Vticen. de perſecut. Vand.* (*f*) *Carion Chron. par* 2. *an. Mund.* 4122. *Polidor. li.* 1. (*g*) *Hiſt. prodigioſ.* (*h*) 1. *p. c.* 3 *Zonar. Annal. To.* 3. (*i*) *Bonifacius ep. ad Ethelbald. apud Baron. an.* 745.

Wife

Wife were Kill'd with Rat's and Mice, which iſſu'd out of the Tomb's, of his Children and Nephew's, whom he had caus'd to be Murder'd. The Heretical and Cruel Emperor *Anaſtaſius* being admoniſh'd in a Dream, that fourteen Years of his Life ſhou'd be cut off for his Hereſie, was Kill'd with a Thunder-bolt. *Celred* one of the *Saxon* Kings of *England* before the Conqueſt, was for his wicked Life Poſſeſt, and Kill'd by the Devil, as he was Banqueting with his Nobility.

26. (*a*) *Gunderick* an *Arian* King of the *Wandals*, Dy'd alſo Poſſeſt, and miſerably vex'd by the Devil; (*b*) *Leo* the IV. Emperor, having Sacrilegiouſly taken a Golden Crown from the Church, and Altar of Saint *Sophia* in *Conſtantinople*, out of Covetouſneſs of a Precious Stone wherewith it was adorn'd, and having worn it on his Head in a Triumphant manner throu' the City, was ſtrucken by Almighty God with an Impoſtume in his Head, call'd a Carbuncle, and was ſo tormented therewith that he Dy'd. (*c*) *Boleſlaus* King of *Polonia*, who Kill'd the Holy Biſhop *Staniſlaus* with his own Hand, was caſt out of his Kingdom by his own Subjects, afterwards falling Mad, ran up and down the Woods, and was found in the end, almoſt Eaten up by Dog's (*d*) *Drahomira* Wife to *Vratiſlaus* Duke of

(*a*) *Victor Vticen. de perſec. Vand. Paul Diac. li.* 15. (*b*) *Zonar. Annal. To.* 3. (*c*) *Egnatius, in Epit. Baron ann.* 1079. *ex Longino. Dubravius.* (*d*) *Hiſtor. Bohemia. li.* 8.

Bohemia procur'd the Death firſt of the Holy Woman *Ludimilla* her Mother-in-law, and afterwards of many Prieſts: And as ſhe paſs'd in her Coach over the place where the Prieſts were Murder'd, the Earth open'd and ſwallow'd her up; for which reaſon the place is held as accurs'd, and ſhunn'd by all ſuch as paſs that way to *Praga*, as *Dubravius* reports, (*a*) in his Hiſtory of *Bohemia*. Finally, *Petrus Cluniacenſis*, a moſt grave Author, affirms, that a Count of *Maſcon* in *Burgundy*, having committed many Sacriledges, and being one Day at his own Palace in *Maſcon*, (*b*) accompany'd with many Noble-men, and Soldiers, was forc'd by a Stranger, who came to him on Horſe-back, to get upon a led Horſe, which he had there ready for him, and ſo was carry'd away in the Air, in the Sight of all the City, and was never ſeen, nor heard of afterwards.

27. To theſe, many more examples may be added of Emperors, Kings and Princes, which for their wickedneſs were notoriouſly puniſh'd by the Hand of God, without the means or help of Men; who nevertheleſs, are the ordinary Inſtruments of God's Juſtice, thô many times they are principally mov'd thereunto, either by hatred, fear, ambition, or by ſome other paſſion, whereof Almighty God ſerves himſelf, for the execution of his ſecret Judgments; as I have already ſhew'd in the puniſhment of Sinners in general, and will now ſhew alſo particularly in in wicked Kings and Princes.

(*a*) *Ibidem.* (*b*) *Petrus Cluniacen. lib.* 2. *miracu. ca.* 1.

28. *Sennancherib*

28. *Sennancherib*, King of *Assyria*, making War upon the *Jews*, and most contemptuously Blaspheming the Holy Name of God, was Condemn'd by the Divine Justice to be Kill'd at his return to *Ninive*: (*a*) *He shall return*, says God, *into his own Country, and I will destroy him there by the Sword*; nevertheless this Sentence of Almighty God was executed by *Sennacherib's* Children, who Kill'd him in *Ninive*, as he was Sacrificing in the Temple of his God *Nesrac*. Also *Baltazar* King of *Babylon* (*b*) receiv'd Sentence of Death, and of the Translation of his Kingdom by the Mouth of *Daniel* the Prophet; because he prophan'd the Holy Vessels of *Ierusalem*, and for his other Impieties: For the execution of which Sentence, God us'd the Ambition of *Cyrus* and *Darius*, who Besieging *Babylon*, took it, and Kill'd *Baltazar*. The like also evidently appears in Scripture, in *Nadab*, *Helam*, (*c*) and many other Schismatical King's of *Israel*; upon whom God executed his Just Judgments by the means of most wicked Men, who Kill'd 'em out of an Ambitious desire they had of their Kingdom's.

29. I thought good to alledge these Examples out of the Holy Scriptures, wherein it has pleas'd God to discover the course of his Providence in the execution of his secret Judgments upon these King's, to the end we may also observe the same in like occasions, and acknowledge his Justice in the miserable end of wicked Princes; by what

(*a*) 4 Reg. *ca.* 9. Iosephus *Antiquit: lib.* 10.
(*b*) Daniel *ca.* 5. (*c*) 3 Reg. 15. 16.

means ſoever the ſame happens unto them, to which purpoſe I will alſo alledge an example, or two, out of later Hiſtories.

30. *Mauritius* the Emperor, (*a*) who was Slain by *Phocas*, Dream'd a little before, that an Image of *Chriſt*, which was over the Brazen Gate of his Palace, call'd him and charg'd him with his Sins; and in the end demanded of him, whether he wou'd receive the puniſhment thereof in this Life, or in the next: And when he Anſwer'd in this, the Image commanded that he ſhou'd be giv'n with his Wife and Children into the Hands of *Phocas*. Whereupon *Mauritius* awaking in great fear, ſent for *Philippicus* his Son-in-law, and ask'd him, whether he knew any Soldier in the Army call'd *Phocas*, who Anſwer'd, that there was a Commiſſary ſo call'd, a Young Man, Temerarious, but Timorous and Cowardly; if he be a Coward ſays *Mauritius*, he is Cruel and Bloody. And within a while after, it ſo fell out, that *Mauritius* grew to be ſo hateful to his Soldiers for his Covetouſneſs, and their bad Payments, that they were eaſily corrupted by *Phocas*, and induc'd to Proclaim him Emperor; by whom *Mauritius* was taken as he fled with his Wife and Five Children, who were Kill'd firſt, and he himſelf afterwards; who conſidering his own deſerts, and the Juſtice of God, often repeated theſe words: (*b*) *Iuſtus es Domine, & rectum judicium tuum*; *Thou art juſt O Lord, and thy judg-*

(*a*) *Zonaras Annal. To.* 3. *in Maurintio Paul. diac. li.* 16. *in fine. Blondus Dec. li.* 8. *Sabellic. ennead.* 8. *li.* 5. *an* 603. (*b*) Pſalm. 118.

ment

ment is right. Wherein we may note, how the hatred of the Soldiers, and the Ambition of *Phocas* were the means, whereby God did execute his Juſtice upon *Mauritius.*

31. The like may be alſo obſerv'd in the Conqueſt of *Naples*, by *Charles* the VIII. King of *France*, whereof I before related the Story at large: (*a*) Where I made it evident, that it proceeded from God's Juſt Judgment, for the puniſhment of the King's thereof; which appear'd not only by the ſtrangeneſs of the ſucceſs, almoſt incredible for the ſpeedy Conqueſt, and the ſmall, or rather no reſiſtance on the behalf of the King's and their Subjects; but alſo by the tormented Conſcience of King *Alphonſus*; ſo terrifi'd with the remembrance, and repreſentation of his former Tyranny, that all things ſeem'd to him to denounce God's Juſt Judgment againſt him, and to cry, *France, France:* Beſides the teſtimony of the Soul of King *Ferdinand* his Father, newly deceas'd, who appearing to a Phyſician, ſignifi'd unto him, (*b*) that God had decreed to deprive King *Alphonſus* and his Son of his Kingdom, for both their Sins; which nevertheleſs was executed upon 'em by the ordinary means, whereby moſt States are overthrown, either by the Ambition of ſome, or the hatred of others.

32. So that we ſee how Almighty God, who as I have fully declar'd before, diſpoſes all things ſweetly, and wou'd not ſuffer any evil in the World, but to the end to draw good from it;

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 22. *Philip. Comi. Chron. du* Roy *Charles* 8. *ch.* 17. (*b*) *Guicciardin lib.* 1.

as

as by the Malice of the Devil, and the moſt execrable Sin of *Judas*, he wrought the Redemption of Man; we ſee I ſay, how for the execution of his Holy Will, and Juſtice upon wicked Princes, he ſerves himſelf as well of the bad Wills, and Deſires of wicked Men, as of all other cauſes, and effects whatſoever; be they Natural, Moral, or Accidental: Whereby it appears, that the miſerable end of Tyrants, whereof the World has had many experiences, is principally to be attributed to the Juſtice of God, as to the firſt, and principal cauſe thereof; thô the ſecondary, and inferior cauſes are, or may be as many and different, as there are many and different Paſſions or Affections in Men, and other Creatures in the World; the Miniſtery and Service whereof their Omnipotent Creator uſes, as it pleaſes him for the execution of his Divine Will.

33. Wherefore it may greatly be wonder'd at, how *Machiavel*, who wou'd ſeem to be Wiſer than all other Men, and is held by his followers for the Arch-Statiſt of the World, either did not ſee the common experience, which the World has ever obſerv'd of God's puniſhment of wicked Princes for Sin; or if he ſaw it, how he cou'd imagine, that the extremity of wickedneſs, or any ſinful Policy can ſecure a Princes State: Wherein he or his followers might be the more excus'd, if this experience I ſpeak of, were only to be obſerv'd in the Hiſtories of our Scriptures, or Eccleſiaſtical and Chriſtian Writers, and were not alſo moſt manifeſt in prophane Authors, and Pagan Hiſtorians; all which inculcate nothing more

more, than the ſeverity of God's Judgments upon wicked Men, and eſpecially upon wicked Princes and Tyrants.

34. If any Man wou'd but Read the Hiſtories of *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, *Dionyſius*, *Valerius Maximus*, *Plutarch*, *Dion*, *Livy*, *Iuſtin*, or of any other Ancient Hiſtorians of the *Gentils*; he wou'd ſee nothing more frequent, and ordinary in 'em, than the curious obſervation of the miſerable end of wicked Tyrants; and the Judgment they make thereof, referring the ſame to the Juſtice of God.

35. To this purpoſe I will take notice of ſome, which one of the above nam'd Hiſtorians recounts, I mean *Iuſtin* (the abridger of the General Hiſtory of *Trogus Pompeius*) in whom we may Read the violent, or unfortunate Deaths of theſe following Tyrants: (*a*) *Aſtiages* King of the *Medians*; (*b*) *Cambyſes*, (*c*) *Oropaſtes* and (*d*) *Ochus* Kings of *Perſia*; (*e*) *Hippias*, and (*f*) Forty other Tyrants of *Athens*; (*g*) *Philip*, and (*h*) *Alexander*, the Great his Son, and (*i*) *Olympias* Mother to *Alexander*; (*k*) *Antipater* the Son of *Caſſander*; (*l*) *Lyſimachus*, (*m*) *Ptolemy* and (*n*) *Perſeus*, all Kings of *Macedon*, (*o*) *Clearchus* Tyrant of *Heraclea*; (*p*) *Machæus*, and (*q*) *Hanno* of *Carthage*; (*r*) *Dionyſius*, and (*ſ*) *Agathocles* Tyrants of *Sicily*; (*t*) *Nabis*

(*a*) *Iuſtin. li.* 2. (*b*) *Idem.* *Ibidem.* (*c*) *Ibidem.* (*d*) *Idem li.* 10. (*e*) *Idem li.* 2. (*f*) *Idem li.* 5. (*g*) *lib.* 5. (*h*) *lib.* 12. (*i*) *lib.* 14. (*k*) *lib.* 16. (*l*) *lib.* 17. (*m*) *lib.* 24. (*n*) *lib.* 33. & 3. (*o*) *lib.* 16. (*p*) *lib.* 18. (*q*) *lib.* 21. 1. (*r*) *lib.* 20. (*ſ*) *lib.* 22. & 2. (*t*) *lib.* 31.

a Tyrant of *Greece*; (*a*) *Ariſtotimus* Tyrant of *Epyrus*; two King's call'd (*b*) *Seleucus*; (*c*) *Antiochus*, (*d*) *Demetrius*, (*e*) *Alexander*, (*f*) and *Tripho* all Kings of *Syria*; (*g*) *Attalus* a King in *Aſia*; (*h*) *Laodice* Queen of *Cappadocia*; (*i*) *Cleopatra* Wife of *Ptolemy* King of *Ægypt*; (*k*) *Mithridates* Son to *Artabanus*, and (*l*) *Orodes* King of *Parthia*; and laſtly (*m*) *Amulius* Uncle to *Romulus*, and *Remus*, who was Kill'd by them.

36. Theſe and divers others, whom I omit for brevities ſake, are noted by *Iuſtin*, to have either got their Eſtates or govern'd 'em Tyrannically, by Perjury, Murders and Cruelty; and to have periſh'd miſerably; and in divers of 'em, he ſeriouſly obſerves the Juſt Judgment of God: Of *Cambyſes* King of *Perſia*, who Kill'd his own Brother, and ſpoil'd the Temple of *Iupiter Hammon*, he ſays, *Thus he Dy'd, being grievouſly wounded in the Thigh with his own Sword, which fell of it ſelf out of his Scabbard, and inflicted the puniſhment, as well of his Murder, as of his Sacrilege.* (*n*) Of *Hippias* Tyrant of *Athens*, he ſays, *In that Battle Hippias the Tyrant, was Slain, the Author and mover of that VVar, the Gods taking revenge upon him:* (*o*) Of *Ptolemy* King of *Ægypt*, he ſays, *The wickedneſs of* Ptolemy *was not long unpuniſh'd, for being ſpoil'd of his Kingdom by the* Gaul's, *and afterwards taken, he loſt his Life by the Sword*

(*a*) *lib.* 26. (*b*) *lib.* 27. & 39. (*c*) *lib.* 27. (*d*) *lib.* 35. (*e*) *Ibidem.* (*f*) *lib.* 36. (*g*) *lib* 37. (*h*) *Ibidem.* (*i*) *lib.* 9. (*k*) *lib.* 42. (*l*) *Ibidem.* (*m*) *lib.* 43. *Iuſtin lib.* 2. (*n*) *Idem lib.* 2. (*o*) *Idem lib.* 24.

as

as he deſerv'd, the Gods thus puniſhing ſo many of his Perjuries, and Bloody Murders.

37. Of *Seleucus* King of *Syria*, who Kill'd both his Brother, and his Mother-in-law, he ſays, (*a*) *Seleucus having prepar'd a great Navy to make VVar upon the Cities which Rebell'd againſt him, loſt the ſame by a Tempeſt, whereby the Gods puniſh'd his Murder*; and a little after, ſpeaking of him, and his Brother *Antiochus* King of *Aſia*, who being Baniſh'd out of his Kingdom was Murder'd by Thieves, he ſays, (*b*) *Seleucus being at the ſame time alſo driv'n out of his Kingdom, fell head-long from his Horſe, and ſo Dy'd; ſo that the two Brothers being Baniſh'd with the like misfortune, after the loſs of their Kingdoms, receiv'd the juſt puniſhment of their wickedneſs.* He obſerves alſo the like Juſtice, and puniſhment of God in the overthrow of the *Meſſenians* for the Murder of *Philopæmen*: (*c*) And in the unfortunate ends, of *Machæus* the *Carthaginian*; *Alexander* King of *Syria*; all the Progeny of *Caſſander* King of *Macedon*; the Children of *Ptolemy*; *Evergetes* King of *Ægypt*; *Brennus* Captain of the *Gaules* with all his Sacrilegious Army; and of *Milo* of *Epirus*, (*d*) who was one of thoſe that Kill'd *Laodomia*; of whoſe Murder, and God's Judgment upon the Murderers, he ſays thus; (*e*) *Which horrible fact the Immortal Gods did puniſh with the deſtruction of almoſt all the people, who were very near quite conſum'd with Dearth and Famine; as well by Civil, as For-*

(*a*) *Idem. lib.* 27. (*b*) *Idem lib* 27. (*c*) *lib.* 32. *lib.* 18. & 28 35. *lib.* 39. (*d*) *lib.* 25. (*e*) *Idem lib* 28.

raign

raign War; and Milo *who was the principal Actor in the Murder of* Laodomia, *falling Mad, and tearing out his own Bowels with his Teeth, Dy'd within twelve Days after her.*

38. This I have thought good to note out of the ſhort Hiſtory of *Juſtin*, to give to the Reader ſome taſt of the Judgment of Pagan Hiſtorians, concerning the Juſtice of God, in puniſhing the Tyranny and wickedneſs of Princes; which as I ſayd before, is ſo ſeriouſly and Religiouſly obſerv'd, by all the beſt Writers in all Ages and Times, as well *Greeks*, as *Latins*, Pagans, as well as Chriſtians, that no Man who has Read 'em can be ignorant, what the Opinion, Judgment, and Experience of the World, has always been concerning the ſame; and therefore it may very well be ſayd, that *Machiavel* was either wilfully Blind, if he ſaw it not, or more than Mad, if he ſaw it and neglected the taking notice of it; preſuming to Teach a Doctrine, not only repugnant to all Laws, both Human and Divine; but alſo prov'd to be very pernicous, by the experience of the whole World.

39. But perhaps ſome Politician, or *Machiavellian*, will ſay in defence of his Maſters Doctrine, that thô very many Tyrants, or perhaps the greateſt part have miſerably periſh'd; yet there hath been many others, who either got, or conſerv'd their States by Tyranny and Wickedneſs, and nevertheleſs Dy'd Natural Deaths; yea, and left flouriſhing Empires, Kingdoms, or States unto their Children: Whereby any Man may be incourag'd to follow their Example, with no ſmall hope

hope of the like good ſucceſs: Such were (*a*) *Baaſa* and (*b*) *Manahen* Kings of *Iſrael*; the Elder (*c*) *Denis* Tyrant of *Sicily*; two (*d*) *Ptolemy's*, the one call'd *Philopater* and the other (*e*) *Evergetes*, the ſecond King of *Ægypt*; (*f*) *Caſſander* King of *Macedon*; (*g*) *Conſtantinus* the IV. and (*h*) *Heraclius* Emperors of *Conſtantinople*; (*i*) *Mahomet* the II. Emperor of the *Turks*; (*k*) *Edward* the IV. King of *England*; (*l*) *Haldan* King of *Denmark*, and (*m*) *John Galliace* Duke of *Milan*: All which, having either attain'd to Soveraignty, or labor'd to conſerve themſelves therein, by the Murders of their Parents, Brethren, Nephews, or Kinsfolks; or by ſome other Wicked and Tyrannical means, Dy'd according to the courſe of Nature, and left their States, to their Children and Poſterity.

40. To Anſwer this, I ſay firſt, that thô this be true, yet 'tis great folly to draw any conſequence from it, or to ground thereupon any Doctrine, or Precepts to teach others to follow their Example; for Precepts are to be deduc'd from things that are moſt frequent and ordinary, which breed an experience; and not from things more rare, or ſeldom ſeen, which are commonly caſual, and to be referr'd to Chance; for what Man that has any Wit, wou'd perſuade his Friend

(*a*) 3 Reg. 15. & 16. (*b*) 4 Reg. 15. (*c*) *Cicero Tuſcul. q. lib.* 5. (*d*) *Juſtin. lib.* 38 & 41. (*e*) *Idem lib.* 30. (*f*) *Idem lib.* 38. (*g*) *Idem lib.* 15. (*h*) *Zonar. Annal.* to. 3. (*i*) *Idem.* (*k*) *Paul. Iovi in comment.* (*l*) *Polidor. lib.* 24. (*m*) *Saxo. lib. Naucler in chron. an.* 1400.

to go to Sea in a Storm, in ſome little Old Rotten Boat; becauſe he has perhaps ſeen ſome eſcape, or Sail proſperouſly, in ſuch another? Wherefore we cannot think 'em to be Wiſe, who contemning common experience, which teaches the miſerable end of Tyrants, perſuade Men to Tyranny, by the example of a few who have eſcap'd, or have perhaps been proſperous, by the ſecret diſpoſition of God's Providence, for cauſes known to his Divine Majeſty; as I have partly ſignifi'd already, (*a*) and will declare farther hereafter.

41. Therefore *Cæſar* ſayd, (*b*) that foraſmuch as he never knew any Man but *Sylla*, who cou'd conſerve his State long by Cruelty; yet he meant not to follow his Example, for as the Proverb ſays, *One Swallow makes not a Summer*; neither ought a few Examples, to overthrow a greater number; and much leſs common experience. In which reſpect, it may very well be ſayd to the *Machiavellians*, as one ſayd to a Prieſt of *Neptune*, (*c*) who ſhew'd him certain Painted Tables that hung up in *Neptunes* Temple, containing the Hiſtories of ſome, whom *Neptune* had, as they thought, deliver'd from Drowning; *But can you tell me*, ſays he, *how many have been Drown'd, for theſe few who have eſcap'd?* The ſame I ſay to *Machiavellians*, that for a few Tyrants which have Liv'd and Dy'd proſperouſly, throu' God's ſecret Judgments, they may find an infinite number of others, who have been by his Juſtice, ruin'd and deſtroy'd.

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 26. (*b*) *Cicero ad Atticum.* (*c*) *Cicero de natura Deor.*

42. But

42. But more fully to ſatisfie this Objection, reflect upon what I have before treated, (*a*) concerning the proſperity of wicked Men in this Life; wherein amongſt many other things, very conſiderable for this matter, I have declar'd that Almighty God, (*b*) *Whoſe mercy is above all his Works*, do's ſometimes extend the ſame towards the moſt wicked, for ſuch cauſes, as I have there ſignifi'd; yet in ſuch ſort, that thô he do's mercifully remit unto them, the Temporal puniſhment due for their wickedneſs, or ſome part thereof; yet he juſtly exacts it afterwards of their Children and Poſterity: whereof I have alledg'd many reaſons, and examples, needleſs to be repeated in this place; becauſe they may be ſeen elſewhere at large, (*c*) whereby it appears how true it is, what *Job* ſays, (*d*) *God will reſerve the ſorrow of the wicked Father for his Children*, and as the Poët expreſſes very well; *Crimina ſæpe luunt nati ſcelerata parentum*; *Children often Pay the Penalty of their Parents wickedneſs.* And this being moſt evidently true in all ſorts of wicked Men, may be moſt generally obſerv'd in ſuch Tyrants, as poſſeſs themſelves of States, or ſeek to conſerve 'em by Murders; as ſhall appear even in thoſe who are mention'd in the Objection, of whom I will treat in the ſame order, that they are ſet down.

43. *Baaſa* got the Kingdom of *Iſrael*, by the Murder of King *Nadab*, and thô he himſelf Dy'd

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 26. (*b*) Pſal. 144. (*c*) Tom. 2. *ch.* 26. *per totum. Chap.* 27. *num.* 3. *& ſequent.* (*d*) Iob. 21.

a Natural Death, yet his Son *Ela*, was Kill'd by his Servant *Zambri*, who as the Scripture ſays, (*a*) *Deſtroy'd all the Houſe of* Baaſa, and of his Son *Ela* for all the Sins of *Baaſa*.

44. *Manahen* depriv'd *Sellum* as well of his Life as of the Kingdom of *Iſrael*, and Dy'd nevertheleſs in his Bed. *Phaceia* his Son, was Murder'd by *Phacee*, and ſo pay'd the Penalty of his Fathers Offences. (*b*)

45. As for *Denis*, the firſt Tyrant of *Sicily* of that Name, Hiſtorians agree not about his Death; for thô moſt affirm that he Reign'd Thirty Eight Years, and Dy'd Naturally, leaving his Kingdom to *Denis* his Son; yet *Juſtin* (*c*) following *Trogus Pompeius*, whoſe Hiſtory he abridges, ſays that he was Slain; but howſoever it was, two things are evident in him, very much to be noted; the one, that his Life was moſt miſerable, by reaſon of the continual fears, ſuſpitions, and torments of Mind, wherein he Liv'd, as I have before declar'd at large; (*d*) and the other is, the puniſhment of God upon his Son, who was driven out of his Kingdom by *Dion*, and forc'd to Live at *Corinth* in a moſt baſe manner; and to get his Living by Teaching Children. (*e*) Wherefore *Valerius Maximus* (*f*) a Pagan Writer, obſerves excellently well that the Juſtice of God fell upon him, for his Fathers Tyranny; ſaying, thô his Father, in his Life time, ſuffer'd not the puniſhment due to his wickedneſs, yet

(*a*) 3 Reg. 16. 11. (*b*) 4 Reg. 15. 14. 26. (*c*) *Iuſtin lib* 20. *fine.* (*d*) Tom. 2, *chap.* 6. (*e*) *Num.* 4. (*f*) *Valer. lib.* 2. *ch.* 2.

being

being Dead, he pay'd for it in the ſhameful Calamity of his Son; whereunto *Valerius* alſo adds this Golden Sentence; (*a*) *Lento enim gradu procedit Divina ira, tarditatemque ſupplicij, gravitate compenſat. The Wrath of God proceeds with a ſlow pace, to take Revenge of Offences committed againſt him, and Recompences the delay of the puniſhment, with the grievouſneſs thereof.*

46. *Ptolemy* (who was call'd in Mockery *Philopater*, or a Lover of Friend of his Father; becauſe he Kill'd both his Father and his Mother) Dy'd a Natural Death, leaving his Kingdom to his Son *Ptolemy Epiphanes*, who alſo Dy'd peaceably, for ought I find to the contrary, wherein I confeſs it pleas'd God to interrupt the ordinary courſe of his Juſtice in puniſhing Tyrannical Murders with Murder, or other violent Deaths, either in the Father, or in the Son, which is to be attributed to ſome juſt, thô ſecret Cauſe, known only to his Infinite Wiſdom; whereof we ſee the very like in the Holy Scriptures in *Jehu* King of *Iſrael*, (*b*) and his Poſterity; for thô the ordinary courſe of God's Juſtice was not wont to permit the Poſterity of any of the Schiſmatical Kings of *Iſrael*, to enjoy that Kingdom farther than the ſecond Generation, ſo that their Progeny or Races were ever cut off, either in the Father or the Son; yet he exempted *Jehu*, and his Poſterity from that puniſhment, granting 'em a particular priviledge to Succeed one another, until the fourth Generation after *Jehu*, for the good Service *Jehu*

(*a*) *Ibidem.* (*b*) 4 Reg. 10. & 15.

did him, in deſtroying the Houſe of *Achab*: As I have before declar'd, treating of the Proſperity of wicked Men. (*a*)

47. And if it may be lawful to conjecture the cauſe, why God exempted *Ptolemy Philopator* and his Son *Epiphanes*, from the puniſhment of violent Deaths, due to the wickedneſs of *Philopator*, I may probably ſay (for of God's ſecret Judgments, I dare affirm nothing for certain) that it may be aſcrib'd to the Mercy of God intended towards 'em, for the Service which *Ptolemeus Philadelphus*, (*b*) Grand-father to *Philopator*, did him, as well in releaſing the *Jews* which were Captives in *Ægypt*, to the number of a hundred and twenty thouſand; as alſo in ſending Rich Gifts and Preſents to the Temple of *Jeruſalem*; and moreover; becauſe he caus'd the Law of *Moyſes*, (*c*) to be Tranſlated into the *Greek* Tongue by Seventy Learned *Jews*, commonly call'd the *Septuaginta Interpretes*, or *Seventy Interpreters*; to the end that the ſame might be reſerv'd in his Library. In all which, it may be thought, he did ſuch grateful Service to Almighty God, that the Reward thereof redounded to the fourth Generation of his Poſterity, as it fell out in the Poſterity of *Jehu*: And that therefore, neither *Philopator*, who was Grand-child to *Philadelphus*, nor *Epiphanes* Son to *Philopator*, nor *Philometor* Son to *Epiphanes* Dy'd violently, thô the Murders, as well of *Philometor*, who Kill'd his own Mother, as of *Philopator*, whom

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 26. *num.* 22. (*b*) *Iuſtin li.* 39. (*c*) *Ioſephus de antiq. lib.* 12. *ca.* 2.

I chiefly hereof ſpeak, might have deſerv'd it.

48. And as the priviledge granted to the Poſterity of *Iehu* (*a*) ceas'd in the fourth Succeſſor; for *Zacharius*, who was the fourth, either left no Children, or if he did, they Succeeded not; ſo alſo the exemption from violent Death, granted as it may be thought to the Poſterity of *Philadelphus*, ceas'd in the fourth Deſcent; for *Philometor*, who was the fourth Succeſſor Dy'd a Natural Death, but his Son was depriv'd, both of his Kingdom, and his Life, by his Uncle *Evergetes*, of whom I am to ſpeak next: And this I thought good to note by the way, as not unprobable; not preſuming to aſſure any thing concerning God's ſecret Judgments; but that which I take upon me to affirm here, is, that foraſmuch as there is no Rule ſo general, but has an exception, therefore neither this example of *Philopator*, nor a few other ſuch like, proceeding from God's ſecret Judgments, which are ever moſt juſt, can prejudice the general Rule, obſerv'd in the ordinary courſe of his Juſtice towards moſt Men.

49. As for *Ptolemy Evergetes* the II. who was Son to *Epiphanes*, and Brother to *Philometor*, he was a moſt Barbarous and Cruel Tyrant, for he Kill'd not only his Nephew, Son to *Philometor*, (*b*) as I have ſayd, but alſo a Son of his own, which he had by *Cleopatra* his own Siſter; beſides his horrible Cruelty in Murdering many

(*a*) 4 Reg. 15. (*b*) *Iuſtin* 38.

Chief Citizens of *Alexandria*; which thô it was not puniſh'd in him by a violent Death; perhaps becauſe he was alſo within the compaſs of the fourth Generation, being Brother to *Philometor* aforeſaid, (*a*) yet it drew the Vengeance of Almighty God upon his Children; for his Son *Ptolemy Phiſcon* was expell'd out of his Kingdom, by his own Mother *Cleopatra*, and by *Alexander* his Younger Brother; which *Alexander* Poyſon'd his Mother, and having Poſſeſt himſelf of the Kingdom, was driv'n out again by the people. And in like manner the two Daughters of *Evergetes*, *Cleopatra* and *Griphina*, being Marry'd to two Brethren *Cizycenus* and *Griphus*, (*b*) who contended for the Kingdom of *Syria*, caus'd the deſtruction of one another; for *Griphina* procur'd *Cleopatra* to be Murder'd in the very Temple of the Gods, where ſhe had taken Sanctuary; whoſe Death was afterwards Reveng'd by her Husband *Cizycenus*; who having overthrown his Brother *Griphus*, Husband to *Griphina*, Slew her in Revenge of his Wives Death.

50. *Caſſander* King of *Macedon*, was not only conſenting to the Poyſoning of *Alexander* the Great, but alſo deſtroy'd all his Children and Family, and yet Dy'd no violent Death; but his three Sons of *Antipater*, *Alexander* and *Philip* were Slain, and his Daughter *Euridice* was kept in continual Priſon; that, ſo as *Juſtin* ſays, (*c*) all the Family of *Caſſander* pay'd for the Murder, as well of *Alexander*, as of his Children; either

(*a*) *Juſtin* 39. (*b*) *Ibidem.* (*c*) *Juſtin lib.* 16.

by

by their Deaths, or elſe by ſome other puniſhment.

51. *Conſtantine* the IV. Emperor of that Name, firſt cut off the Noſe and Ears of his two Brothers, and afterwards Kill'd 'em; and foraſmuch as he became in the end a good Man, it ſeem's that God Tranſlated the Temporal puniſhment thereof from him, to his Son *Iuſtinian* the Emperor; whom *Leontius* the Tyrant depriv'd as well of his Noſe and Ears, as of his Empire; Baniſhing him into *Pontus:* And *Leontius* being overthrown, and taken in a Battle by *Tiberius*, loſt both his Noſe and his Liberty. (*a*) Afterwards *Iuſtinian* recovering his Empire, took *Tiberius* Priſoner, and having commanded both his Noſe and his Ears to be cut off, caus'd him and *Leontius*, whom he found in Priſon, to be executed together: With whom nevertheleſs the Tragedy ended not, until at length both *Iuſtinian*, and his Son *Tiberius* were Slain by *Philippicus*, who Succeeded him in the Empire.

52. *Heraclius* the Emperor (*b*) Succeeding *Phocas*, whom he Slew, left two Sons, *Conſtantin* the V. and *Heracleon*; of which two, *Conſtantin* was Poyſon'd by his Step-mother *Martina*, (*c*) to advance *Heracleon* her Son to the Empire, who after a while was depriv'd thereof, and Baniſh'd together with his Mother; her Tongue and his Noſe being cut off.

53. *Mahomet* the II. Emperor of the *Turk's* of that Name, who overthrew the Empires of

(*a*) *Zonar. Annal. To.* 3. (*b*) *Zonar. Annal.* (*c*) *Paul. Diac. lib.* 18.

Conſtantinople and *Trabiſonda*, Succeeded his Brother *Amurates*; (*a*) and for the ſecurity of his Empire, preſently caus'd his own Brother to be Kill'd; the Revenge of whoſe Blood, fell upon his Sons, *Zizimus* and *Bajazet* the II. of whom the firſt being forc'd by his Brother to fly into Chriſtendom, was Poyſon'd in *Italy*; and the other, to wit, *Bajazet* was expell'd out of *Conſtantinople*, and Poyſon'd by his own Son *Selim*.

54. *Edward* the IV. King of *England*, caus'd not only King *Henry* the VI. and the Prince his Son, but alſo his own Brother *George* Duke of *Clarence* to be Murder'd; (*b*) the penalty whereof was pay'd with the Blood of both his Sons, *Edward* the V. and his Brother, Murder'd by their Uncle King *Richard* in the Tower.

55. *Haldan* King of *Denmark* got the Kingdom by the Murder of his two Brethren, *Roe* and *Scato*, and was afterwards ſo Cruel a Tyrant all his Life long, that *Saxo Grammaticus*, an Ancient Hiſtorian of *Denmark*, ſays thus of him; (*c*) *His Fortune was moſt admirable in one thing, that thô he never omitted any moment of time in the exerciſe of Cruelty, yet, Senectute vitam, non ferro finivit; He ended his Life by Old Age, and not by the Sword.* Thus ſays *Saxo*, noting the common experience of the Bloody and Violent Deaths, of Cruel and Bloody Tyrants; in reſpect whereof he wonder'd at the natural and quiet end of *Haldan*, which muſt be referr'd, as I have noted of the

(*a*) *Paul. Iovius. in com. rerum Turcic.* (*b*) *Polidor. lib.* 2. (*c*) *Saxo Gramma hiſt. Daniæ. lib.* 2.

reſt,

reſt, to the ſecret Judgments of Almighty God; transferring ſometimes the Fathers Temporal puniſhment, to the Children; for very juſt, thô ſecret Cauſes, known only to his Infinite Wiſdom; as it may alſo be obſerv'd in this caſe: For whereas King *Haldan* left two Sons, *Roe* and *Helgo*, (*a*) the firſt being Invaded and overthrown in three Battel's by the King of *Swedland*, was alſo Slain by him; and the other following his Fathers Steps, as well in Cruelty, as all other wickedneſs, grew no leſs hateful to himſelf, than to all other Men, and in the end Kill'd himſelf with his own Sword.

56. To conclude, *Iohn Galeas Viſconte*, Poſſeſſing the one half of the State of *Milan*, and his Brother *Barnabas* the other, Kill'd his Brother to have the whole; and having obtain'd of *Wenceſlaus* the Emperor, the Title of Duke, ſubdu'd all *Lombardy*, and left the ſame with the Title of a Dutchy to his Son *Iohn Maria Viſconte*; (*b*) who was afterwards Slain by his own Subjects for his Tyranny, and ſo receiv'd the puniſhment both of his Fathers wickedneſs, as well as his own.

57. To theſe may be added other Children of Bloody Tyrants, who pay'd the Penalty of their Fathers wickedneſs with their Blood, but yet if you compare them in number with thoſe whom God hath manifeſtly puniſh'd in this Life for their own Tyranny, you ſhall find 'em to be few in reſpect of the other; but howſoever

(*a*) *Saxo. Ibidem.* (*b*) *Naucler. in Chron. an.* 1400.

it

it is, this I dare be bold to ſay, that there are very few, or ſcarce any Tyrant to be found in all Antiquity, whoſe Perſon, State or Poſterity, has not receiv'd ſome notorious puniſhment, even in the very Opinion and Judgment of the World; and moſt commonly by Violent and Bloody Deaths; it being moſt conſonant to the Juſtice and Judgments of God, that the puniſhment ſhou'd correſpond to the fault; that Blood be repay'd with Blood; and that as our Saviour ſays, *He who ſtrikes with the Sword, ſhou'd periſh by the Sword.*

58. Wherefore Almighty God ſayd to *Noe.* (*b*) *VVhoſoever ſhall ſpill Man's Blood, his Blood ſhall be ſpilt*; which we ſee was verifi'd for the example of others in *Cain* the Proto-paricide, when he had Kill'd his Brother *Abel*; (*c*) whoſe Blood our Lord ſayd did cry to him for Vengeance from the Earth; and therefore he was accurs'd by Almighty God, and afterwards Kill'd by *Lamech*; and *Adonibezec* having cruelly cut off the Hands and Feet of Seventy Kings, and after Kill'd 'em, was taken by the Tribe of *Iuda*, and handl'd in the ſame manner, acknowledging God's Juſtice in himſelf, ſaying, *As I have done to others, ſo our Lord has render'd the ſame unto me.* (*d*)

59. And in like manner, when *Achab* had Kill'd *Naboth* (*e*) to have his Vineyard, the Prophet ſayd unto him. *Even in the ſame place where the Dog's have lick'd the Blood of* Naboth,

(*a*) Matth. *ch.* 26. (*b*) Gen. 9. (*c*) Gen. 4. (*d*) Iud. *c.* 17. (*e*) 3 Reg. 22.

they

they ſhall lick thine; which was afterwards fulfill'd. And the like ſeverity of God's Juſtice may be noted alſo in *David* and his Children, for the Murder of *Vrias*; and not only in *Amon* Son to *Manaſſes*; but alſo in the People and Country of *Iuda*, who were miſerably ſpoil'd and waſted by the Incurſions of the *Syrians*, *Moabites* and *Amonits*, in the time of *Ioachin* Grand-child to *Manaſſes*; (*a*) *For the Innocent Blood which* Manaſſe *ſhed*; (*b*) *And for this cauſe God wou'd not be merciful unto them.* Thus ſays the Scripture; whereby we may ſee that, as the Royal Prophet ſays; (*c*) *Our Lord abhor's the Bloody and deceitful Man.*

60. To which purpoſe, I cannot omit upon this occaſion to note by the way, the wonderful Providence and Juſtice Almighty God Daily ſhews, in the ſtrange diſcovery of Murders amongſt private Men, be they never ſo ſecretly committed. For, whence can it proceed, but from God's ſpecial Providence and Juſtice, that the Wounds of the Dead Body of him that is Murder'd, ſhou'd Bleed afreſh if the Murderer com's where it is? Which not only Grave Authors teſtifie, but alſo common experience proves to be true; by the means whereof, many Murders have been diſcover'd: And what is there more generally obſerv'd in the experience of Men, than that Murder cannot long ly hid, but is diſcover'd and puniſh'd ſooner or later; which has been alſo an Old obſervation, as may appear by a ſtrange Story, which *Plutarch* reports of the Murder

(*a*) 4 Reg. 14. (*b*) Ibid. (*c*) Pſal. 5.

of

of one *Ibicus*, thô he tells it to another purpoſe.

61. *Ibicus* (*a*) being taken by certain Enemies of his, and carry'd to a ſecret place, where they meant to Kill him, perſuaded 'em to deſiſt from their Enterprize, aſſuring 'em that his Death wou'd be diſcover'd, and reveng'd by ſome means or other; and when they Laugh'd at him, and ask'd him who ſhou'd diſcover it, he ſhew'd 'em certain Cranes, which flew over their Heads; ſaying, that thô there ſhou'd be no Human Teſtimony to convince 'em, yet thoſe Cranes ſhou'd be Witneſſes againſt 'em, and help to revenge his Death; nevertheleſs they Slew him, and when he had been miſs'd ſome Years, and great enquiry made after him by his Friends, it chanc'd one Day, that as the Murderers Sat together in the Theater, beholding a publick Spectacle, there flew over their Heads certain Cranes, which one of 'em ſeeing, ſhew'd 'em to his fellows, and Laughing, ſayd, behold the Witneſſes and Revengers of the Death of *Ibicus*: This was overheard by ſome that knew him, who ſignifi'd it to the Magiſtrates, whereupon being taken, and Examin'd, they Confeſs'd the Murder and were Executed.

62. The ſame Author recounts another Story, (*b*) which I have alledg'd before upon another occaſion; how, that one who had Kill'd his own Father, and was not diſcover'd for many Years, betray'd himſelf by pulling down a Swal-

(*a*) *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe of much talking.
(*b*) *Plutarch de ſera uum. vindicta.*

lows

lows Neſt, and ſtamping the Young Swallows under his Feet in a great Rage; telling 'em who ask'd him the cauſe, that the Swallows ſayd, he had Kill'd his Father; whereupon he was ſuſpected, Examin'd, and upon his Confeſſion Condemn'd and Executed, as I have before declar'd more at large. (*a*)

63. Tò theſe I will add only one Example more out of *Cedrenus.* (*b*) A Thief having Robb'd and Kill'd a Poor Man, who had a Dog with him, left the Dead Body not far from the High-way, and the Dog lying by it; within a while after, a Paſſenger ſeeing the Dead Body, Bury'd it; which being done, the Dog Fawn'd upon him, and follow'd him Home; this Man was an Inn-keeper, and whereas the Dog was wont to Fawn upon all the Gueſts that came to his Houſe, it chanc'd one Day, that he Bark'd at one, who came to Drink there, and ſet upon him with ſuch violence, that the Inn-keeper and others, taking notice of it, were mov'd, ſays the Author, by Divine Inſtinct, to conceive that he was the Man who had Kill'd the Dog's former Maſter, and upon Suſpicion thereof, caus'd him to be Apprehended and Examin'd, and ſo it fell out, that he being the Murderer, Confeſs'd it, and receiv'd the due puniſhment he deſerv'd.

64. I forbear to alledge Modern Examples of this matter, becauſe no Man can be ignorant of the ſtrange accidents which happen Daily in one

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 26. *num.* 10. (*b*) *Cedren apud Zonar. Annal. To.* 3. *in Conſtantino Pogonato.*

place

place or other, for the diſcovery and puniſhment of Murderers; and therefore I conclude, that the common obſervation thereof, being deriv'd from the experience as well of former Ages, as of the preſent time, is an excellent Argument, not only of the Enormity of Murder, but alſo of God's greater Providence, and ſevere Juſtice in puniſhing the ſame.

65. Seeing then Almighty God has ordain'd this Miraculous diſcovery of Murders, to the end no Murderer amongſt private Men, ſhou'd eſcape the puniſhment of Human Laws, 'tis no wonder, if he ſeverely puniſhes Murder in Princes, who ought to puniſh it in others: Whereby it may alſo be judg'd what ſecurity or benefit a Prince can procure to his State by ſuch horrible Murders, as *Machiavel* ſeems to allow in his Prince; whereby he ſhall expoſe himſelf not only to the hatred of Men, but alſo to the Wrath and Vengeance of Almighty God, againſt whom he has no defence. For be he never ſo ſtrong and powerful, God will put, as the Prophet ſayd of *Sennacherib*, (*a*) *A Ring in his Noſe, and a Bridle in his Mouth*; wherewith he will wring, wind and turn him which way he pleaſes, and perhaps make ſome little Mouſe, Louſe or Worm overthrow him, and Triumph over all his Power, Pomp and Pride; as may appear by the ſtrange and miſerable ends of divers Kings and Princes, of whom I have ſpoken before in this Chapter. (*b*)

(*a*) Iſay 37. 4 Reg. 19. (*b*) *Num.* 11, & 12.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

'Tis farther debated whether all Sinful Policy be againſt Reaſon of State, by occaſion whereof, ſome things are obſerv'd concerning the courſe of God's Providence, in the conſervation and deſtruction of States: And by the way, ſomewhat is ſayd of Sorcery, and how dangerous the Practiſe thereof is to Princes.

BUT now perhaps the Politicians will ſay, that thô he ſhou'd grant that the continuance of wickedneſs might make a Prince hateful both to God and Man; and conſequently procure his Ruin; nevertheleſs 'twou'd not follow, that every Policy which may be ſinful and offenſive to God, is againſt reaſon of State; ſeeing experience teaches, that ſuch Policies are many times beneficial and profitable thereunto; and whatſoever do's benefit the State, the ſame may be juſtly ſayd to be according to reaſon of State, and be practis'd by Statiſts, without imputation of folly, eſpecially in caſes of extremity, when a Prince ſees himſelf brought to ſuch an exigence, that he has no hopes of help by any lawful means; and yet perſuad's himſelf

ſelf that ſome Act, accounted a Sin or Offence to God, may procure him ſome remedy; for example, ſome fraudulent dealing, Perjury, Murder or ſuch like: For thô, ſay the Politicians, that in caſes where there is freedom of Election of good or evil Policies, it may perhaps be convenient to uſe good, and avoid the bad; yet when the caſe ſeems to be deſperate, and no choice left, but either to practiſe ſome wicked Policy, or to ſuffer the State to periſh, then at leaſt, ſay they, reaſon of State requires that the State ſhou'd be conſerv'd by any means whatſoever.

2. For the ſatisfaction of this difficulty, 'tis to be conſider'd, that every thing which ſucceeds well in matter of State, cannot be ſayd to be according to reaſon of State, or to be well and wiſely done; becauſe the ſucceſs not only of very bad, but alſo of very fooliſh deſigns, is many times according to the common ſaying very good by chance, or rather by the permiſſion, or ſecret diſpoſition of Almighty God; who as I have often ſignifi'd, diſpoſes of the Affairs of Men, not according to their Wills or Wiſhes, but according to his own Holy Will, and ſecret Judgments; drawing always good out of evil, and turning the worſt Intentions and Actions of the wicked'ſt Men in the World, to the good of others, and his own Glory, one way or other.

3. Therefore a Prince who ſees himſelf reduc'd to ſuch an extremity, that he may think it needful to uſe ſome wicked Policy, is to conſider that

that the Calamity which he either ſuffers or fears, cannot happen unto him without God's ſpecial Providence, but rather by his juſt Ordination, either for his trial and exerciſe, or for the juſt puniſhment of his own Sins, or thoſe of his Parents or Predeceſſors, or perhaps for the Sins of the People, as I have ſufficiently prov'd heretofore. (*a*)

4. If it be only for his trial, that is to ſay, to prove and try his Faith and Hope in God, and to exerciſe his Patience (for which cauſes God ſuffer'd *Job* and *Tobias* (*b*) to be Tempted, and often permits his beſt beloved Servants to fall into difficulties) what other effect can wicked Policy work, than that the affliction which God layd upon him for his benefit and ſpecial good; ſhou'd turn by God's Juſt Judgment, to his utter ruin both of Body and Soul.

5. And if the affliction be a puniſhment of Sin in any kind, he cannot with any reaſon conceive that the ſame can be remedy'd by ſinful, and wicked means; whereby the cauſe of his affliction will be increas'd, and God's Indignation and Wrath farther kindl'd againſt him and his State; and much leſs can he hope, either to force or fruſtrate the Will of God by Policies and Devices: As we Read that divers wicked Princes have labor'd to do, and gain'd nothing elſe in the end, but either a note of extream folly and impiety; or elſe utterly ruin'd themſelves and their States; and as the Tragical Poët

(*a*) Tom. 1. *chap.* 27. *num.* 24. 25. *&* 26. (*b*) Iob. 1, 2, 3, 41. Tob. 12.

well expreſſes. (*a*) —— *Ad fatum venere ſuum, dum fata timebant*; *They came to their fatal end, whilſt they fear'd, or ſought to avoid their fate*; that is, they made themſelves the inſtruments of God's Will and Juſtice, to execute the ſame upon themſelves.

6. And thô I have prov'd this already by many examples of Princes, who have periſh'd by their own wicked Policies; yet I will add here a few more examples of ſuch, who having had ſome light, and underſtanding of God's Will, concerning themſelves or their States, have ſought by ſome impious Policies either to elude or avert it.

7. To which purpoſe 'tis by the way to be noted, that Almighty God do's ſometimes for ſecret cauſes, known only to his Infinite Wiſdom, reveal his own hidden and ſecret Councels, not only to wicked Men, as he did to *Caiphas*; (*b*) but alſo to wicked Spirits, by the Miniſtery of his Angels, as Saint *Auſtin* witneſſes; (*c*) by which means the Devils did truly foretell to the Pagans many things, which depended only upon the Will of God: Whereof there has been alſo, and ſtill is, ſufficient experience amongſt *Chriſtians*, in the deteſtable practiſe of Negromancy and Witchcraft.

8. For thô the Devil, who is (*d*) *A Lyer, and the Father of Lyes*; do's commonly Ly, and delude thoſe that deal with him, yet he do's at other times truly foretell things to come, either by chance or by conjecture, or elſe ſuch things

(*a*) *Seneca in Oedip.* (*b*) Ioan. 11. (*c*) *Aug. de Geneſi ad litteram ca.* 17. (*d*) Ioan. 8.

as

as proceed from Natural cauſes whereof he has an exact knowledge; or elſe ſuch other things as depend upon his own Power and Will, by the permiſſion of God; or laſtly ſuch things, as it pleaſes Almighty God to reveal unto him, for the execution of his ſecret Judgments.

9. Therefore to come now to the examples which I promis'd; (*a*) *Alexander* King of *Epirus*, having underſtood by an Oracle of *Jupiter*, that he ſhou'd Die near to the River *Acheruſia*, and the City *Pandoſia*, of which Names there was a City and River in his own Kingdom of *Epirus*; thought to avoid the ſame, by leaving his Country, and making War abroad in *Italy*: Where he was Slain within a while after, near to a River and City ſo call'd, as above mention'd. *Non prius*, ſays Juſtin, (*b*) *fatalis loci cognito nomine quam occiderit*; *Not knowing the Name of that fatal place, before he Dy'd in it.*

10. Alſo the wicked Emperor *Anaſtaſius*, of whom I have before ſpoken, (*c*) being forewarn'd that he ſhou'd be Kill'd with a Thunderbolt, Built a Marvellous ſtrong Houſe call'd *Tholotum*, (*d*) and beſides many ſtrange Labyrinths, and places of retreat for his ſafety, he made a deep Ciſtern in the bottom of all the Houſe, whither he meant to retire himſelf when he ſhou'd ſee cauſe; nevertheleſs, he was Kill'd ſhortly after (*e*) with a Thunderbolt, as he was running in time of great Thunder, from one Chamber to another, to get down to his

(*a*) *Juſtin lib* 12. (*b*) *Ibid.* (*c*) Tom. 2. *ch.* 7. *num.* 8. (*d*) *Zonar. annal. To.* 3. (*e*) *Cedren.*

Ciſtern; to whom it might have been ſayd, as a Poët ſays of *Enceladus* the Giant, who flying away from *Jupiter*, was as the Poëts fain, ſtruck with a Thunderbolt, and caſt under Mount *Ætna*. —— *Quo fugis* Encelade? *Quaſcunque acceſſeris oras, ſub* Jove *ſemper eris*; *Whither doſt thou fly* Enceladus? *What Coaſt ſoever thou ſhalt come unto, thou ſhalt ever be under* Jupiter; that is, under the Hand of God: Which the Pſalmiſt teaches excellently well ſaying; (*a*) *Whither ſhall I go O Lord, from thy Spirit; or whither ſhall I fly from thy Face? If I aſcend up to Heaven thou art there; if I deſcend down to Hell, thou art there alſo; if I take VVings early in the Morning, and dwell in the fartheſt part of the Sea, there alſo thy Right Hand will lay hold of me.* Thus ſays the Pſalmiſt, to ſhew the Vanity and Folly of wicked Men, who think to eſcape the Hand of God.

11. No leſs vain, and much more impious was the endeavour of the Emperor *Valens*, (*b*) to Annul God's Ordination: For having conſulted with Negromancers concerning the Name of his Succeſſor, and being told that it ſhou'd begin with *Theod*, (*c*) he caus'd a great number of perſons to be made away, of whom ſome were call'd *Theodoſius*, ſome *Theodotus*, ſome *Theodulus*, and ſome *Theodorus*; and amongſt the reſt he moſt ungratefully Murder'd the Valiant Captain *Theodoſius*, (*d*) after he had recover'd *Africk* from his Enemies, and gave order alſo, to Kill *Theodoſius*

(*a*) Pſal. 138. 8. (*b*) *Paul. Diac. lib.* 12. (*c*) *Oroſ: lib.* 7. (*d*) *Ammian lib.* 29.

his

his Son, (*a*) whom nevertheleſs, Almighty God deliver'd from that danger, and after made him Emperor, whereby the Prediction was fulfill'd.

12. In like manner, the Emperor *Andronicus Comnenus*, (*b*) gueſſing by the Letters *I. S.* which were ſhew'd him by a Conjurer in a Baſon of Water, that his Succeſſors Name ſhou'd be *Iſacius*, thought to Kill *Iſacius Angelus*, whom by that means he made Emperor, and wrought his own deſtruction, as I have before ſignifi'd. (*c*)

13. To theſe I will add only one more out of our own Country, of *Edward* the IV. King of *England*; who having underſtood, as 'tis ſuppos'd by ſome Prophecy, that one whoſe Name did begin with a *G.* ſhou'd procure the deſtruction of his Children after his Death, caus'd his Brother *George* Duke of *Clarence*, (*d*) to be Murder'd in the Tower; not at all ſuſpecting his Brother the Duke of *Gloceſter*, who fulfill'd the Prophecy, if it was one, or the Prediction, if inſpir'd by the Holy Ghoſt, and not rather ſome device of the Devil, which I think more probable; becauſe it induc'd King *Edward* to the Murder of his Brother: Whereupon the deſtruction alſo of his own Children, which he endeavor'd thereby to prevent, might very well follow, throu' the ſeverity of God's Judgments, who many times puniſhes

(*a*) *Ambroſ. in fine oratio. in fun. Theodoſ.* (*b*) *Nicet chroniat. Annal. lib. 3. de Andro. Com.* (*c*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 6. *num.* 33. *&* 34. (*d*) *Polidor. lib.* 24.

Sinners, by that, which they moſt fear, and ſeek by wicked means to avoid; and therefore *Salomon* ſays, (*a*) *That which the wicked Man fears, ſhall fall upon him.*

14. But leaving this to God's ſecret Judgments, 'tis to be noted in theſe Examples, how dangerous a thing it is in a Prince, to be curious to know God's ſecret Counſels and Decrees, concerning himſelf, and his State; whereby many Princes have been drawn, to uſe the help of Negromancers and Sorcerers, to God's great offence, and conſequently to their own deſtruction; there being no Sin, which God has and do's puniſh more than this: As we may eaſily perceive, both by the expreſs prohibition thereof in many places of the Holy Scriptures; (*b*) as alſo by the ſevere Judgments of God upon the *Babylonians*, *Amorhæans*, *Pherezeans*, *Chananæans*, *Hevæans*, *Iebuſæans*, and divers other people deſtroy'd in the Land of Promiſe with their Kings, to the number of one and thirty, as the Scripture teſtifies, chiefly for their Witchcrafts, Enchantments and Negromancy: (*c*) And therefore *Moyſes* warn'd the Children of *Iſrael* before they came into the Land of Promiſe, that they ſhou'd not imitate thoſe Infidels in theſe Sins, concluding; *For our Lord do's abhor all theſe, and for theſe kind of Sins he will utterly deſtroy them at their entrance.* (*d*)

15. And if it be alſo conſider'd, what deluſion the Devil uſes in Sorcery, and how little truth may be known thereby, 'twill evidently appear how

(*a*) Proverb. *ca.* 10. (*b*) Levit. 19. & 20. *ver.* 26. Deut. 18. Iſay 47. (*c*) Deut. *ca.* 18. (*d*) *Ibid.*

vain

vain and frivolous the practiſe thereof is. For whereas he ſeems to be ſubject to the Sorcerer or Magician, as either forc'd by Enchantments, or bound by Covenant; yet 'tis but meer fraud, and deceit on his part; becauſe he can neither be forc'd by Man, or by any natural means, being of nature and power, ſuperior to the nature and power of Man; neither can he be farther bound by Covenant, than he himſelf pleaſes; which is never longer than he may hope thereby to do Man ſome particular miſchief: Moreover, the Devils neither know ſuch things as meerly depend upon the Will of God, or Man, as I have already ſhew'd; (*a*) nor will they for the Malice and Envy to Man, tell him the truth of ſuch things as they know; but to the end only, to do him ſome hurt and miſchief one way or other; which alſo God of his Juſtice many times permits, revealing unto them his own ſecret Judgments, for the juſt puniſhment and greater confuſion of thoſe who confide in 'em; to whom they uſe to ſignifie the ſame in ſuch Riddles, and with ſuch Ambiguity, that thô they only denounce unto them, God's Sentence giv'n againſt 'em for their deſtruction; yet they feed 'em with falſe hope of proſperous ſucceſs; to make 'em run headlong to their own ruin: Whereof many ſtrange Examples might be alledg'd out of the Ancient Hiſtories of Pagans, which for brevety's ſake I omit, and content my ſelf to relate two or three out of later Hiſtories.

(*a*) *Supra num.* 8.

16. *Ferrand* Count of *Flanders* aſſiſted by the Emperor *Otho* the IV. or as ſome call him, the V. of that name, being on the point of giving Battle to *Philip* King of *France* call'd the *Auguſt*, was greatly incourag'd thereunto by his Mother, upon the Prediction of certain Magicians, with whom ſhe had Conſulted; who aſſur'd her that the King of *France* ſhou'd be overthrown in the Battle, Trodden under the Horſes Feet, and not Bury'd; and that the Count her Son, ſhou'd be receiv'd by the *Pariſians* with great Joy: (*a*) All which fell out to be true, thô in another manner than ſhe expected; for thô the King of *France* was ſo preſt by his Enemies, that he was thrown down from his Horſe, and Trodden under the Horſes Feet, yet he was reſcu'd by his Soldiers, and having won the Battle, took the Count of *Flanders*, and ſent him Priſoner to *Paris*; at which the *Pariſians* very much rejoyc'd: *And ſo we ſee*, ſays the Story, *how the Count truſting to Sorcerers, inſtead of a Crown which he expected, purchas'd a Priſon.* (*b*)

17. We Read alſo of the like deceit and illuſion of the Devil, in the aſſurance which a Sorcereſs gave to *Macbbeth* King of *Scotland*; to wit, that no Man Born of a Woman, ſhou'd be able to Kill him; whereby he was animated to uſe all Cruelty towards his Subjects; and in the end was Slain by *Macdulf* Earl of *Fife*; who was not Born of his Mother, but cut out of her Belly. This is reported by *Hector Boëtius* (*c*) in

(*a*) *Gaguin. Annal. France, lib 6.* (*b*) *Idem. Ibid.* (*c*) *Hector Boethius. lib. 12.*

his

his Hiſtory of *Scotland*; out of whom I will alſo add another Example of God's Juſt Judgments, upon ſuch as Conſult with Sorcerers, and of the Devils Malicious ſubtilty in procuring their deſtruction.

18. *Natholocus* King of *Scotland*, ſent a great Favourite of his to inquire of a Famous Witch, what ſhou'd be the ſucceſs of a War he had in Hand, and about other things concerning his own Perſon and State: To whom ſhe anſwer'd, that *Nathalocus* (*a*) ſhou'd not live long, and that he ſhou'd be Kill'd by ſome of his own Servants; and being farther urg'd to tell by whom, ſhe ſayd, that the Meſſenger himſelf ſhou'd Kill him; who thô he departed from her with great diſdain, and even revil'd her, proteſting that he wou'd ſuffer ten thouſand Deaths rather than he wou'd do it; yet at his return, thinking better upon the matter, and imagining by the Devils ſuggeſtion, that the King might come to know by one means or other, the Witches Anſwer, and ſuſpect him ever after, or perhaps make him away, reſolv'd to Kill him; which he preſently after perform'd: Wherein we may ſee the Craft and Malice of the Devil, who thirſting after Man's Blood and Perdition, fram'd ſuch an Anſwer to his Meſſenger, as he thought moſt likely to move him to the Murder of *Nathalocus*, who ſent him; which alſo God of his Juſtice permitted for the juſt puniſhment of the ſinful and wicked Curioſity of *Nathalocus*, in

(*a*) *Hector Boeth. li. 6.*

ſeek-

ſeeking to know his ſecret Judgments, by ſuch unlawful means.

19. Wherefore I ſhall conclude this Point, with the Counſel of the Preacher in the Holy Scripture, who ſays, (*a*) *Search not after things higher than thy ſelf, but always think of thoſe things which God has commanded thee, neither be thou curious in prying into many of his Works, for 'tis not neceſſary for thee to ſee thoſe things which are hid.* Whereby the curioſity of Men, in ſearching into the ſecrets of God, is very much blam'd.

20. But now to return to the matter which I had in Hand, it appears ſufficiently by what I have ſayd, not only how dangerous it is, for Men to be curious to know God's Judgments by unlawful means, but alſo how vain and frivolous Man's inventions are, when he ſeeks to croſs, or fruſtrate the Will of God; which is not to be overturn'd by Force, nor to be avoided by Policy; but is only exorable and flexible by Prayer and Pennance; by which means God's Mercy has been often, and no doubt is Daily mov'd, to reverſe the rigorous Sentences of his Juſtice, giv'n againſt Sinners: Whereof we have examples in the *Ninivits* (*b*) whom God determin'd to deſtroy, and yet ſpar'd for their Repentance; and in *Achab* King of *Iſrael*, (*c*) who having receiv'd Sentence of the deſtruction of his whole Family, from the Mouth of the Prophet, by Humility and Repentance, obtain'd the

(*a*) Eccli. 3. (*b*) Ioan 3. (*c*) Reg. 21.

deferring

deferring of it, in reſpect whereof God ſayd to *Elias.* (*a*) *Becauſe he has humbl'd himſelf for my ſake, I will not inflict the puniſhment of his Sin upon his Houſe in his Days, but in the Days of his Son.* (*b*) Alſo *Ezechias* being Sick, and admoniſh'd from Almighty God by the Prophet, that he ſhou'd Die of that Diſeaſe, obtain'd by Prayers and Tears, not only preſent recovery, but alſo prolongation of Life for fifteen Years; as I have ſignifi'd before, (*c*) where I have by many examples, ſhew'd the admirable effect of Prayer and Spiritual means, for the remedy of the neceſſities of Princes; and therefore ſhall ſpeak no farther thereof in this place.

21. But ſays the Polititian, how many have Pray'd when they have been brought to extremities, and have had no help? When ſome others by ſome Perjury, Murther, or other ſuch like miſchief have conſerv'd their States.

22. Whereunto I Anſwer, that the Queſtion here, as I have before inſinuated, is not of the event and ſucceſs of Mens Actions, which is only in the Hand of God, and diſpos'd by him according to his ſecret Judgments, but of the likelyhood and probability of help in extremities, by the one means, or by the other; for I cou'd alſo with much more reaſon demand, how many have periſh'd by wicked Policies? Whereas infinite others have conſerv'd themſelves, and their States by having recourſe to God, and Godly means; of both which ſorts, I have alledg'd many re-

(*a*) 4 Reg. 20. (*b*) *Num.* 2. 6. 7. 10. 13. 14. 23. 25. & 28, *nu.* 8. & 9. (*c*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 15. & 21 mark-

markable Examples throu'out this whole Diſcourſe.

23. But that which I wiſh ſhou'd be obſerv'd for the better explication of this matter, is, that God do's ſometimes abſolutely determine to deſtroy a Prince or State; as when he ſayd of the People of *Juda*, that thô *Moyſes* and *Samuel* ſhou'd Pray for 'em he wou'd not ſpare 'em: And ſometimes again he abſolutely determin's to conſerve a State for a time; as when he promis'd *Jehu*, that his Poſterity ſhou'd Sit in his Seat till the fourth Generation. (*a*) In the firſt caſe thô neither good nor bad Policy, nor even Prayer can conſerve the State (I mean when God abſolutely determin's to deſtroy it) yet 'tis to be underſtood that wicked Policy may throu' the ſeverity of God's Juſtice, accelerate and aggravate the threaten'd calamity; whereas good Policy joyn'd with confidence in God, and pure Devotion, may move his Divine Majeſty, to execute his Judgments with much more Mercy; and to turn all the Temporal affliction of the Prince to his Eternal good; which in that caſe, were the greateſt benefit that cou'd be deſir'd, as I ſhall declare hereafter. (*b*)

24. In the ſecond caſe, I mean when God abſolutely determin's to conſerve a State, 'tis not to be doubted but that wicked Policy may by God's permiſſion, be a means thereof, and farther the execution of his ſecret Judgments, thô nevertheleſs the Prince that ſhou'd practiſe the

(*a*) Ierem. 15. 4 Reg. 10. (*b*) *Infra num.* 31. 32. & 33.

ſame

ſame ſhou'd, commit a notorious folly; becauſe he might in that caſe maintain his State by lawful and good Policy, with leſs danger, and much more benefit both to himſelf and others. And this I ſay, becauſe God uſes many times the wicked Policies of Men, for the conſervation of States, when his abſolute Will is to maintain 'em; which nevertheleſs he wou'd conſerve by the means of their lawful and good Policies, if the fault were not in themſelves. To which purpoſe 'tis to be underſtood, that Almighty God, having giv'n freedom of Will to Man, for ſuch cauſes as I have before declar'd, (*a*) do's not neceſſitate, or force Man's Will, but uſes it as it is, moving it always to good, and yet ſerving himſelf of it, be it good or bad, for his own Glory, and the accompliſhment of his Will.

25. Wherefore I ſay, that whenſoever he conſerves the States of Princes, by means of their bad Wills, and wicked policies, he wou'd much rather work the ſame effect by their good Wills, and lawful endeavours, if they themſelves wou'd; yea and even yield 'em withal, not only Temporal but alſo Eternal Rewards for the ſame: Whereas on the other ſide thô he ſuffers their wicked Policies to have good ſucceſs for a time, ſo long I mean, as he intends to conſerve their States, during which time they cannot by any Errors or folly of theirs overthrow 'em, yet he commonly puniſhes 'em for it in the end,

(*a*) Tom. 1, *ch.* 24. *num.* 4. 5. 6, 7. *&c.*

not

not only Eternally, if they Repent not; but alſo Temporally, either in their Perſons or States, or at leaſt in their Children and Poſterity: As 'tis evident in the wicked Tyrants mention'd in the laſt Chapter; (*a*) who thô they proſper'd for a while, yet at length periſh'd miſerably, throu' God's Juſtice: And thoſe few of 'em which eſcap'd Temporal puniſhment in their own Perſons, left their Children engag'd to pay their debt by their utter ruin.

26. Beſides 'tis to be conſider'd, that a wicked Policy throu' God's permiſſion, as I have ſayd, (*b*) may ſome way benefit the State, and help to uphold it for a time; and yet draw God's Wrath and Vengeance upon it ſome other way; whereby it will not only periſh in the end, but alſo in the mean time be miſerably afflicted: As the uſe of unwholeſome Meats gives the Body ſtrength, and nouriſhes it for a time, and yet ſo corrupts it, that it periſhes much the ſooner, and is in the mean time repleniſh'd with Diſeaſes.

27. This was manifeſt in the Kingdom, and Kings of *Iſrael*: For whereas they all continu'd the wicked Policy of *Jeroboam*, their firſt Predeceſſor, for the conſervation of their State, to wit their Idolatry and Schiſm, which was firſt begun by *Jeroboam* (*c*) for reaſon of State; 'tis not to be doubted, that Almighty God, having determin'd to maintain that Kingdom for ſome time, permitted that wicked Policy to have the effect,

(*a*) Tom. 2. *ch.* 7. *nu.* 25 36 37. *&c.* (*b*) *Ibid. num.* 42. 43. *&c.* (*c*) 3 Reg. 12.

for

for which it was devis'd; that is to ſay, to divert the people from going to the Temple in *Jeruſalem*, (*a*) and conſequently from returning to the Obedience of the Kings of *Juda:* And yet nevertheleſs he puniſh'd the ſame very ſeverely, ſometimes in the Princes, and ſometimes in the State, as 'tis evident in the Holy Scriptures; where it appears that not only *Jeroboam* (*b*) himſelf was ſtrucken by the Hand of God, and all his Children deſtroy'd for the ſame, but alſo all the Kings his Succeſſors Dy'd violent Deaths; either the Father or the Son, excepting the Children and Poſterity of *Iehu*, (*c*) who were priviledg'd, as I have ſayd before, for four Deſcents; wherein 'tis alſo to be noted, that during the time of the priviledge granted to their Perſons, their States were miſerably afflicted for the continuance of that wicked Policy, thô not overthrown; by reaſon of the Covenant which God had made with *Abraham*, *Iſaac* and *Jacob*; for which, ſays the Scripture, (*d*) *God wou'd not deſtroy them, nor utterly caſt 'em off as yet*, thô at length he gave the Kings their Succeſſors, and all the people into the Hands of the Kings of *Aſſyria* (*e*) to perpetual Captivity for the continual practiſe of the ſame ſinful Policy.

28. Thus then we ſee, how wicked Policy may by God's permiſſion ſome way help to the conſervation of State, ſo long as God has ordain'd

(*a*) 3 Reg. 12. (*b*) 2 Paral. *ca.* 13. 3 Reg. 15. (*c*) 4 Reg. 10. & 15. 4 Reg. 13. & 14. (*d*) 4 Reg. 14. (*e*) 4 Reg. 13.

that

that the State ſhall ſtand, and yet may in the mean time, throu' God's Juſtice, procure the Calamity of the Prince and State ſome other way, and the deſtruction of both in the end.

29. But now 'tis to be conſider'd, that the Will and Determination of Almighty God, to deſtroy or conſerve States, is not always ſo abſolute, but that he may be mov'd by the Merits or Demerits of Men to uphold the State, which he meant to deſtroy; and to deſtroy that which he meant to uphold. He determin'd as I ſayd before, to deſtroy the *Ninivits*, (*a*) and all the Family of *Achab* (*b*) for their Sins; and denounc'd his Will unto them by his Prophets, and yet he conſerv'd the one, and deferred the execution of the other for ſometime, in reſpect of their Humility and Repentance. On the other ſide, God promis'd to *David* (*c*) that the Kingdom of *Iuda* ſhou'd remain for ever in his Poſterity, if they ſerv'd him, and kept his Commandments; thô in reſpect of his promiſe, and for *Davids* ſake, he conſerv'd it in his time, and after it, (*d*) for many Generations, and divers times defended it from Forraign Enemies; yet at length utterly deſtroy'd it for the Sins of it's Kings and People. So that we ſee in both theſe caſes, that good Policy aſſiſted with Prayer, and Spiritual help, may be a ſpecial means to uphold and maintain the State and wicked Policy, as alſo all kind of Sin, be a

(*a*) Ioan. 3. (*b*) 3 Reg. 21. (*c*) Pſal. 131. (*d*) 1 Reg. 7. 3 Reg. 11. Paral. 21. (*e*) 4 Reg. 20.

chief

chief or rather the only means to overthrow it.

30. Wherefore, foraſmuch as the Judgments of God are ſecret, and not ordinarily known but by the effect, his Infinite Wiſdom having ſo ordain'd, to the end we may thereby the better know, and acknowledge our dependance on his Will, it behoves Princes, yea and all other Men in all dangers and extremities, to imitate the Holy and Prudent King *David*, whom I the rather propoſe for an example to Princes in this Point; becauſe the wicked *Machiavel* moſt falſely, and prophanly makes him a Pattern for a Tyrant, as I will more fully declare in the next Chapter, where I ſhall confute *Machiavels* impious, and abſurd Calumniation againſt him and *Moyſes* in that behalf; and evidently ſhew that they were both of 'em, the true Mirrour of Princely Perfection: (*a*) And in the mean time concerning King *David*, and the matter in hand, 'tis to be conſider'd, that when his wicked Son *Abſalon* roſe againſt him, and forc'd him to fly with a few out of *Jeruſalem* bare Headed, bare Footed and Weeping; he acknowledg'd it to be a juſt puniſhment of God for his Sins: And as on the one ſide, he us'd all Human diligence to defend himſelf, and to diſcover and diſſipate the deſigns of his Enemies; ſo alſo on the other ſide, he ſought to move Almighty God to Mercy by Prayer, Patience and Reſignation of his Will to God's, ſaying to *Sadoc* the Prieſt; *If I find favor*

(*a*) Tom. 2. *ch.* 9. *num.* 18.

in the Sight of God, he will reſtore me, but if he ſays unto me, thou do'ſt not pleaſe or content me, I am ready to Obey him, let him do with me whatſoever it ſhall pleaſe him. Moreover, he not only avoided all unlawful Policies that might offend God, but alſo forbore to take a juſt Revenge of the injury done him by *Semei*, whoſe reproachful Speeches and Maledictions he patiently ſuffer'd, as juſtly permitted by Almighty God for his puniſhment, ſaying to *Abiſai* who wou'd have Kill'd *Semei*; *Let him rail againſt me, for perhaps our Lord may behold my affliction, and render me good this Day for his Malediction.* Such was the Religious Humility of the Wiſe and Valiant King in this his great affliction, which was ſo grateful to Almighty God, that he gave him a great Victory, and reſtor'd him to his former Peace and Dignity.

21. The like Humility, Patience and Reſignation of Will, he ſhew'd alſo in other occaſions, even when he found not that Mercy and favor at God's Hands which he expected. When the Prophet *Nathan* had ſignifi'd unto him the Will of God, for the Death of his Child in the Cradle, in puniſhment of his Adultery and Homicide; (*a*) he never ceas'd to Crave his Mercy for the Life of his Son with continual Prayer, Tears and Faſting, ſhut up in his Chamber, and proſtrate upon the ground for ſome Days, after his Son fell Sick; not omitting any other lawful means for his Recovery, until he underſtood

(*a*) 2 Reg. 12.

by

by his Servants that he was Dead; and then ſeeing by the effect, what was the Will of God, he moſt humbly contented himſelf therewith, Waſh'd and Anointed himſelf, chang'd his Apparel, went to the Houſe of God to Pray, refreſh'd himſelf with Meat, and was in ſuch Conſolation, that he comforted *Berſabe* his Wife and all his Family; ſaying unto them, when they ask'd him why he was ſo ſorrowful whilſt the Child was alive, and found ſuch a comfort now he was Dead; (*a*) *I Faſted*, ſays he, *and Wept whilſt he Liv'd; becauſe I knew not whether God wou'd grant me his Life, or no; but now that he is Dead, why ſhou'd I afflict my ſelf any longer?* As if he wou'd ſay, now that I ſee what is the Will of God, what ſhou'd I do elſe, but accomodate my ſelf to it, and rejoyce in the accompliſhment thereof.

32. Thus ſayd, and did, this Holy King and Prophet, and ſo ſhou'd all Kings and Princes ſay, and do in like caſes, imploring the Favor and Mercy of God, whilſt they can have any hope; ſaying alſo with *Job*: (*b*) *Althô he Kill me I will hope in him*, not omitting any lawful policy or diligence which can be us'd, to procure a remedy; and contenting themſelves with God's Will in the ſucceſs, whatſoever it be, acknowledging his Juſtice therein. Whereof I have before alledg'd an extraordinary example in *Mauritius* the Emperor, (*c*) who having underſtood God's Will, concerning the loſs of his Life

(*a*) 2 Reg. 12. 22, 23. (*b*) Iob. 13. 15. (*c*) Tom. 2. *chap.* 35. *num.* 30.

and Empire, by means of *Phocas* for the puniſhment and ſatisfaction of his Sins in this Life; labor'd nevertheleſs by continual Prayer, and all kind of Devotion, to pacifie the Wrath of God; uſing alſo all lawful policy and diligence, to prevent the danger, and to defend himſelf againſt *Phocas*, (*a*) and in the end when nothing cou'd prevail, and that he ſaw himſelf in the Hands of his Enemy, and his Children Kill'd before his Face, he humbly acknowledg'd the Juſtice of God, often repeating theſe words of the Pſalmiſt; (*b*) *Thou art juſt O Lord, and thy judgments are right.*

33. We Read alſo the like, of the Holy and Pious, thô moſt unfortunate King *Henry* the VI. who having joyn'd all lawful policy with Prayer, and other Spiritual means, for the Conſervation of his State; and finding no remedy thereby, attributed all his Calamity, as *Polidore* witneſſes, (*c*) to the juſt puniſhment of God for his Sins, and the Sins of his Anceſtors; thô his own Vertue, or rather Innocency was ſuch, that if God had not, as it may be preſum'd, irrevocably Decreed, to lay the Temporal penalty of ſome Sins of his Anceſtors upon him, it might have obtain'd God's favor towards him, as well Temporally for the Conſervation of his State, as it did Spiritually for his Eternal Glory; teſtifi'd by ſo many remarkable Miracles, that King *Henry* the VII. demanded his Canonization of Pope *Julius* the II. and had obtain'd it, had he

(*a*) Zonar. *Annal.* To. 3. *in Mauritius.* (*b*) Paul. Diaco. *lib.* 17. Pſal. 118. 137. (*c*) Polid. *lib.* 23.

not

not Dy'd before it was effected: Whereby it appears how admirable is the effect of Prayer, Humility and Reſignation of Will, to the Will of God, when he do's abſolutely determine to deſtroy a Prince, whoſe Temporal loſs of a Tranſitory State ſubject to all Miſery, is thereby recompenc'd with an incomparable gain of Eternal felicity; whereas by wicked policy he can neither conſerve the one, nor gain the other, but ſhall paſs from one Miſery to another incomparably greater; that is to ſay, from a Temporal Calamity, to unſpeakable and everlaſting Torments.

CHAP. IX.

A Confutation of Machiavels *Impudent and Impious Calumniation of the Holy Prophets and Princes,* Moyſes *and* David; *whom he makes Patterns of Cruelty and Tyranny; whereas they were true Mirrours of Juſtice, Piety, Vertue, and all Princely Perfection; laſtly, certain concluſions are drawn out of the whole Treatiſe.*

IN the precedent Chapter I propos'd Holy *David* for a pattern to Princes in their Calamities, as alſo I have elſewhere done the like upon other occaſions, in reſpect of his excellent Vertues; and therefore, foraſmuch as *Machiavel* do's moſt Impudently and Impiouſly Calumniate not only him, but alſo *Moyſes*, propoſing 'em to his Tyrant for Examples to move him to Cruelty and Impiety; I think good in this laſt Chapter, as well to clear 'em from that Imputation, as alſo to make it evident, that they were, as I may ſay, the perfect Models, by which all Wiſe and Vertuous Princes ought to frame their Lives and Actions, for the benefit of their Subjects, and their own Honor and Security.

2. Firſt

2. Firſt then concerning *Moyſes*, whereas *Machiavel* affirms, that the Wiſe and Attentive Reader of Scripture, will eaſily perceive, that *Moyſes* did Eſtabliſh his Dominion with infinite Slaughters of Men; the contrary of which is ſo evident in Scripture, that any Man cannot but wonder at the Monſtrous Impudency of *Machiavel* in abuſing the ſame, ſeeing that it teſtifies expreſly of *Moyſes* that he was, (*a*) *The Meekeſt Man, above all that then Liv'd upon the Earth*; which may alſo be prov'd by ſo many Examples throu'out the whole courſe of his Government; that whoſoever Reads the ſame, if he be Wiſe and Attentive, will not ſay as *Machiavel* do's; but thô he ſhou'd be never ſo ſimple or ſupinely negligent in noteing what he Reads, yet he will not be of *Machiavels* Opinion, but will ſee that *Moyſes* was as free from all Vice, Ambition and Tyranny, as *Machiavel* was from Vertue, Piety and Truth.

3. For *Moyſes* did not only thrice refuſe the Government of the people, when offer'd him by Almighty God himſelf; but alſo having accepted it out of Obedience only, and not out of Ambition, did ſo manage it, that he ſhew'd himſelf no leſs Prudent, Juſt and Valiant, than Religious and Pious; and being by Office not only a King, but alſo a Prieſt, he did ſo perfectly joyn the Contemplative Life with the Active, that he fully diſcharg'd his Duty in both, as Saint *Gregory* well obſerv'd, in theſe

(*a*) *Num.* 12 3.

words. (*a*) *Moyſes*, ſays he, *do's often go in and out of the Tabernacle; and as within he is raviſh'd with Contemplation, ſo abroad he is preſs'd with the affairs and buſineſs of the weak; within, he conſiders the ſecrets of God; abroad, he bears the burthens of Carnal Men; alſo in all doubtful matters he has recourſe to the Tabernacle, and Conſults with God before the Ark of the Teſtament; giving an excellent Example to all Governors, that when they have any doubt how to diſpoſe of Forraign Affairs, they may retire within themſelves, as 'twere, into the Tabernacle, and Conſult with our Lord, as before the Ark of the Teſtament.*

4. But to come to the point of *Machiavels* Calumniation, touching the many Slaughters and Murders committed by *Moyſes*; what other cou'd they be which *Machiavel* means, but the Death of thoſe twenty-three thouſand Men, who were Kill'd by the Commandment of *Moyſes* for Adoring the Golden Calf? (*b*) Wherein 'tis evident by the teſtimony of the Holy Scripture, that *Moyſes* did not intend either the Revenge of any injury done to himſelf, or the carrying on of any Ambitious deſign, or deſire of his own, but the ſatisfaction of God's Juſtice, ſhewing himſelf therein to be no leſs Pious, than prudent, in ſeeking by the puniſhment of ſome, to avert the Wrath of God from the reſt of the people; and to deliver 'em from utter ſubverſion and ruin, which God had threaten'd 'em, and they juſtly deſerv'd for their horrible Ingratitude and Idolatry.

(*a*) *Greg. de paſt. cura par. ca. 5.* (*b*) Exod. 32. 6.

5. And

5. And this, I ſay, *Moyſes* endavor'd to procure, partly by the execution of Juſtice upon ſome, and partly by his Prayers to Almighty God for the reſt; but by what manner of Prayer did he do this? Truly, by ſuch as cannot but move us to wonder, at the great exceſs of his Charity; (*a*) *O Lord*, ſays he, *either forgive them this fault, or if thou do'ſt not, blot me out of the Book thou haſt Written.* O admirable Prayer! O ſtupendious Charity, and Love of a Prince towards his Subjects! Whoſe Salvation he ſo much deſir'd, that he did not deſire to be Sav'd himſelf, if they periſh'd. Whereupon Saint *Chryſoſtom* ſays, (*b*) Moyſes *Lov'd ſo many thouſands of Men, more than a Father Loves his Children; for there was never yet any Father, that deſir'd to periſh for his Children; eſpecially not having himſelf any way offended.*

6. But of this fact of *Moyſes* Saint *Gregory* Diſcourſes excellently well. (*b*) *Moyſes*, ſays he, *ſo Lov'd 'em, whom he Govern'd, that for them he ſpar'd not himſelf, and yet ſo puniſh'd the Offence of thoſe whom he Lov'd, that he wou'd not ſpare 'em, even when God ſpar'd 'em, ſhewing himſelf herein both a wiſe Legate, and an admirable Mediator: He pleaded the Peoples Cauſe with God by Prayer, and God's Cauſe with the People by the Sword; for Loveing 'em interiorly, he temper'd God's Wrath by his Prayers for 'em; and uſing ſeverity outwardly, he expiated their Offence by puniſhing 'em; and therefore Almighty God did the ſooner hear him, Praying for*

(*a*) Exod. 32. 32. (*b*) *S. Chryſoſt. de Divina Provid. lib.* 3. (*c*) *S. Greg. in c.* 38. *Iob. lib.* 20. *c.* 8.

the

the People, becauſe he ſaw that he wou'd execute juſtice, as well as ask mercy for 'em; ſo that Moyſes *temper'd his Government in ſuch ſort, that there neither wanted Diſcipline nor Correction in his Mercy, nor Mercy in his Diſcipline.*

7. But how great the Charity and Love of *Moyſes* was towards the people, and his Authority with Almighty God; may ſufficiently appear, by his ſo tying the Hands of God's Juſtice, as I may ſay, that they cou'd not take revenge upon the people; for when God requeſted him, that he wou'd ſuffer him utterly to aboliſh and extinguiſh 'em, and promis'd him alſo greater Dignities and Honors, the better to move him thereunto; yet neither their ingratitude towards himſelf, nor the hope of greater Dignity and Dominion, nor yet the Authority of God's requeſt, cou'd induce him to abandon 'em. (*a*) *Suffer me*, ſays Almighty God, *to extend my Wrath upon 'em, that I may extinguiſh 'em, and I will make thee Prince of a great Nation*; but what did *Moyſes* do? *He Pray'd unto his Lord God, and left not off Praying till our Lord was paciſi'd.*

8. This did *Moyſes* not only when the peop'e offended God, but alſo when they Rebell'd and Conſpir'd againſt himſelf; for thô his Zeal to God's Honor and Service, was ſuch, that he wou'd not ſuffer their Offences to God, to paſs unpuniſh'd, yet he ſuffer'd with a great deal of patience their injuries done to himſelf; inſomuch that when Almighty God Reveng'd his Cauſe

(*a*) Exod. *ubi ſup.*

upon

upon 'em, and puniſh'd 'em for the ſame, he ſought to pacifie his Divine Majeſty towards 'em, by all the means he was able. As when upon the return of the Spy's from the Land of *Chanaan*, the ungrateful and inconſiderate people diſtruſting God's Oracles and Promiſes, not only Murmur'd againſt *Moyſes* and *Aaron*, but alſo reſolv'd to return to *Ægypt*, and to chooſe another Captain Governor to conduct 'em thither; Almighty God ſayd unto *Moyſes*, (*a*) *I will ſtrike this People with a Peſtilence, and deſtroy them*; but *Moyſes* inſtantly crav'd pardon of God for 'em, and never ceas'd till God Anſwer'd him; *I have forgotten 'em according to thy word.* (*b*)

9. Moreover, when *Core* and his Fellows, pretending to make a Rebellion, incens'd the people againſt him and *Aaron*, by railing againſt 'em, and reviling 'em moſt opprobriouſly; he neither deſir'd the Death, nor the puniſhment of any of 'em, but complaining only of their ingratitude towards him, and calling God to witneſs, that he had neither taken ſo much as an Aſs from any of 'em, nor done 'em the leaſt wrong or injury in the World, he left the matter to God's Judgment and Determination, ſaying, (*c*) *To Morrow God will make it known who belong to him, and whoſoever he ſhall chooſe, he ſhall be Holy*; and when the manifeſt Plague and puniſhment of God fell upon 'em, the Earth open'd, and ſwallow'd up the chief Conſpirators, together with their Aſſociat's, yet nevertheleſs the Sedition,

(*a*) Num. 14. 12. (*b*) Num. 14. 20. (*c*) Num. 16. 5.

and

and Tumult of the people increas'd the Day following in ſuch a manner, that *Moyſes* and *Aaron* were fain to Fly to the Tabernacle, Almighty God biding 'em depart from amidſt the people; becauſe he wou'd now utterly deſtroy them with Fire, which already began to conſume 'em.

10. But *Moyſes* was ſo far from ſeeking Revenge for their ingratitude, that he not only lay ſtill proſtrate upon the Earth, Praying to Almighty God for 'em, but alſo caus'd *Aaron* to take the Cenſors, and offer Incenſe for the Remiſſion of their Sins, whereby the Fire ceas'd. And finally, when God puniſh'd 'em alſo afterwards with Firy Serpents, for Murmuring againſt *Moyſes*, he obtain'd for 'em a remedy and releaſe of their puniſhment. (*a*) Moyſes *Pray'd*, ſays the Scripture, *for the People, and God ſayd unto him, make a Brazen Serpent, and ſet it up for a Sign, and whoſoever, that is ſtrucken, ſhall behold it, ſhall Live.*

11. I omit many other manifeſt Examples and Arguments of *Moyſes's* great Piety, Charity and Love towards the people, ſince theſe are ſufficient to ſhew the impiety and abſurdity of *Machiavel*, in charging him with Cruelty and Tyranny; whereas 'tis moſt evident, that he being the true Type and Figure of our Saviour himſelf, (*b*) was not only moſt Humble and Meek, but alſo adorn'd with all other Vertue, and with far greater priviledges of Nature and Grace, than ever any Man had beſides himſelf; for he was a

(*a*) Num. 21. 7. 8. (*b*) Heb. 3. *S. Aug. Ser.* 49. *de Verbis Domini.*

Supream

Supream and Soveraign Prince, as well Eccleſiaſtical as Temporal; a moſt Famous and Worthy Law-maker; and a moſt Valiant and Invincible Captain in War; no leſs admirable for his Supernatural and Miraculous Works, than renown'd for his Natural Gifts of Valour, Wiſdom, and all kind of Knowledge, both Human and Divine; being not only an excellent Poët, and the Ancient'ſt for ought we know, that ever Writ, but alſo an eminent Philoſopher, a profound Divine, as Saint *Auſtin* calls him, (*a*) and as *Philo* ſays, a moſt skilful Phyſician of Souls: Finally, he was a moſt Divine Prophet; ſo grateful and acceptable to Almighty God, that he Convers'd with him, *Face to Face*, and ſaw God, ſays the Scripture; (*b*) *Manifeſtly and not by Figures, or Repreſentations*, as other Prophets did.

12. In which reſpect the Holy Ghoſt ſays worthily of him in *Eccleſiaſticus*, (*c*) Moyſes *was Belov'd of God and Man, whoſe Memory is Bleſs'd; God made him like to his Saints in Glory, and Magnifi'd him in the fear of his Enemies, and tam'd Monſters by his words; he glorifi'd him in the ſight of Kings and commended him in the Preſence of his People, and ſhew'd him his Glory; he made him Holy in Faith and Meekneſs, and choſe him out of all Fleſh.* This teſtimony the Holy Scripture gives of *Moyſes*; whereby it may appear how free he was from that Ambition, Tyranny and Cruelty, which *Machiavel* moſt wickedly imputes unto him.

(*a*) *S. Aug. de Civit. lib.* 18. *ca.* 37. (*b*) Num. 12. 8. (*c*) Eccleſi. 45. 1. 2, 3.

13. Who

13. Who is no leſs falſe and impious in his Fiction of the like Cruelty and Tyranny in the Holy King *David*, whom he is not aſham'd to compare and couple with the wicked King *Philip* of *Macedon*, for Tyrannical Government: And the better to cover his abſurd Ly with ſome ſhew of Scripture, he fooliſhly applys to him that which the Bleſſed Virgin *Mary* ſayd of Almighty God himſelf, that (*a*) *He fill'd the Hungry with good things, and ſent the Rich away empty*; and whereas the Holy Scripture teſtifies of *David*, that (*b*) *God ſought a Man for himſelf, according to his Heart:* And that *David* (*c*) *Had God always before his Eyes*; that (*d*) *He Lov'd the Commandments of God above Gold and Precious Stones*; that he us'd (*e*) *Twice at Midnight to confeſs the Name of God*; that he (*f*) *Pray'd to God ſeven times in the Day*; that he *Eſteem'd all Human help to be Vain*; (*g*) and therefore repos'd his whole truſt and confidence in Almighty God; (*h*) calling him his Hope, his Rock, his Stay, his Shield, his Buckler, his Refuge.

14. Moreover, he alſo joyn'd the Prudence of the Serpent, with the Simplicity of the Dove, I mean true Reaſon of State, with Religion and Piety, (*i*) ſo that he made a perfect temperature and mixture of 'em both, having recourſe in all occaſions to the Prieſts and Prophets, to underſtand by them God's Holy Will: And when the ſame was not manifeſted unto him by them, he

(*a*) Luc. 1. 53. (*b*) 1 Reg. 13. 14. (*c*) Pſal. 15. 8. (*d*) Pſal. 127. (*e*) Pſal. 118. (*f*) *Ibid.* (*g*) Pſal. 59. (*h*) Pſal. 17. & 143. (*i*) 1 Reg. 22. 22.

made

made uſe not only of his own prudence, but alſo of the advice of his Wiſe Counſellors, yet in ſuch ſort, that he always acknowledg'd as well the direction, as the ſucceſs of all his Conſultation and Actions, to proceed wholly from the Providence and Will of God: (*a*) And ſuch was the reſpect and reverence he bore to God's Prophets, that he punctually obey'd 'em when they either advis'd, admoniſh'd, or reprehended him: (*b*) And when he chanc'd by Human frailty to offend God, his Repentance was ſuch, that he pour'd fourth ſtreams of Tears, (*c*) and as he witneſſes himſelf, with them he waſh'd his Bed, and Water'd his Wine: *I have labor'd*, ſays he, *in my Sorrow, I will Night by Night waſh my Bed with Tears*; (*d*) in another place, *I did Eat Aſhes as Bread, and I mix'd my Drink with Tears.* (*e*)

15. Finally, the Scripture teſtifies of him, that *He did judgment and juſtice to all his People*; (*f*) joyning always Mercy with Juſtice, Lenity with Gravity, and an affable Benignity with Kingly Majeſty; ſhewing himſelf in all occaſions a true Father to his people, in Peace moſt Prudent, in War moſt Valiant and Invincible, in Adverſity Conſtant and Magnanimous, in Proſperity Humble and Meek, in both Fortunes moſt Moderate and Wiſe, a moſt excellent Pſalmiſt, a Divine Prophet, and a moſt Holy, Juſt and Wiſe King; who having Raign'd forty Years, and propagated the bounds of his Kingdom on all ſides, and no

(*a*) 2 Reg. 12. (*b*) 3 Reg. 1. (*c*) Pſal. 118. (*d*) Pſal. 6. (*e*) Pſal. 101. (*f*) 2 Reg. 8.

leſs

leſs piouſly than wiſely diſpos'd of all things, as well concerning God's Service, as his own Temporal State, as the Scripture ſays, (*a*) *He Dy'd in a good Old Age, full of Days, Riches and Glory.*

16. Who now ſees not, the execrable wickedneſs and impudency of *Machiavel*? Who durſt match this moſt Holy and Prudent King, with *Philip* King of *Macedon*; a moſt perfidious Tyrant, and perjur'd Parricide; hateful to God and Man; and therefore worthily Slaughter'd in the end by his own Subjects. And if any Man object unto me the Murther committed by *Davids* Order, upon the perſon of *Vrias*, and his Adultery with *Berſabe*, he is to underſtand, that there's not any Example in all the Holy Scriptures more fit to confute the impious Doctrine of *Machiavel*, or to withdraw Princes from Sin and wickedneſs: Seeing that the grievous penalty due to Sin, and the rigour of God's Juſtice, is moſt manifeſtly diſcover'd therein.

17. For who is ſo wretchleſs in Reading the Hiſtory of *David*, that ſeeing his Sin, he do's not alſo take notice of the rigorous puniſhment thereof, by the untimely Death of his little Son, Dying in the Cradle; (*b*) the Conſpiracy of his Son *Abſalon*, (*c*) who roſe againſt him; and not only took upon him the Kingly Title, but alſo publickly diſhonor'd him in his Wives? (*d*) Wherein the rigour and exactneſs of God's Juſtice may well be obſerv'd, ordaining the puniſhment

(*a*) 1 Paral. 29. (*b*) 2 Reg. 12. (*c*) *Ibid.* c. 15. (*d*) *Chap.* 16.

of

of *David*, correſpondent to his Sin, as the Prophet foretold him, ſaying in the perſon of God; (*a*) *I will take away thy Wives in thy ſight, and I will give 'em to thy Neighbor, and he ſhall Sleep with 'em in the ſight of this Sun. For thou haſt committed thy Sin ſecretly, but I will do this in the ſight of all* Iſrael.

18. Farthermore, there's alſo a pittiful deſcription of his lamentable departure out of *Jeruſalem*, (*b*) when he fled bare foot, bare headed, accompany'd with a mournful Troop; lamenting with Tears, his and their own miſery: Beſides, the contumelious and reproachful Maledictions of *Semei*, (*c*) which he acknowledg'd, as a juſt puniſhment for his Sins, and therefore ſayd to a Soldier who wou'd have reveng'd his quarrel, *Suffer him, to Curſe me according to our Lord's Commandment, if perhaps our Lord may behold my Affliction.* Finally, there's alſo related the Cruel and Bloody Battle, wherein *Abſalon* with twenty thouſand Men, was Slain; and thô *David* had the Victory, yet he was ſo far from rejoycing or triumphing at it, that he lamentably bewail'd the Death of his wicked Son and Enemy *Abſalon*; thinking himſelf more miſerable by his Victory in having loſt his Son, than if he had himſelf been overcome by him: Now then, were not all theſe miſeries the woful fruits of Sin? And therefore whoſoever ſhall duly conſider the ſame, he muſt needs deteſt the impious and abſurd Doctrine of *Machiavel*, teaching that impiety may be profitable to a Prince.

(*a*) 2 Reg. 16. (*b*) *Chap.* 15. (*c*) *Ibid.*

19. But if any Man will be ſo inconſiderate, as for this cauſe to number *David* amongſt wicked Princes, or to make him, as *Machiavel* do's, a pattern for a Tyrant, he is to underſtand, that this worthy Kings fall and infirmity in this point, is ſo far from ſtaining or obſcuring the light of his Holy Life, that not unlike to a Shadow in a Picture, or a little Mole in a Beautiful Face, it makes it more Glorious; and a true Mirrour wherein Princes may ſee, not only the neceſſity of Vertue, and God's Benediction for the Conſervation of their States; and the unſpeakable dammage that happens thereunto by Sin and Wickedneſs; but alſo the means how to remedy their Errors committed by Human frailty: And laſtly, how neceſſary it is for 'em, always to remember and fear, as well their own infirmity, as the rigour of God's Juſtice in the puniſhment of Sin.

20. Therefore let all Kings and Princes, be they good or bad, contemplate and behold the exemplar Life of this Holy King; if good, let 'em imitate his Religion, Piety, Juſtice, Valour, and other Vertues, that they may become better; and withal conſidering their own infirmity, may ever fear a fall, and labor to prevent it: If bad, and fallen, that they may riſe again; and as they have Sinn'd with him, ſo they may alſo with him acknowledge, and bewaile their Sin; for many Princes follow *David* in Sinning, and not in Repenting. Whereupon Saint *Ambroſe* ſays excellently well; (*a*) David *Sinn'd, as Kings are*

(*a*) *D. Ambroſ. 1. Apolog. ca. 4.*

wont

wont to do, but he did Penance, Wept and Mourn'd for it, which Kings are not accuſtom'd to perform.

21. Moreover, let Princes learn by him, to prefer as he did, the common good of their Subjects, before their own particular; who when he ſaw his Subjects ſtrucken by the Angel for his Sins, exclaim'd, ſaying to Almighty God; (*a*) *'Tis I O Lord, that have Sinn'd, theſe who are only my Sheep, what have they done? I beſeech thee, let thy Hand be turn'd towards me, and the Houſe of my Father.* (*b*)

22. Alſo let 'em learn by him that their Empires, Kingdoms and States, do not ſtand by their own Force or Strength, or by Human Counſel and Wiſdom, but by God's protection; neither yet do they depend on their own Wills and pleaſures, but on the Holy Will and Providence of Almighty God; which is evident in the Holy Scripture throu'out the whole courſe of his Reign.

23. Let 'em learn, that their Piety, Juſtice and a Vertuous Life, will be a means to avert God's Wrath as well from their Children and Poſterity, as from themſelves; ſeeing that Almighty God for *Davids* (*c*) ſake, forbore to execute the rigour of his Juſtice, not only upon *Salomon* (*d*) his Son, but alſo many Years after, upon the Kings *Joram* and *Ezechias.* (*e*)

24. Let 'em learn, that Sin is the moſt dangerous, peſtilent and mortal diſeaſe of Kings and

(*a*) 2 Reg. 24. (*b*) Pſal. 32. 75 143. (*c*) 3 Reg. 11. 2. (*d*) Paral. 21. 4. (*e*) Reg. 29.

their Kingdoms, and the very Fountain from which their Miſeries and Calamities do flow; (*a*) and that therefore they have great cauſe to fear the ſeverity of God's Judgments, whereby the penalty of their Sins may be extended to their Iſſue, and whole Poſterity; as the Sin of *David* was, according to the Prediction of the Prophet *Nathan*; who foretold him, (*b*) *That the Sword ſhou'd never go out of his Houſe*, for the Murther of *Vrias*, and his Adultery with *Berſabe*.

25. Moreover, let 'em know that they cannot with reaſon expect that their Subjects, Servants, Friends, Kinsfolks or Children, ſhou'd be Faithful and Loyal to them; if they be Faithleſs, Ungrateful, and become Traytors to their Lord and God; ſeeing that Juſtice and Reaſon requires, that the puniſhment be anſwerable to the fault; and therefore, that the diſloyalty of Creatures towards their Creator, ſhou'd be puniſh'd with the Treachery and Ingratitude of ſuch as are ſubject to them: Whereby it happens, that there are ſo many *Abſalons* as we Daily ſee, I mean, ſo many Unnatural and Rebellious Children; ſuch perfidious Treacheries of Domeſtical Servants; and ſuch dangerous Conſpiracies of Subjects againſt their Princes.

26. Finally, ſeeing that the Infirmity of this Holy King being weighed in the moſt equal Ballance of God's Juſtice, deſerv'd ſo great a puniſhment as has been before declar'd; what do's the Impiety and Malice of *Machiavellian*

(*a*) Pſal. 2. 10, 36. & 75. (*b*) 2 Reg. 12.

Tyrants

Tyrants deſerve, I mean their extream Contempt of God, their horrible Frauds and Deceit's, Perjuries, Whoredoms, Murthers, and all kind of Miſchief and Wickedneſs, which makes 'em odious both to God and Man; what elſe, I ſay, do's the ſame deſerve, but what the Pſalmiſt threatens in God's Name; (*a*) *It ſhall Rain Ropes and Halters upon Sinners, Fire, Brimſtone, and the Spirit of Storms and Tempeſts, ſhall be their Part or Portion.* This therefore ſhall ſuffice for the preſent concerning *Moyſes* and *David*, of whom I might, and wou'd have ſayd much more, but that I ſhall have juſt occaſion to do it afterwards; and therefore I will here only draw certain concluſions from what I have hitherto ſayd.

27. The firſt is, that ſeeing Almighty God Governs all States by his Providence, and diſpoſes of 'em, as it pleaſes him, as I have fully prov'd, it muſt needs follow, that thô ſometimes out of his ſecret Judgments, he permits wicked policies to proſper, yet conſidering the ſeverity of his Juſtice in puniſhing Princes and their States for Sin, and ſometimes for very ſmall Sins, in the Opinion of Men, as I have ſhew'd in my Rules for Young Statiſts; (*b*) therefore I ſay, no wicked Policy can ſtand with true Reaſon of State; the danger of God's indignation being ſo great, that no Man can be truly counted Wiſe, who will venture to preſume thereupon; no more than any one might be ſayd to

(*a*) Pſal. 10. 7. (*b*) Tom. 2. *ch.* 3. *num.* 4.

do wiſely, who for his particular benefit ſhou'd uſe to Rob and Steal in a well Govern'd Common-wealth, where he ſhou'd as often incur the danger of the Law, thô perhaps he ſhou'd many times eſcape the ſame. Wherein nevertheleſs this difference is to be noted, that whereas Men do ſometimes avoid the penalties of Laws; yet no Man can eſcape the Hand of God, if he offend him; but he muſt pay the penalty of his Sin ſome way or other, ſooner or later, and ſo much the more grievouſly, by how much longer 'tis deferr'd; and moſt of all, if the whole puniſhment thereof be totally reſerv'd to the next Life, which nevertheleſs is ſeldom ſeen in Tyrants and wicked Princes, as appears by what I have ſayd before. (*a*)

28. The ſecond concluſion ſhall be, that ſeeing I have alſo evidently prov'd throu'out this whole Diſcourſe, that Man of his own nature is ſo infirm and weak both of Wit and Power, that he neither knows many times what is convenient for himſelf, and much leſs for others; nor yet can warrant the ſucceſs of his own deſigns and wiſeſt policies, by reaſon of the infinite accidents, croſſes, and diſappointments whereunto Mans Life, and all Human Affairs are ſubject. Moreover, I have alſo made it manifeſt by reaſon, and examples, not only that all Political Science is of it ſelf inſufficient, for the perfect Government of State; but alſo, that all true Wiſdom

(*a*) Tom. 2, *chap.* 6. 7.

and

and Policy is from God; therefore it cannot be deny'd, but that the aſſiſtance of God's Grace and Protection, is moſt neceſſary for the good Government and aſſurance of all Princes States; whereupon alſo follows the neceſſity of true Religion for the Conſervation of any State; ſeeing God do's by means thereof, moſt amply Communicate his Grace and Favor, as well to whole Common-wealths, as to particular Men; of which I ſhall farther Diſcourſe, and more fully prove hereafter, where I am purpoſely to handle that matter; and ſhew as well the Dignity and neceſſity of true Religion in the Common-wealth, as alſo that the Catholick Religion, is moſt convenient for the State.

29. The third and laſt concluſion ſhall be, that all Wiſdom or Policy grounded on Sin and wickedneſs, is meer folly, which may appear by that which I have taught and prov'd, as well concerning the puniſhment of God upon Princes and their States for Sin, as alſo touching true Wiſdom and Policy; whereof I have before particularly and amply treated, and clearly prov'd, (*a*) that it conſiſts principally in the Fear, Love and Service of God; and that no Man can poſſibly attain to any Perfection of Wiſdom, without the Light of God's Grace, whereby Mans natural abilities are increas'd and perfected, and his defects ſupply'd, (*b*) and that according to the Doctrine of the beſt Philoſophers, as well as our Divines, true Prudence and Vertue can-

(*a*) Tom. 1. *cha.* 28. *nu.* 7, 8. 9. 10. *&c.* (*b*) *Ibid. nu.* 17. 18. 19. 20. *&c.*

not be ſeparated; and that 'tis moſt requiſite to every prudent Action, that not only the end thereof, and the means to obtain the end, be good and vertuous; (*a*) but alſo that every good thing be eſteem'd in the degree it deſerves, and the chief good of all, which is God and his Service, be preferr'd before all other things whatſoever. (*b*) And finally, that 'tis the ſpecial Office of a Wiſe Man, moſt to eſteem and ſeek, that which moſt imports him; which is the Salvation of his Soul, and his Eternal good; becauſe as the Scripture ſays, (*c*) *The Wiſe Man is Wiſe for his Soul.* Whereupon it follows, that he who prefers tranſitory things, before thoſe that are ſtable and permanent; and loſes or ventures his Soul for any Worldly commodity or pleaſure whatſoever, is no wiſer than *Eſau*, (*d*) who Sold his Birthright, for a Meſs of Pottage; or *Æſops* Cock, that eſteem'd a Barly Corn, more than a Precious Stone; or the Fool, who, as the Proverb ſays, *Will not give his* Babel *for the Tower of* London; and therefore ſuch as value Honor, Riches, or other Worldly Commodities above Vertue, are worthily compar'd by *Ariſtotle* to Children, that eſteem their Babies and Puppets more than Gold; and *Seneca* (*e*) accounts 'em more fooliſh than Children, becauſe Children, ſays he, play the Fools in trifles, and matters of ſmall moment, in which there is no danger; whereas theſe other are ſeriouſly fooliſh, or rather Mad in

(*a*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 28. *nu* 12. 13. 14. (*b*) *Ibid. nu.* 15.
(*c*) *Ibid. nu.* 32. (*d*) Geneſ. *ca.* 25. (*e*) *Seneca ep.* 98.

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matters no leſs weighty than dangerous, as well to themſelves, as to others; and therefore, ſays he, *Verius, cariuſque inſaniunt*; *They are more truly and coſtly Mad.* (*a*) For it coſts 'em many times not only their Reputation and Honor; States and Lives, but even both Bodies and Souls.

30. So that they may ſay and exclaime with *Lyſimachus*, (*b*) when being Beſieg'd and vex'd with Thirſt, who yielded himſelf Priſoner, and gave his Kingdom for a Draught of Water, which having Drunk, cry'd out; *O for how ſmall and ſhort a Pleaſure have I loſt a Kingdom!* Thus they may ſay with more reaſon, who change not one frail, and earthly thing, for another as he did, but Heavenly things for Earthly; Divine for Human; Eternal for Tranſitory; which admit no compariſon. Moreover, they ſhew themſelves to be no better, nor wiſer then brute Beaſts, which are led by Senſe only, and vehemently mov'd by preſent Objects, without Diſcourſe and Conſideration of future things, or of the end which is chiefly to be conſider'd by Man, to whom Nature hath given Reaſon to Diſcourſe and Judge, not only of things preſent or paſt, but alſo of things to come; and eſpecially of the laſt end of all Human Actions, wherein conſiſts his Eternal felicity or miſery. And therefore *Moyſes* partly lamenting, and partly reprehending the abſurd folly of ſuch kind of Men ſays, (*c*) *Theſe are a People without Counſel and Prudence,*

(*a*) *Ibidem.* (*b*) *Plutarch in Apopotheg. regum & principum.* (*c*) Deut. 32. 28. 29.

I wou'd to God they wou'd be wiſe, and underſtand, and foreſee or provide for their laſt end.

31. Farthermore, how can theſe be counted truly Wiſe, whoſe Wiſdom conſiſts in perverting the whole courſe and order of Nature, and contradicting the principles and grounds of reaſon: For what is more conformable to Nature, or more evident in reaſon, than that the Soul excell's the Body, as Heaven do's Earth; and therefore, that the Goods and Gifts of the Mind, ought to be preferr'd before thoſe of the Body; Heavenly things before Earthly; Reaſon before Senſuality; the Publick good before any Mans Particular; Eternal felicity before Temporal pleaſure or commodity; and the Service and Glory of God, before all things elſe whatſoever; all which Nature ordains, Reaſon perſuades, Philoſophy, and all Learning teaches, the conſent of the World confirm's, and Mans own Conſcience within himſelf, proclaimes to be True. Nevertheleſs the Politicians, and *Matchiavellians* have found out a kind of Wiſdom, and Policy, which they call Reaſon of State, contradicting all this; preferring the Body before the Soul, Earth before Heaven, Human things before Divine, Senſuality before Reaſon, and the Particular Pleaſure of the Prince, before the General Good of the Common-wealth, Temporal Commodities before Eternal Felicity, and laſtly whatſoever ſeem's to their corrupt Judgments to be according to Reaſon of State, the ſame they prefer before Conſcience, Religion, and the Service of God; as thô there were either

no

no God to call 'em to an Account, or that he had nothing to do with 'em, or with the Affairs of Men. So that to make their Wiſdom true Wiſdom; their Policy good Policy; their Reaſon of State, good Reaſon; and themſelves Wiſe Men; the whole courſe, and order of Nature muſt be chang'd, and all things turn'd upſide down: The Soul muſt be made ſubject to the Body; Heaven to Earth; Reaſon to Senſuality; the Common good to a Private Advantage, and Temporal Goods to Eternal: And laſtly, we muſt have a new Syſteme of Nature, and either another God, or no God at all, or at leaſt ſuch a one, as ſhall have no Providence or care over the Affairs of Men.

32. What wonder is it then, that this kind of Wiſdom and Policy overthrow's Princes, Subverts their States, and fill's the World with Miſeries and Calamities? In which reſpect the Scripture call's it. (*a*) *The Fooliſh VViſdom of this VVorld*, and the profeſſors thereof Fools, as I have before ſufficiently ſhew'd, (*b*) where I convinc'd Atheiſts of Ignorance and Folly, whereunto for the concluſion of this Point, and of this Diſcourſe, I will here add, what the Holy Ghoſt teſtifies in the Book of Wiſdom, concerning as well the Miſery, as the Folly of theſe kind of Wiſe Worldlings, and what they ſhall then ſay one to another, when they ſhall ſee at the Day of Judgment themſelves con-

(*a*) 1 Cor. 1. 20. Rom. 1. 22. Pſal. 52. & 91. & 93. Matth. 7. 26. (*b*) Tom. 1. *ch.* 23. *nu.* 19. 20.

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demn'd to Eternal Torments, and the Servants of God Rewarded with Everlaſting Glory.

33. *We Men without Senſe, and underſtanding, eſteeem'd the Life of theſe, that is of the Juſt, to be madneſs, and their End without Honor, and behold how they are now reckon'd amongſt the Children of God, and their Lot is amongſt the Saints. Therefore we have err'd from the way of Truth, and the Light of his Juſtice has not ſhin'd upon us, neither has the Sun of underſtanding Riſen unto us; we have weary'd our ſelves in the way of Iniquity, and Perdition, and have walk'd difficult ways, and have not known the way of our Lord. What has our Pride profited us; or what benefit has the Oſtentation of our Riches been unto us? All which is now paſt away like a Shadow, like one that Run's Poſt, like a Ship under Sail, like a Bird that Fly's, like an Arrow Shot at a Mark, of whoſe paſſage there remains no Sign: In like manner we were Born and preſently ceas'd to be, and have not left behind us any Sign of Vertue, but are conſum'd, and ſpent in our one malignity and wickedneſs:* Thus do's the Holy Ghoſt deſcribe the Miſerable and Lamentable State of the Worldly Wiſe, and all other Wicked Men, at the Day of Judgment: Which I wiſh every Man wou'd conſider betimes, leſt he Repent too late amongſt thoſe, who ſhall make this pittiful complaint without hope or poſſibility of any remedy.

34. This therefore ſhall ſuffice at preſent, and if in what I have already ſayd, my Dear

(a) Sap. 5. *ver.* 4. 5. 6. *&c.*

Reader,

Reader, thou find any thing that contents thee, I beſeech thee give the Praiſe, and Honor thereof to Almighty God, (*a*) *From whom every Good and Perfect Gift proceeds*; and if there be any thing thou diſlikeſt, I am content to own my fault, and beg of thee to bear and pardon it, and to let it paſs for an Example of the Weakneſs and Infirmity of Mans Wit, which I have prov'd by ſo many other Examples of the Errors of very Wiſe and Learned Men, that I cannot preſume to warrant my own Actions or Writings from Errors and Overſights: Only this I aſſure thee, that I have not Maliciouſly Err'd in any thing, but throu'out this whole Diſcourſe, have had a Charitable deſire of thy good; and as I hope, a true Zeal of God's Glory; which all Men ought to make the cheif Scope, and End of their Actions: And if I find that this be grateful to thee, I will for thy farther ſatisfaction proceed in my undertaking, with ſuch ſpeed, as my Decay'd Health, and other Affairs, ſhall permit.

(*a*) Iac. 1.

FINIS.

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